The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have held that driving under the influence, and other offenses where injury may be caused through negligence, do not come within the definition of crime of violence under 18 USC 16.   Under these rulings, the offense will not be an aggravated felony even a sentence of a 365 days or more is imposed.  Leocal v Ashcroft, 125 S.Ct. 377 (2004); Montiel-Barraza v INS, 275 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2002).

Singh v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 2004) (Oregon Revised Statute 166.065(1)(a)(A), punishing intentionally harassing or annoying another person by subjecting that person to offensive physical contact is not a crime of violence, and therefore not a crime of domestic violence for immigration purposes, since the force required to commit the offense, including spitting, is not necessarily "violent" force).

United States v. Sarbia, 367 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. May 14, 2004) (in defining "crime of violence" per U.S.S.G. 4B1.2, there is not difference between commission and attempted commission of an offense).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0310276p.pdf

The Senate is considering expanding the definition of "crime of violence" contained in 18 U.S.C. 16 to include a felony offense that presents the inherent risk of injury to person or property.  This might make offenses such as drunk driving or negligent child endangerment into crimes of violence, and therefore aggravated felonies, if a sentence of a year or more is imposed.

     If charged with committing a domestic violence offense, check to see whether a conviction may be sustained under the convicting statute by mere offensive touching. Such offensive touching is arguably not a crime of violence, a domestic violence offense, or a crime involving moral turpitude. Check the minimum elements required to sustain a conviction by looking to the criminal jury instructions and relevant caselaw, and then check the record of conviction in your clients case to determine whether your client specifically plead to a violent offense.

Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. November 26, 2003) (Indiana conviction of misdemeanor battery, in violation of Ind.Code 35-42-2-1, which may be based on any touching, however slight, done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, in which any bodily injury, however minor does not constitute a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 16(a), since the elements do not include a sufficiently violent act where there is no intent to injure, merely an intent to touch, required). "Section 16(a) refers to the "use of physical force".

United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2003) (reversing district court to hold the Colorado DUI conviction is not a crime of violence); Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that conviction under Connecticut assault statute is not a crime of violence); Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. Nov. 26, 2003) (reversing BIA to find that noncitizen convicted under Indiana battery statute was not deportable for having a crime of domestic violence). But cf. Matter of Martin, 23 I. & N. Dec.

Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. November 26, 2003) (as no power to interpret 18 U.S.C. 16, a criminal statute, has been delegated to the Attorney General, BIA cases interpreting that statute have only persuasive force).

United States v. Venegas-Onelas, 348 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. November 14, 2003) ("Force, as used in the definition of a crime of violence, is synonymous with destructive or violent force. United States v. Landeros-Gonzales, 262 F.3d 424, 426 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Guzman, 56 F.3d 18, 20 n. 8 (5th Cir.1995); see also Lucio-Lucio, 2003 WL 22436260, at *2 (explaining that 16(b) calls to mind active violence) (quotation omitted); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 611 (7th Cir.2001) ([W]e found the term 'physical force' in 18 U.S.C.

California conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, or by force likely to produce great bodily injury, in violation of Penal Code 245(a)(1), is arguably not a crime of violence aggravated felony because California law allows conviction for "negligent assault." People v. Wright, 100 Cal.App.4th 703, 710-724 (2002). Conviction of this offense, therefore, cannot constitute a crime of violence under Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S.Ct. 377, 382 (2004), which held that the mens rea necessary for a crime of violence aggravated felony must be more than mere negligence.