The Supreme Court has now recognized a number of different types of plea bargaining IAC errors, and that each error has its own different type of prejudice. There are two different types of prejudice:

(1) normal IAC prejudice, interpreting the Strickland general prejudice standard in different contexts. The general test is whether the defendant can show a reasonable probability, less than a preponderance, but large enough to undermine confidence in the outcome, that a different (more favorable) outcome would have resulted absent counsels error; and

(2) whether it would have been rational for the defendant not to enter the plea (Roe v. Flores-Ortega, Padilla). There is another prejudice formulation: loss of an opportunity for a rational decisionmaker to exercise discretion in the defendants favor. This comes up in Roe, Barocio, Bautista, Janvier v. US, and US v. Kwan. These two formulations can be considered to be the same prejudice test, and the defendant can be considered to be a rational decisionmaker under this standard. This prejudice test is appropriate where counsels error resulted in the complete loss of a procedural opportunity, such as:

-- loss of the right to appeal (Roe);
-- loss of a motion for a JRAD or other form of non-deportable sentence, such as a sentence imposed of 364 days instead of 365 for a conviction that would otherwise be an aggravated felony crime of violence. (Barocio, Janvier, Kwan)
-- loss of a motion to withdraw a plea (Kwan), or
-- loss of the opportunity to make an immigration-neutral defense plea offer (Padilla, Bautista; Kwan).

This second type of prejudice is a very favorable standard. The defendant does not need to show a reasonable chance that the appeal or motion would have been victorious, just that the defendant would have chosen to make it if s/he had known of the opportunity. This is far easier to prove.