United States v. Miranda-Ortegon, 670 F.3d 661, 664, n.9, 11 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 2012) (court of appeal used Oklahoma criminal jury instructions to ascertain elements of state definition of offense, for purposes of determining the nature of the conviction for removal purposes).

Pilla v. United States, 668 F.3d 368, 372 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2012) (petition for writ of coram nobis was not in substance a motion to vacate, and thus was not precluded as second or successive motion to vacate: Here, Pilla was no longer in custody when she filed her petition for a writ of coram nobis, which means her petition is not in substance a motion under 2255. Her petition is therefore not a second or successive motion for relief under that section; and thus we proceed to consider its merits.); see United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir.

Pilla v. United States, 668 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2012) (defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's inaccurate immigration advice because she faced overwhelming evidence of guilt, had no realistic chance of being acquitted at trial, and would have received a longer sentence plus the same deportation consequences: no rational defendant in Pilla's position would have proceeded to trial in this situation.); see United States v. Johnson, 237 F.3d 751, 755 (6th Cir. Jan. 25, 2001).

Villegas de la Paz v. Holder, 640 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. Jul. 30, 2010) (court had jurisdiction to review the reinstatement of a prior removal order, and REAL ID Act granted circuit courts jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law raised in the context of reinstatement proceedings; but evidence was sufficient to show prior order, and IJs failure in underlying deportation proceeding to inform alien that she could seek to withdraw her application for admission to United States did not violate alien's due process rights); Martinez-Merino v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 801 (9th Cir.

Rangel-Zuazo v. Holder, 2012 WL 432283 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 2012) (unpublished) (state decision to try a youthful offender as a juvenile or as an adult determines whether juvenile has suffered a "conviction" for purposes of removal under the INA; federal immigration law distinctions between juvenile and adult offenders, and between minors tried as juveniles and those tried as adults, are rational and do not violate the Equal Protection Clause).

Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. Feb. 29, 2012) (California misdemeanor conviction of disorderly conduct [soliciting an act of prostitution], in violation of Penal Code 647(b), categorically constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, whether or not the defendant is the prostitute or the customer: We hold that soliciting an act of prostitution is not significantly less base, vile, and depraved than engaging in an act of prostitution.).

In Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. Feb.

United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. Jan. 31, 2012) (harboring an alien does not mean merely providing a place to stay).

Latter-Singh v. Holder, 668 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2012) (California conviction of criminal threats, in violation of Penal Code 422, categorically constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, for immigration purposes, because (1) the required threatened conduct is itself a CMT; (2) the victims must suffer sustained fear; and (3) the offense is committed with intent to instill fear), compare Fernandez"Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir.

Rangel-Zuazo v. Holder, 2012 WL 432283 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2012) (unpublished) (granting petition for review of a final order of removal issued by the BIA in light of Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011), which required reversal of the BIA's conclusion that the petitioner was ineligible for a waiver under former INA 212(c) because he failed to meet the comparability requirement).

Zarate v. Holder, 671 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012) (apprehension at border followed by arrest and being given the option of either seeing an IJ or withdrawing his application for admission and voluntarily returning to Mexico was sufficient to break continuous presence for non-LPR cancellation of removal), compare Valadez"Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1311 (9th Cir. 2010) (informal voluntary return, including making of a record of a turnaround, photographing and fingerprinting, does not break continuous residence).