Peng v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2012) (the seven years continuous presence requirement for lawful permanent residents under INA 212(h) is not impermissibly retroactive when proceedings were begun after the effective date of IIRAIRA).

Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2012) (circuit court has jurisdiction to review a removal order executed against a person claiming to be a United States citizen 8 U.S.C. 1252(a); BIA lacked jurisdiction to remove the petitioner from the country because he was a derivative U.S. citizen).

Pizzuto v. Blades, 673 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2012) (A prisoner's motion to file a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied, where a claim of judicial bias had been dismissed with prejudice in an earlier petition; the petitioner did not show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty; and the petitioner could not show actual innocence of the aggravating factors used to sentence him to death).

Penal Code 1192.5 does not require that the factual basis for a plea be in writing: In sum, we conclude that the trial court must garner information regarding the factual basis either from the defendant or defense counsel. If the trial court examines the defendant regarding the factual basis for the plea, the court may have the defendant describe the conduct that gave rise to the charge (Watts, supra, 67 Cal. App. 3d at p. 179), or may question the defendant regarding the detailed factual basis described in the complaint or written plea agreement. (Montoya-Camacho, supra, 644 F.2d at p.

People v. Tuck (1st Dist. Mar. 27, 2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 724, 730, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 407 (rejecting argument that mandatory registration as a sex offender, under Penal Code 290, can be stricken in the interest of justice under Penal Code 1385: The registration requirement is neither an action, a criminal count, nor a factual allegation. Nor is registration under section 290 considered to be punishment.).

In People v. Tuck (1st Dist. Mar.

A state conviction of being a felon, addict, or undocumented person in possession of a firearm is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, because it is analogous to federal firearms offenses at 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)-(5). However, a conviction of being a felon, addict, or undocumented person who owns, rather than possesses, a firearm is not an aggravated felony. Current California Penal Code 29800, and former 12021(a), prohibit not only possessing but owning a firearm. 18 U.S.C. 922(g) does not prohibit owning a qualifying firearm.

Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 1287 (2009) (Assigned counsel, just as retained counsel, act on behalf of their clients, and delays sought by counsel are ordinarily attributable to the defendants they represent. For a total of some six months of the time that elapsed between Brillon's arrest and his trial, Brillon lacked an attorney. The State may be charged with those months if the gaps resulted from the trial court's failure to appoint replacement counsel with dispatch. Similarly, the State may bear responsibility if there is a breakdown in the public defender system.).

New INA 216(g), Pub.L. 112-58, Nov. 23, 2011, 125 Stat. 747 (adding 216(g) to toll time periods for filing a petition and appearing for an interview to remove the condition from permanent resident status during periods in which Armed Forces members are on active-duty serving abroad). Former INA 216(g) was redesignated as INA 216(h).

Matter of Lemus, 25 I. & N. Dec. 734 (BIA Mar. 19, 2012) (adjustment of status under INA 245(i), 8 U.S.C. 1255(i), is unavailable to an alien who is inadmissible under INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), absent a waiver); clarifying Matter of Lemus, 24 I. & N. Dec. 373 (BIA 2007).

Note: There is one very positive aspect of this decision, namely that the case was remanded to the IJ because ten years has, after years of litigation, now passed since Mr. Lemus departed the United States.

There is a bill now pending in Congress, S.1925, "To Reauthorize the Violence Against Women Act of 1994", which primarily deals with that topic, but also seeks to create authority for Indian tribal courts to prosecute non-Indians for domestic violence, and then sneaks in the following:

"Section 1008. REMOVAL OF DRUNK DRIVERS
(a) In General: Section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.