United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. May 7, 2012) (affirming conviction of being an illegal alien in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(A), 924(a)(2), rejecting claim that lawful sporting purposes exception to Sentencing Guideline should apply to defendant's offense: that exception does not, by its terms, apply to offenses under (a)(4). U.S.S.G. 2K2.1 cmt. n.6).

Figuereo-Sanchez v. United States, 678 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. May 1, 2012) (Padilla does not announce a retroactively applicable new rule of law).

Bedoya-Melendez v. U.S. Atty General, 680 F.3d 1321, (11th Cir. May 17, 2012) (whether noncitizen was battered or subjected to extreme cruelty, as required to be eligible for VAWA special rule cancellation of removal, was not a question of law, such as the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider, but unreviewable discretionary determination).

Lin v. U.S. Atty General, 681 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. May 23, 2012) (the departure bar regulation, 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(d)"stating that the BIA may not entertain a motion to reopen filed by or on behalf of a person who has departed the United States"impermissibly conflicts with INA 240(c)(7)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(A), which permits an alien to file one motion to reopen); accord, Contreras"Bocanegra v. Holder, 2012 WL 255879 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Prestol Espinal v. Att'y Gen., 653 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2011); Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2010); William v.

The Supreme Court has now recognized a number of different types of plea bargaining IAC errors, and that each error has its own different type of prejudice. There are two different types of prejudice:

(1) normal IAC prejudice, interpreting the Strickland general prejudice standard in different contexts.

The Ninth Circuit stated in Castillo-Rivera that a conviction under Penal Code 12021(a) may not constitute an aggravated felony because it covers those addicted to the use of any narcotic drug[,] 244 F.3d at 1022-23 (emphasis added). Both Penal Code 12021(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 922(g) make it a crime for persons addicted to certain substances to possess a firearm, but the California prohibition is broader than the federal statute in two regards.

Penal Code 12021(a)(1) prohibits [a]ny person . . . who is addicted to the use of narcotic drugs from possessing a firearm, while 18 U.S.C.

A possession conviction, like any other facts, can be considered by the
government in making the Reason To Believe illicit trafficking determination, but it obviously standing alone is not sufficient because it provides no RTB of trafficking, just use. See Matter of Winter, 12 I. & N. Dec. 638 (BIA 1968); Matter of Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. 550 (BIA 1980), that are not exactly on point but may help by analogy.

Wood v. Milyard, 132 S.Ct. 1826 (April 24, 2012) (state deliberately waived the statute of limitations defense, where it twice informed the district court that it would "not challenge, but [was] not conceding," the timeliness of a prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus; courts of appeals, like district courts, have the authority--though not the obligation--to raise a forfeited timeliness defense on their own initiative in exceptional cases).

Matter of Arrabally and Yerrabelly, 25 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA Apr. 17, 2012) (noncitizen who leaves the United States temporarily pursuant to a grant of advance parole does not thereby make a departure . . . from the United States within the meaning of INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)); clarifying Matter of Lemus, 24 I&N Dec. 373 (BIA 2007), so the ten-year unlawful presence ground of inadmissibility, under INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C.

Matter of MW, 25 I&N Dec. 748 (BIA 2012) (Michigan conviction for violation of 750.317 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, second degree murder, is categorically an aggravated felony murder offense for immigration purposes; under the categorical approach, a conviction for the aggravated felony of murder, as defined in INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C.