State v. Alshaif, 2012 WL 540740 (Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2012) (unpublished) (North Carolina applies the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989), to determine "retroactivity for new federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure on state collateral review. State v. Zuniga, 336 N.C. 508, 513, 444 S.E.2d 443, 446 (1994). . . .

State v. Gonzalez, 283 Neb. 1, 807 N.W.2d 759 (Neb. Jan. 13, 2012) (to render effective assistance of counsel, defense counsel must inform his or her client whether a plea carries a risk of deportation).

In Nebraska, the right to withdraw a plea is not absolute, and, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, refusal to allow a defendants withdrawal of a plea will not be disturbed on appeal. Withdrawal of a plea of guilty or no contest after sentence is proper only where the defendant makes a timely motion and establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.

In Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986), 477 U.S. 365, 379, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "the Constitution constrains our ability to allocate as we see fit the costs of ineffective assistance. The Sixth Amendment mandates that the State bear the risk of constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel. (See also Alvernaz v. Ratelle (S.D. Cal. 1993), 831 F.Supp. 790, 798, applying this rule to a California state court case.)

The defendant "is entitled to be put in the position he would have been in had the constitutional error never occurred in the first place . . . .

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that counsels performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced his or her defense. In the context of a plea of guilty or no contest, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must allege facts showing a reasonable probability that he or she would have insisted on going to trial but for counsels errors.

Advice regarding immigration consequences is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), applies to such a claim. See State v. Gonzalez, 283 Neb. 1, 807 N.W.2d 759 (Neb. Jan. 13, 2012), abrogating State v. Zarate, 264 Neb. 690, 65 1N.W.2d 215 (2002). Defense counsel must inform his or her client whether a plea carries a risk of deportation.

LaVigne and Van Rybroek, Breakdown in the Language Zone: The Prevalence of Language Impairments Among Juvenile and Adult Offenders and Why It Matters, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POLICY 37 (2011); Rogers et al., Spanish Translations of Miranda Warnings and Totality of the Circumstances, 33 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 61 (2009); Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda Warnings in American Jurisdictions: A Replication and Vocabulary Analysis, 32 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 124 (2008); Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile Miranda Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB.

In the civil arena, "the party seeking reconsideration must provide not only new evidence but also a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce that evidence at an earlier time. In short, the moving party's burden is the same as that of a party seeking new trial on the ground of 'newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.'" (Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carville (1982), 132 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1013. Accord, Mink v.

People v. Witcraft (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 659 (IAC for failing to move to dismiss a count).

In re Jeffrey H. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1052 (disposition reversed, on grounds juvenile court exceeded its authority in amending the petition over the prosecution's objection).