AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - AGGRAVATED BATTERY

United States v. Treto-Martinez, 421 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. Sept. 7, 2005) (Kansas for aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(C), is a crime of violence for sentencing purposes; "[a]lthough not all physical contact performed in a rude, insulting or angry manner would rise to the level of physical force, we conclude that all intentional physical contact with a deadly weapon done in a rude, insulting or angry manner does constitute physical force under 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)").

jurisdiction: 
Tenth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - VEHICULAR HOMICIDE

Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260 (3rd Cir. Aug. 11, 2005) (vehicular homicide under New Jersey Statutes 2C:11-5, is not a crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. 16, since the statue requires only a reckless intent)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/3rd/034143p.pdf

jurisdiction: 
Third Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - SEXUAL BATTERY ILLEGAL REENTRY- SENTENCING

United States v. Lopez-Montanez, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2005) (sexual battery under California Penal Code 243.4, is not a categorical crime of violence under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, as the offense is not necessarily a "forcible" sex offense under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, cmt. n. 1(B)(ii)). Compare Lisbey v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2005) (sexual battery under California Penal Code 243.4 constitutes an aggravated felony for removal purposes, as the offense involves a substantial risk of physical force under 18 U.S.C. 16(b)).

jurisdiction: 
Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - SEXUAL BATTERY

Lisbey v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2005) (sexual battery under California Penal Code 243.4 constitutes an aggravated felony for removal purposes, as the offense involves a substantial risk of physical force under 18 U.S.C. 16(b)). United States v. Lopez-Montanez, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2005) (sexual battery under California Penal Code 243.4, is not a categorical crime of violence under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, as the offense is not necessarily a "forcible" sex offense under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, cmt. n. 1(B)(ii)).

jurisdiction: 
Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE

United States v. Dominguez-Ochoa, 386 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. Sept. 22, 2004) (Texas conviction of criminally negligent homicide, under Tex. Penal Code 19.05, did not constitute crime of violence aggravated felony under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)(2002), for purposes of a 16-level enhancement of sentence for illegal reentry, since it does not include as an element the intentional "use, attempted use, or threatened use" of force and it is not one of the offenses enumerated in the Guidelines or its equivalent because it does not require the mens rea of recklessness which is required for manslaughter).

jurisdiction: 
Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - GUIDELINES DEFINITION DOES NOT REQUIRE INTENTIONAL USE OF FORCE

The court held that the definition of "crime of violence," as used in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1), does not require the force be used intentionally.      To decide whether Subsection (I) of the guideline definition of crime of violence contains a volitional element, we start with the plain language of the guideline, considering not only its bare meaning, "but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144-45, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995) (internal quotations omitted).

jurisdiction: 
US Supreme Ct

CRIME OF VIOLENCE - INTENT TO TOUCH IS NOT INTENT TO INJURE

Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. November 26, 2003) (state statute that prohibits unlawful intentional touching, but does not require intent to injure, is not necessarily crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a))

jurisdiction: 
Seventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - DISTINCTION BETWEEN USE OF FORCE AND INFLICTION OF INJURY - UNLAWFUL SEX WITH A MINOR

Valencia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 522452 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2006) (California conviction of unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under 18 years of age, who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator, in violation of California Penal Code 261.5(c), for which a sentence of one year had been imposed, is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and therefore not a crime of violence aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

jurisdiction: 
Ninth Circuit

RECORD OF CONVICTION - JUDICIAL NOTICE - AGE OF THE DEFENDANT - PROBABLY NOT A PROPER SUBJECT OF JUDICIAL NOTICE AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR

Valencia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 522452 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2006) (court of appeal declined to take judicial notice of age of defendant in applying modified categorical analysis to California conviction of unlawful sex with person under 18 years, in violation of California Penal Code 261.5(c), to determine whether the record of conviction established a substantial risk that force may be used in committing the offense to bring the conviction within the definition of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b)), withdrawing and replacing 431 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. December 12, 2005).

jurisdiction: 
Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - 18 U.S.C. 16(b) - UNLAWFUL SEX WITH A MINOR - MODIFIED CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS DOES NOT BRING CONVICTION WITHIN AGGRAVATED FELONY DEFINITION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ESTABLISH AGGRAVATING FACTORS, SUCH AS USE OF A THREAT O

Valencia v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 522452 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2006)(California conviction of unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under 18 years of age, who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator, in violation of California Penal Code 261.5(c), is not categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), or an aggravated felony under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C.

jurisdiction: 
Ninth Circuit

 

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