Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2004) (federal conviction of conspiracy constitutes an aggravated felony, under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), triggering deportability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), so long as the substantive offense that is the object of the conspiracy constitutes an aggravated felony under (R), without regard to whether the elements of the conspiracy crime themselves establish a subsection (R) offense).

Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2004) (federal conviction of conspiracy to utter and possess counterfeit securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, 513(a), constitutes an aggravated felony, as "an offense relating to . . . counterfeiting," under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(R), triggering deportability under 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Leiva-Deras, 359 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. Feb. 17, 2004) (sentence following probation violation is included in determining sentence imposed for drug offense.

There is a question whether an Oregon sentence will be considered a sentence imposed of one year or more, for immigration purposes, if the conviction is for a crime of violence, the sentencing court finds a presumptive prison term of 13-14 months with a gridblock of CSS:6/CHS:D, and then sentences the defendant to three years probation with no jail sentence as a dispositional departure.

United States v. Frias, 338 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. July 30, 2003) ("sentence imposed" means the upper limit of an indeterminate sentence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 sentence enhancement in illegal reentry cases).

Garcia-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. June 26, 2003)(California court order reducing a conviction of violating Penal Code § 487.2, grand theft from the person, from a felony with a three-year maximum to a misdemeanor with a maximum no greater than one year, was binding upon the immigration courts for purposes of qualifying the offense under the petty offense exception to inadmissibility for a crime of moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), so the noncitizen was eligible for suspension of deportation).

Neff v. Jackson County, 187 Or. App 402 (2003) (Oregon court held that 366 days is a year in the context of a whistleblower lawsuit filed 366 days after a one-year statute of limitations started to run, holding the lawsuit was timely filed). Thanks to Brian Conry.

Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2004).      In Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 145 at *6-7 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit analysis of "relating to" parentheticals in United States v. Monjaras-Casteneda, 190 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1999).

Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. May 7, 2004) (Pennsylvania conviction of theft by deception, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 3922(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 2000), with an indeterminate sentence from a minimum of six months to a maximum of 23 months, does not trigger removal as an aggravated felony fraud conviction under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), since the loss to the victim was under $10,000, and because it is a hybrid offense, as a theft offense as well as a fraud offense, it must qualify as an aggravated felony under both categories or it does not trigger removal).

ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT - DRUG TRAFFICKING
Olivera-Garcia v. INS, 328 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. May 5, 2003) (federal conviction of offense of manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), constituted an illicit-trafficking "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), was determined by the label in the judgment despite references to accessory after the fact under 18 U.S.C. § 3, for purposes of determining whether Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review removal order).