The Foreign Affairs Manual, 40.21 acknowledges Lujan-Armendariz, and even includes discussion of Nunez-Reyes and provide that it applies to pre-July 14, 2011 convictions only. However, the FAM requests an advisory opinion in each case to sort out "complications." Thanks to Kathy Brady

Overview of the powers of the CBP to search and arrest.
Immigration Policy Center, Feb 23, 2012
http://immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/CBP_Overview_02211...

Immigration counsel should establish the circuit in which the applicant intends to reside, and in addition show that the applicant will cross the border at a port of entry into the circuit containing the intended residence.
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/6503708/200574580/name/FAM_40.21_Notes_on_C...

United States v. Lang, 672 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. Feb. 16, 2012) (federal convictions of making a material false statement to the DHS in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2), and unlawfully applying for and obtaining naturalization and a certificate of naturalization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1425(b), affirmed over objections that admission of N-400 violated defendant's Confrontation Clause rights; and immigration form was inadmissible under public records exception to hearsay rule).

United States v. Camero-Renobato, 670 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012) (affirming illegal reentry sentence to 71 months in prison, against claims that the district court committed a procedural error when it allegedly failed adequately to explain the chosen sentence and imposed a sentence that is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to achieve the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)); distinguishing United States v. Mondragon"Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 363 (5th Cir.

United States v. Camero-Renobato, 670 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012) (per curiam) (Because there is no procedural error, we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. [A] sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir.2006); see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.).

Prejudice For Violation of Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining Can be Shown by Reasonable Probability That the Defendant Would Have Accepted, and the Prosecution and Court Would Have Entered, a More Favorable Plea Bargain

By Norton Tooby

The Supreme Court held that the right of effective assistance of counsel applies in all critical stages of a criminal case, including consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected. In Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (Mar.

Where Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Results in Rejection of a Plea Bargain, Followed by Trial, Prejudice is Shown by Establishing that The Plea Would Have Been Entered and the Conviction or the Sentence Would Have Been More Lenient

By Norton Tooby

The Supreme Court established a prejudice standard where ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining results in rejection of a plea offer, followed by a jury trial, conviction, and sentence over three times longer. In Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (Mar.

Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 1479 (Mar. 29, 2012) (INA 101(a)(13)(C)(v), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), providing that the commission of a criminal offense identified in INA 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2), is an exception to the presumption that a LPR returning from abroad is not seeking admission and is therefore subject to the grounds of inadmissibility, does not apply to criminal offenses committed on or prior to Sept. 30, 1996, the effective date of IIRAIRA).

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (Mar. 21. 2012) (Though the [ineffective assistance] standard for counsel's performance is not determined solely by reference to codified standards of professional practice, these standards can be important guides.).