Bejarano-Urrutia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___ (4th Cir. July 5, 2005) (Virginia conviction for simple involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-36 (2004), which requires the killing of a person as a proximate result of the defendant's reckless disregard for human life, did not constitute a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Perez-Vargas, ___ F.3d ___ (10th Cir. 2005) (Colorado conviction for third-degree assault, "knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another person or with criminal negligence he causes bodily injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon," in violation of C.R.S.

Tran v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1620320 (3d Cir. July 12, 2005) (Pennsylvania conviction of "reckless burning or exploding," in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. 3301(d)(2), did not constitute a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and was therefore not an aggravated felony crime of violence under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes of removal, since the crime required only a reckless mens rea, and involved no risk that the defendant would intentionally use force in the commission of the crime).

Popal v. Gonzalez, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 1791998 (3d Cir. July 29, 2005) (simple assault (reckless), in violation of Pennsylvania Penal Code 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2701, is not an aggravated felony crime of violence for immigration purposes, since a mens rea of recklessness is insufficient to qualify as a crime of violence). Following Tran v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 1620320 (3d Cir. July 12, 2005).

Leocal v. Ashcroft, ___ U.S. ___, 160 L. Ed. 2d 271, 125 S. Ct. 377 (2004) (state statute of conviction must require at least the same level of scienter as the relevant federal statute in order for the state conviction to constitute an aggravated felony).

In Leocal v. Ashcroft, ___ U.S. ___, 160 L. Ed. 2d 27 (2005), the Supreme Court held that to be a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a) and 16(b), there must be (1) a risk of the use of force (as distinguished from resulting harm) in committing the offense; (2) the offense must be committed in an active manner which cannot encompass merely negligent or accidental conduct; and (3) in addition to being active, the use of force involved must be violent.       Although Leocal v. Ashcroft, ___ U.S. ___, 160 L. Ed.

United States v. Garcia, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. March 11, 2005) (aiding and abetting is not a separate offense from the substantive offenses of alien smuggling and transportation of aliens, but rather a different theory of liability for the same offense).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0450105p.pdf

The ordinary meaning of "alien smuggling" does not include transportation of noncitizens within the United States, but requires a border be crossed. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. ___, 160 L. Ed. 2d 271, 125 S. Ct. 377 (2004) (Supreme Court uses "ordinary meaning" approach to conclude that accidental injury does not fall within ordinary meaning of "crime of violence" aggravated felony definition: "In construing both parts of 16, we cannot forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term crime of violence.

Parrilla v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1606506 (July 11, 2005) (even if Washington offense of communicating with a minor for immoral purposes constituted attempt, within the meaning of the aggravated felony definition, INA 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), the substantive offense did not categorically constitute sexual abuse of a minor, so the presumed attempt likewise did not constitute an aggravated felony).

Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2004) (New York conviction of attempted reckless endangerment in the first degree, in violation of New York Penal Law 120.25, does not constitutes a crime of moral turpitude for deportation purposes, since a person cannot intend to commit a criminally reckless act, and the "crime of attempted reckless endangerment is nonexistent since it is a non-intent offense."), citing People v. Trepanier, 84 A.D.2d 374, 380, 446 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y.App.Div.1982) (affirming the lower court's decision to dismiss the indictment as to this charge).