(B)  State Department List.  The State Department has listed a number of crimes against the government which are often “regulatory in character and which do not involve the element of fraud or other evil intent” and are not considered to involve moral turpitude.  It listed black market violations, breach of the peace, carrying a concealed weapon, desertion from the armed forces, disorderly conduct, drunk or reckless driving, drunkenness, escape from prison, failure to report for military induction, false statements (not amounting to perjury or involving fraud), firearms violations, gambling violations, immigration violations, liquor violations, loan sharking, possessing burglar tools (without intent to commit burglary), smuggling and customs violations (where intent to commit fraud is absent), tax violations, and vagrancy. [129]

 

[129] 9 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 40.21(a) N.2.3-2(b).

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - DUI + SUSPENDED LICENSE
Marmolejo-Campos v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2610788 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2007) (Arizona conviction for violation of A.R.S. 28-1383(A)(1), driving under the influence with knowledge that defendant did not have valid license to drive, is a crime involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes).

Third Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " UNLICENSED DEALING IN FIREARMS
Mayorga v. Attorney General U.S., ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 2898528 (3d Cir. Jun. 27, 2014) (federal conviction of unlicensed business of firearms dealing, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2), did not categorically constitute a crime of moral turpitude, since the offense is a regulatory/licensing offense); see Matter of Abreu"Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 775, 776 (BIA 1968) (the violation of a regulatory, or licensing, or revenue provision of a statute is not a crime involving moral turpitude).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER
Totimeh v. Attorney General, 666 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. Jan. 12, 2012) (Minnesota conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of Minn. Stat. 243.166.5, defined the offense as knowingly violat[ing] any of [the statutes] provisions or intentionally provid[ing] false information, is not a crime of moral turpitude, since it is a regulatory offense designed to assist law enforcement, and does not regulate a crime that of itself is inherently vile or intentionally malicious.); following Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2011) (Colorado conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, is not a CIMT).

Fourth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPIUTDE " SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
Mohamed v. Holder, 769 F.3d 885 (4th Cir. Oct. 17, 2014) (Virgina conviction for violation of VaCodeAnn. 18.2-472.1, failure to register as a sex offender, is not a crime involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes, since it is merely a regulatory offense), disagreeing with Matter of Tobar-Lobo, 24 I&N Dec. 143 (BIA 2007).

Seventh Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FAILURE TO APPEAR IN COURT
Obi v. Holder, 558 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2009) (federal conviction of failure to appear in court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3146, is mentioned in dictum as a crime involving moral turpitude); but see Hussein v. Ashcroft, 2002 WL 31027604 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002) (federal conviction of failure to appear in court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3146, was not found to be a crime of moral turpitude, but court denied naturalization based on a conclusion that other convictions showed a lack of good moral character).

Ninth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " SEX OFFENSES " FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER
Pannu v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1782959 (9th Cir. May 11, 2011) (remand to BIA to review issue of whether California conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, Penal Code 290(g)(1), categorically constituted a crime of moral turpitude), citing Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738, 743 n.2, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (Nevada conviction for failure to register as a sex offender under a similar law (Nev. Rev. Stat. 179D.550) did not categorically constitute a CMT, since that statute creates strict liability for failing to register or notify of a change of address, so that a defendant could be convicted for forgetting to register or even for accidentally sending his registration forms to the wrong address).

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE WHILE KNOWING LICENSE HAS BEEN SUSPENDED IS A CMT
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Arizona conviction of driving under the influence while knowing that that one had a suspended license, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes 28-1383(A)(1),constitutes a crime of moral turpitude for immigration purposes), deferring to Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - REGULATORY OFFENSES
Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2008) (Nevada conviction of failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 179D.550, does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because the offense of conviction is a regulatory offense that is not inherently evil, but is an offense solely because a law was passed regulating it), following Fong v. INS, 308 F.2d 191, 195 (9th Cir.1962) (holding that an alien who was deportable for failing to register with the Attorney General had committed "only a minor infraction" and that his record showed "no moral turpitude whatever").

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - STATUTORY RAPE
Quintero- Salazar v. Keisler, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2916162 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007) (California conviction of statutory rape, in violation of California Penal Code 261.5(d), where the victim is under 16 years of age and the actor is over 21, is not a crime involving moral turpitude, since (1) it includes consensual sex between [at minimum] between a high-school junior and a college sophomore, and is not inheritly base, vile, or depraved; court also noted that (2) the statute proscribes at least some malum prohibitum conduct, since the same act would not be illegal at all if the two were married at the time; (3) the same conduct is not illegal in other states; (4) the statute was passed in order to address teenage pregnancy, not to avoid a moral issue; and (5) the offense does not require any element of intent be proven).

Other

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " REGULATORY OFFENSES " PRACTICE ADVISORY
Offenses classed as regulatory offenses generally are not considered to involve moral turpitude because although the behavior is illegal, there is nothing inherently wrong, fraudulent or evil about it. If it is not intrinsically wrong, the fact that it is illegal " standing alone -- does not make it turpitudinous. However, there are inconsistencies in the BIA case law. See Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 2007) (Where an act is only statutorily prohibited, rather than inherently wrong, the act generally will not involve moral turpitude.), citing Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2000); Matter of J, 4 I. & N. Dec. 512, 1951 WL 7052 (BIA 1951). For a comprehensive digest of moral turpitude holdings on regulatory cases, see Tooby, Rollin & Foster, Crimes of Moral Turpitude 8.22 (2008 and monthly updates since at nortontooby.com).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE"POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY AN UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT
Possession of a firearm, under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5), should not be considered to be a crime involving moral turpitude. Since possessing a firearm is not inherently evil and not malum prohibitum, the fact of being unlawfully undocumented when doing so should not make it a crime of moral turpitude. See Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I&N Dec. 262 (BIA 1990) (possessing a sawed-off shotgun not a crime of moral turpitude). See also Matter of Gabryelski, 20 I&N Dec. 750 (1993): [W]e point out that while the respondent's conviction for possession of a firearm establishes his deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, see Matter of Chow, Interim Decision 3199 (BIA 1993), it does not render him inadmissible for purposes of section 245 adjustment, as there is no corresponding exclusion ground. In Matter of Rainford, supra, the Board specifically held that a conviction for criminal possession of weapon did not preclude a finding of admissibility in connection with an application for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act, because it is not a ground of excludability. (Ibid.) Since it is not a ground of inadmissibility, it is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Thanks to Jonathan Moore.