(B)  Offenses Involving Fake Controlled Substances.  A state conviction for sale of a simulated controlled substance,[659] that is not a federally-listed controlled substance, is not an aggravated felony conviction under the second prong.  The federal definition of “counterfeit substance”[660] is a subset of the federally defined “controlled substance.”[661]  The definition of a counterfeit controlled substance requires the substance to be on the federal list of controlled substances, but mislabeled as to the manufacturer.[662]  There is no federal felony proscribing sale of non-controlled substances (a.k.a. “bunk”) which have been falsely passed off as a controlled substance (i.e., oregano sold as marijuana or a cutting agent sold as cocaine ).[663]

 

Sale of a non-controlled substance in lieu of a controlled substance additionally does not meet the first prong of the aggravated felony drug trafficking test, because non-controlled substances, such as sugar, are not listed in the federal controlled substances schedules.  Sale of sugar therefore cannot be considered “illicit trafficking” in a controlled substance.

                On the other hand, it appears that a drug trafficking offense involving a counterfeit controlled substance will be considered a drug trafficking offense in the illegal re-entry sentencing context, even if it is not considered an aggravated felony.[664]  See § 19.22, supra.

[659] For example, Washington State forbids creating or delivering a counterfeit controlled substance.  RCW § 69.50.401(b).  See also Texas Health and Safety Code § 482.002 (delivering and offering to sell a simulated controlled substance).  A defendant may be liable under this latter statute for attempting to distribute dominoes, represented to be a bag of cocaine.  See Ramos v. State, 928 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App. 1996).  A defendant may also be convicted for distributing leaf stems and sunflower seeds, which were represented to be a nickel bag of marijuana.  See Holliman v. State, 692 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App. 1985).

[660] 21 U.S.C. § 802(7) (“The term ‘counterfeit substance’ means a controlled substance which, or the container or labeling of which, without authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, number, or device, or any likeness thereof, of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed such substance and which thereby falsely purports or is represented to be the product of, or to have been distributed by, such other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser.”) (emphasis added).  This definition provides a federal definition of  “counterfeit substance” under the Controlled Substances Act, and also governs convictions under the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, see 21 U.S.C. § 951(b) (1994), and the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, see 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(i) (1994).

[661] United States v. Cooper, 121 F.3d 130, 133, 134 (3d Cir. 1997) (by definition, a “counterfeit substance” must be  a “controlled substance;” if a particular substance is not a “controlled substance,” then it cannot be a “counterfeit substance” within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 802(7)).

[662] 21 U.S.C. § 802(7).

[663] There is, however, BIA authority indicating that such a conviction does constitute a conviction relating to a controlled substance.  Matter of TC, 7 I. & N. Dec. 100, 102 (BIA 1956) (California conviction for selling a liquid substance “in lieu of a narcotic drug” under California law was an offense “relating to” a controlled substance under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)). See also N. Tooby & J. Rollin, Safe Havens: How to Identify and Construct Non-Deportable Convictions § § 7.138, et seq. (2005).

[664] U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), appl. note 1(B)(iv) (2005); United States v. Crittenden, 372 F.3d 706 (5th Cir. 2004) (Texas U.S.S.G. case holds a simulated controlled substance is a controlled substance); United States v. Frazier, 89 F.3d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Hester, 917 F.2d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 1990); but cf. United States v. Peters, 215 F.3d 861, 862 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[Th]e district court determined conspiracy to sell a simulated controlled substance, in this case baking soda, did not qualify as a controlled substance offense under the guidelines and the government does not appeal this determination.”).

BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " DELIVERY OF SIMULATED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 273 (BIA 2010) (Texas conviction of delivery of a simulated controlled substance, as defined by 482.001(4) of the Texas Health and Safety Code, is not an aggravated felony drug trafficking offense because federal law does not punish distribution of a non-controlled substance in place of a real controlled substance; the violation is, however, a controlled substances offense for purposes of triggering removability under INA 237(a)(2)(B)).

