United States v. Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757 (4th Cir. Nov. 10, 2011) (no unconstitutional seizure occurred where a local police officer took time to call ICE to verify the authenticity of a permanent residence card during an otherwise routine traffic stop).

United States v. Esparza, 678 F.3d 389, (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2012) (record evidence is sufficient to justify the trial judge's conclusion that Esparza was an alien at the time of his reentry, and the nunc pro tunc divorce decree obtained in 2010 purporting to retroactively rearrange Esparza's custody status in 1994 does not raise a reasonable doubt as to his alienage).

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. Nov. 8, 2011), cert. granted, No. 11-702 (Apr. 2, 2012).

Note: The Supreme Court will decide whether a state conviction under a state statute that includes distribution of a small amount of marijuana without remuneration is a drug trafficking aggravated felony, even where the record of conviction does not establish that the noncitizen was convicted of an offense that would constitute a federal felony.

United States v. Bahenz-Navarro, 678 F.3d 492, (7th Cir. Apr. 24, 2012) (district court did not err in rejecting defendants proposed guilty plea on the ground that he was unwilling to knowingly and voluntarily waive certain trial rights)

Rivas v Napolitano, 677 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. Apr. 25, 2012) (court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to review consular official's discretionary decisions to deny an immigrant visa; the district court also had no jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551, et seq., or the Declaratory Judgment Act, 5 U.S.C. 702).
CD4:15.12;AF:2.7;CMT3:3.7

Rivas v Napolitano, 677 F.3d 849, 850-851 (9th Cir. Apr. 25, 2012) (Federal courts are generally without power to review the actions of consular officials. Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.3d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1986). However, at least two exceptions to this rule exist. First, a court has jurisdiction to review a consular official's actions when [the] suit challenges the authority of the consul to take or fail to take an action as opposed to a decision within the consul's discretion. Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1997).

Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 705 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2012) (A crime involving moral turpitude is either one that involves fraud or one that involves grave acts of baseness or depravity, such that its commission offend[s] the most fundamental values of society. Navarro"Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1074"75 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring for the majority), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Aguila"Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2012) (court of appeals did not give Chevron deference to BIA holding that federal conviction of misprision of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4, was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, where BIA relied on flawed rationale that an offense which contravenes societal duties is enough to make it a crime involving moral turpitude, since under that rationale, every crime would involve moral turpitude); following Navarro"Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.

Noble v. Adams, 676 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2012) (remanding case to the district court to determine whether a four-and-a-half-month delay between the denial of a first habeas petition in the California Superior Court and the filing of a second petition in the same court was reasonable in the context of the case under California law, so as to toll the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations period for filing the federal habeas corpus petition).

United States v. Kelly, 676 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2012) ([I]t is malicious to intend to do what constitutes the actus reus of the crime in question. Id. Nevertheless, the common-law definition of malice clearly recognized the non-necessity of any element of hatred, spite, grudge, or ill-will. Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law 857; see also In re Bammer, 131 F.3d at 791 (Malice does not require a showing of biblical malice, i.e., personal hatred, spite, or illwill.); 4 Charles E. Torcia, Whartons Criminal Law 470 (15th ed.