Crimes committed with intent to commit certain types of acts have traditionally been found to involve moral turpitude, such as committing any offense with intent to commit theft, fraud, or a lewd sexual act.  Some of these intents are discussed in § § 20.5-20.8, infra.

Second Circuit

MORAL TURPITUDE " MISPRISION OF A FELONY
Lugo v. Holder, 783 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. Apr. 9, 2015) (remanding to BIA to determine whether to continue to adhere to Matter of Robles"Urrea, 24 I. & N. Dec. 22 (BIA 2006), holding that conviction of misprision of a felony, under 18 U.S.C. 4, is still a crime of moral turpitude in light of circuit split), citing Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir.2002), and Robles"Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 711 (9th Cir. 2012).

Fifth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " MISPRISION OF A FELONY
Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions, 874 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 2017) (federal conviction of misprision of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4 ((1) knowledge that a felony was committed; (2) failure to notify the authorities of the felony; and (3) an affirmative step to conceal the felony."), was a crime against moral turpitude, because misprision of a felony required an intentional act of deceit); following Patel v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. April 29, 2008); Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that misprision of felony is a categorical CIMT); distinguishing Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 711 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that misprision of felony is not a CIMT for lack of a sufficiently evil mental state).

Ninth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " MISPRISION OF A FELONY
Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 705 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2012) (A crime involving moral turpitude is either one that involves fraud or one that involves grave acts of baseness or depravity, such that its commission offend[s] the most fundamental values of society. Navarro"Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1074"75 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring for the majority), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Aguila"Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). That an offense contravenes societal duties is not enough to make it a crime involving moral turpitude; otherwise, every crime would involve moral turpitude. Id. at 1070 (majority opinion). Because the BIA relied on this flawed rationale in concluding that misprision of a felony is a crime involving moral turpitude, we cannot defer to its interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Instead, we hold that misprision of a felony is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.). Note: While this ought to be good news signaling that California accessory after the fact, in violation of Penal Code 32, is not a CIMT, the ILRC strongly suggests that criminal defense counsel continue to assume conservatively that it will be charged as a CIMT, however wrongly. There are three reasons to be conservative here: 1. Misprision is somewhat different from accessory, in that misprision does not require intent to help someone avoid arrest, sentence, etc., and accessory does. The federal offense of misprision of a felony, under 18 U.S.C. 4, in Robles, prohibits someone who, knowing a felony has been committed, "conceals" or fails to report it, with no further intent required. At one point, the opinion points out that misprision does not have this intent unlike other concealing offenses, including accessory after the fact, as yet another reason why misprision is not CIMT. ICE is likely to use this to assert that even if misprision is not CIMT, accessory after the fact is. While this goes against the thrust of the whole rest of the opinion, it still gives ICE its opening. 2. The court made clear that misprision is a divisible statute and that the immigration judge may review the record of conviction under the modified categorical approach to see if a fact "necessary" to the conviction showed moral turpitude, although the court found it hard to see how that could happen. (The Ninth Circuit appears to hold that the regular categorical approach applies, contrary to Silva-Trevino. On the other hand, Silva-Trevino had not been decided at the time the BIA made its decision in this case, so that issue was not before the court.) 3. It is possible that this case will go en banc. For one thing, this is a very rare instance where a court acknowledges that it owes Chevron deference to an agency opinion, but declines to give it because the agency's reasoning is so bad as to be impermissible. 4. Immigration counsel in removal proceedings should argue that a California conviction of accessory after the fact, in violation of Penal Code 32, is not a CIMT. Thanks to Katherine Brady, Senior Staff Attorney, Immigrant Legal Resource Center.