Guamanrrigra v. Holder, 670 F.3d 404 (2d cir. Feb. 24, 2012) (service of a Notice to Appear, which did not specify the time or date of the hearing, followed by an NTA that did, stopped the clock for the 10-year continuous presence requirement for non-LPR cancellation of removal under INA 240A(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(A) as of the date of the second notice).

Crocock v. Holder, 670 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2012) (checking the citizen or national box on an I"9 Employment Eligibility Verification Form, is a false claim of citizenship; rejecting the argument that the I-9 form is ambiguous, because it is the petitioners burden under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), to demonstrate that he is not inadmissible).

Castro v. Attorney General, 671 F.3d 356 (3d Cir. Feb. 14, 2012) (noncitizen falsely representing himself as a citizen in the course of a police arrest was not for a "purpose or benefit" under federal or state law, for purposes of INA 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii); citizenship status was irrelevant to the police officer to whom the statement was made and there was no evidence that the police would have reported respondent to the DHS); compare Matter of Barcenas"Barrera, 25 I. & N. Dec. 40, 44 (BIA 2009), aff'd sub nom. Barcenas"Barrera v. Holder, 394 F. App'x 100 (5th Cir.

Castro v. Attorney General, 671 F.3d 356 (3d Cir. Feb. 14, 2012) (the circuit court has jurisdiction to entertain a timely petition to review of the denial of a motion to reconsider a decision of the BIA, regardless whether review was sought from the original BIA decision: An adverse BIA decision on the merits (and accompanying order of removal) and a BIA order denying a motion to reconsider are two separate final orders. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995).

Castro v. Attorney General, 671 F.3d 356, 366, (3d Cir. Feb. 14, 2012) (Section 1182 provides for a waiver by the Attorney General of inadmissibility based on other forms of misrepresentation, see 8 U.S.C. 1182(i)(1); by implication, the bar to admissibility in 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) cannot be waived by the Attorney General. Pichardo v. INS, 216 F.3d 1198, 1201 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2000).).

Dung Phan v. Holder, 667 F.3d 448 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2012) (District of Columbia conviction of distribution of cocaine constituted a conviction of a drug trafficking aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B), for purposes of triggering a permanent statutory bar to showing good moral character, for purposes of naturalization, since the courts order setting aside the conviction, under the District of Columbia Youth Rehabilitation Act, D.C.Code 24"906(e), was done for rehabilitative goals, which do not bar the use of the conviction in the immigration context).

Dung Phan v. Holder, 667 F.3d 448, 451 n.4 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2012) (argument that District of Columbia conviction of distribution of cocaine under the District of Columbia Youth Rehabilitation Act, D.C. Code 24"901, et seq., did not constitute a conviction under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), for immigration purposes, was waived since petitioner did not raise this argument in his brief on appeal); see United States v. Al"Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 571 n.

United States v. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2012) (reversing federal convictions of making a false claim to U.S. citizenship, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 911, and illegal reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Chavez-Hernandez, 671 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 2012) (Florida conviction for sexual activity with a minor, in violation of Florida Statute 794.05, was not a crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, because state statute applied to 17-year-olds; defense counsel's admission at sentence that victim was 14 years of age established victim's status as a minor under the federal standard).

United States v. Miranda-Ortegon, 670 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 2012) (Oklahoma conviction for domestic assault and battery, in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, 644C [[a]ny person who commits an assault and battery against a current or former spouse ... [or] a child ... shall be guilty of domestic abuse.], did not constitute an aggravated felony crime of violence for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes because the elements of the offense require only the slightest touching is necessary to constitute the force or violence element of battery.); quoting Steele v.