United States v. Kelly, 676 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2012) ([I]t is malicious to intend to do what constitutes the actus reus of the crime in question. Id. Nevertheless, the common-law definition of malice clearly recognized the non-necessity of any element of hatred, spite, grudge, or ill-will. Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law 857; see also In re Bammer, 131 F.3d at 791 (Malice does not require a showing of biblical malice, i.e., personal hatred, spite, or illwill.); 4 Charles E. Torcia, Whartons Criminal Law 470 (15th ed. 2011) ([M]alice in the traditional legal sense does not require that the defendant harbor ill will toward the [property] owner. (footnote omitted)); 3 id. 337 ([M]alice in a literal sense is not required; a defendant may act maliciously even though he harbors no malevolence or ill-will toward the owner or occupant.). It was sufficient that the defendant (1) had the intent to do the prohibited act and (2) had no justification or excuse.).

Note: Kelly supports arguments that offenses with malice as an essential mental element are not crimes involving moral turpitude, because malice is not a worse mens rea than merely an intentional illegal act done without justification. Therefore malicious mischief and similar offenses do not require a particularly evil intent. The lack of evil intent and moral turpitude in such malicious property destruction is underlined by the fact that Kelly involved mostly symbolic property damage done as an act of civil disobedience by longtime peace and disarmament activists. Two are Catholic priests, and one is an eighty-year old Catholic nun. Two others are grandmothers. Kelly, at 914. Thanks to Jonathan Moore.