United States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2012) (noncitizen had to show that he actually had been prejudiced as result of ineffective assistance of counsel by showing that he had plausible claim to relief under Convention Against Torture based on gang violence).

United States v. Loya-Rodriguez, 672 F.3d 849 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 2012) (affirming conviction of illegal reentry, because defendant failed to make a clear and unequivocal request to represent himself at trial, but reversing sentence and ordering fresh sentence hearing, because he did clearly make such a request to represent himself at sentencing).

United States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348 (10th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (the 16"level enhancement in USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) does not apply to a defendant whose later probation-violation sentence for an earlier drug trafficking felony was made longer than 13 months after the defendant was deported and committed the base offense of illegal reentry); see United States v. Lopez, 634 F.3d 948 (7th Cir.2011); United States v.

Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1029 (10th Cir. Oct. 17, 2011) (lawful entry as inspected backseat taxi passenger of previously deported person, without seeking the Attorney Generals permission to reapply for admission as she was required to do, under INA 212(a)(9)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii), constituted unlawful entry into the United States, under 8 C.F.R. 241.8(a)); following Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir.

United States v. Valdiviez-Garza, 669 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2012) (Government is collaterally estopped from attempting to establish alienage because a jury, in a re-entry case, found against the Government); see United States v. Bennett, 836 F.2d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir.1984) (barring prosecution completely if fact necessarily determined in former trial is essential element for conviction in present proceeding).

United States v. Valdiviez-Garza, 669 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2012) (Government is collaterally estopped from attempting to establish alienage because a jury, in a re-entry case, found against the Government).

United States v. Valdiviez-Garza, 669 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2012) (To convict on this charge the Government has to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Valdiviez-Garza: (1) was an alien at the time of the offense; (2) who had previously been removed or deported; (3) and had reentered the United States after removal; (4) without having received the express consent of the Attorney General.).

United States v. Valdiviez-Garza, 669 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2012).

The Court states:

Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).

Possession of a firearm, under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5), should not be considered to be a crime involving moral turpitude. Since possessing a firearm is not inherently evil and not malum prohibitum, the fact of being unlawfully undocumented when doing so should not make it a crime of moral turpitude. See Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I&N Dec. 262 (BIA 1990) (possessing a sawed-off shotgun not a crime of moral turpitude). See also Matter of Gabryelski, 20 I&N Dec.

People v. Gabriel, 203 Cal.App.4th 199, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 382 (2d Dist. Feb. 3, 2012) (California conviction of possession of an assault weapon, in violation of Penal Code 12280(b), constituted a crime of moral turpitude, for purposes of impeachment of a witness with that conviction; Defendant's conviction of this charge required, at the least, that he should have known the weapon possessed the characteristics that made it particularly dangerous to human life. ( 12280, subd. (b); see In re Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p.