Third Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " HYPOTHETICAL FEDERAL FELONY TEST " DISTINGUISHED FROM HYPOTHETICAL APPROACH CRITICIZED IN CARACHURI-ROSENDO
Catwell v. Attorney General, 623 F.3d 199, 209, n.11 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2010) (Our reference to a hypothetical federal felony in this case differs from the hypothetical approach recently criticized by the Supreme Court in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, --- U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 2577, 177 L.Ed.2d 68 (2010). As directed by the Supreme Court, we look to the proscribe[d] conduct of a state offense to determine whether it is punishable as a felony under federal law, considering both the conviction (the relevant statutory hook), and the conduct actually punished by the state offense. Id. at 2588 (quoting Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60, 127 S.Ct. 625, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006)). While our precedent uses the term hypothetical federal felony, our analysis is not at all hypothetical. Rather, it follows the Supreme Court's direction in Carachuri-Rosendo for determining whether a state offense constitutes a fictional federal felony. For consistency with our precedent, we will continue to use the phrase hypothetical federal felony.).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " HYPOTHETICAL FEDERAL FELONY " EXCEPTION FOR GRATUITOUS DISTRIBUTION OF SMALL AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA " CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS
Catwell v. Attorney General, 623 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2010) (determination of whether gratuitous distribution of marijuana involved more than small amount was subject to strict categorical analysis).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " HYPOTHETICAL FEDERAL FELONY " GRATUITOUS DISTRIBUTION OF MARIJUANA " DEFINITION OF SMALL AMOUNT " DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRISON AND NON-PRISON SITUATIONS
Catwell v. Attorney General, 623 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2010) (Very few cases have addressed the question of small amount for purposes of the exception set forth in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(4). All of the cases we have found specifically discussing small quantities of marijuana involved drug possession in prison. The cases all distinguish between drug possession in or near a prison and drug possession on the street, noting that possessing drugs in prison has more severe consequences than possessing drugs on the street. The amounts involved ranged from 1.256 grams to 17.2 grams. None of these were determined to be a small amount for the purposes of section 841(b)(4).); citing United States v. Carmichael, 155 F.3d 561 (4th Cir.1998) (unpublished table decision) (1.256 grams of marijuana brought into prison is not a small amount since drugs in prison are measured in grams and milligrams not pounds and ounces); United States v. Wheeler, 121 F.3d 702 (4th Cir.1997) (unpublished table decision) (2.86 grams not a small amount); U.S. v. Damerville, 27 F.3d 254 (7th Cir.1994) (17.2 grams of marijuana distributed to inmates is not a small amount)).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " HYPOTHETICAL FEDERAL FELONY " GRATUITOUS DISTRIBUTION OF MARIJUANA " DEFINITION OF SMALL AMOUNT
The Third Circuit discussed what constitutes a small amount of marijuana, for purposes of making a federal drug-trafficking conviction a misdemeanor: The legislative history of 841(b)(4) provides some guidance on the definition of small amount of marijuana since it, at least, mentions a specific amount at one point. In 1970, when the Senate was considering amending the CSA to include the small amount exception, Senator Ted Kennedy, a co-sponsor of the amendment, observed that [m]any youngsters may be in a situation where they are with friends, where they give a marihuana cigarette or a small quantity of marihuana to one or two others-not professional pushers, not to make a profit, but in a casual and informal way. 116 CONG. REC. 35,555 (1970). Several courts have noted, looking to the legislative history of the statute, that the exception contemplated social sharing situations. United States v. Eddy, 523 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir.2008) (section 841(b)(4) refers to social sharing of marijuana among friends); United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 637 (2d Cir.2002) (unspecified amount of marijuana, but court noted the exception applied to the sharing of small amounts of marijuana in social situations). These observations are supported by statements made by Senator Harold Hughes from Iowa, who observed that [t]rafficking provisions should apply to the large distributor, rather than to the person who is only using the drug with his friends. 116 CONG. REC. 35,555 (1970). The comments made during consideration of the amendment lead us to conclude that Congress contemplated and intended small amount to mean the amount of marijuana an individual would be likely to use on a single occasion, in a social setting. In light of Senator Kennedy's remarks, that amount would be no more than one or two marijuana cigarettes, or a few grams of marijuana. This conclusion is consistent with 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides an exception to the controlled substances offense as a basis for removal. The exception exempts someone who possesses 30 grams or less of marijuana from removal, describing this as an exception for personal use. 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, one marijuana cigarette is equivalent to .5 grams. U.S.S.G. 2D1.1. Given that criterion, Petitioner possessed the equivalent of 241 marijuana cigarettes, well beyond the single cigarette envisioned by Senator Kennedy and the Congress. We conclude that 120.5 grams is not a small amount, as contemplated by Congress when it enacted the exception. Therefore, Petitioner's conviction did not involve a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration.FN18 The exception created by 841(b)(4) does not apply to him. As a result, Petitioner's conviction was for an aggravated felony, rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Catwell v. Attorney General, 623 F.3d 199, 208-209, 2010 WL 3987664 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2010) (footnotes omitted).

Fourth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - DRUG TRAFFICKING
United States v. Maroquin-Bran, 587 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. Nov. 9, 2009) (California conviction for violation of Health & Safety Code 11360(a) is not necessary a "drug trafficking offense" for illegal re-entry sentencing purposes, since the statute of conviction is divisible and includes transportation for personal use); accord, United States v. Medina-Almaguer, 559 F.3d 420, 422-23 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lopez-Salas, 513 F.3d 174, 177-78, 180 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Garcia-Medina, 497 F.3d 875, 877 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Almazan-Becerra, 482 F.3d 1085, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2007); cf. United States v. Herrera-Roldan, 414 F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d 1228, 1231-33 (11th Cir. 2003).

Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " DELIVERY OF COCAINE
Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2014) (Florida conviction of delivery of cocaine, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a)(1)(sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance), is not a categorical aggravated felony drug trafficking offense, since Florida statute does not require knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance, while federal offense requires knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance); see State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415"16 (Fla. 2012) (explaining that knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance is no longer an element of the Florida crime that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " DELIVERY OF COCAINE
Sarmientos v. Holder, 742 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2014) (Florida conviction of delivery of cocaine, in violation of Florida Statute 893.13(1)(a)(1)(sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance), is not a categorical aggravated felony drug trafficking offense, since Florida statute does not require knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance, while federal offense requires knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance); see State v. Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415"16 (Fla. 2012) (explaining that knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance is no longer an element of the Florida crime that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " MANUFACTURING
United States v. Reyes-Mendoza, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 2011) (California conviction of manufacturing a controlled substance, in violation of Health & Safety Code 11379.6, is not categorically a drug trafficking offense, under USSG 2L1.2 (which includes an offense under . . . state . . . law that prohibits the manufacture . . . of a controlled substance), because the word manufacture has been interpreted more broadly under California law than under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, and there are some acts that would violate Health & Safety Code 11379.6 without qualifying as drug trafficking offenses for purposes of USSG 2L1.2); see United States v. Arizaga-Acosta, 436 F.3d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 2006) (possession of a precursor chemical with intent to manufacture a controlled substance was not a drug trafficking offense for purposes of USSG 2L1.2, and was not substantially equivalent to attempted manufacture of a controlled substance.); United States v. Forester, 836 F.2d 856, 859-61 (5th Cir. 1988) (defendant could not be sentenced for both production of a precursor with intent to manufacture a controlled substance and the attempted manufacture of a controlled substance).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
Moncrieffe v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL 5343694 (5th Cir. Nov. 8, 2011) (Georgia conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of Ga. Code 16"13"30(j), which includes specifically, distribution of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, was nonetheless a drug-trafficking aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B); Moncrieffe bore the burden to prove that he was convicted of only misdemeanor conduct.); see United States v. Walker, 302 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2002) (the default sentencing range for a marijuana distribution offense is the CSA's felony provision, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(D), rather than the misdemeanor provision); see Matter of Aruna, 24 I. & N. Dec. 452 (BIA Feb. 26, 2008) (a state conviction for possessing an indeterminate amount of marijuana with intent to distribute is considered an aggravated felony); Garcia v. Holder, 638 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2011) (the default punishment under 21 U.S.C. 841 is a felony, where the statute punishes gratuitous distribution of a small amount as well as sales, so a conviction constitutes a drug-trafficking aggravated felony even absent record evidence of the quantity or price); United States v. Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 925 (6th Cir. 2002) (same); Julce v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. June 20, 2008) (same); Jeune v. Attorney General, 476 F.3d 199 (3d Cir.2007) (same); but see Martinez v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2008) (default is a misdemeanor: only the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under a given statute is relevant to the categorical approach); Julce v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 30, 34"36 (1st Cir. 2008) (same); Jeune v. Attorney General, 476 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2007) (same).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - DRUG TRAFFICKING - SOLICITATION
United States v. Morales-Martinez, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2255292 (5th Cir. Aug. 8, 2007) (Texas conviction for delivery of controlled substance, in violation of Texas Health and Safety Code 481.112, was not a "drug trafficking offense" within meaning of USSG 16-level enhancement for illegal reentry after deportation, under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), as neither the statutory language nor the charging document necessitated a finding that defendant committed a drug trafficking offense; Tex. Health & Safety Code 481.002(8) defines "deliver" as "transfer, actually or constructively, to another a controlled substance, counterfeit substance, or drug paraphernalia, regardless of whether there is an agency relationship. The term includes offering to sell a controlled substance, counterfeit substance, or drug paraphernalia," which is broader than the sentencing definition, which does not include solicitation).

Sixth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - DRUG TRAFFICKING
United States v. Medina-Almaguer, 559 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 2009) (California conviction of violation of Penal Code 11352(a) ["transport, import ..., sell, furnish, administer, or give away" a controlled substance or to "offer[ ]" to do those things], is divisible for purposes of imposing a 16-level sentence enhancement for illegal reentry because the prior deportation arose from a "drug trafficking offense," within the meaning of USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), since the broad sweep of the California statute covers conduct that comes within the Guideline's definition of a "drug trafficking offense," as well as conduct that falls outside of it, i.e., "transport[ation]" of controlled substances and "offers" to perform the proscribed activities).

Eighth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - DRUG TRAFFICKING - SALE - CALIFORNIA SALE STATUTE IS OVERINCLUSIVE, INCLUDING BOTH OFFENSES THAT WOULD, AND OTHERS THAT WOULD NOT, TRIGGER THE GUIDELINES SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT
United States v. Garcia-Medina, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2317381 (8th Cir. Aug. 15, 2007) (California conviction of sale or transportation of a controlled substance, in violation of Health & Safety Code 11352(a), is overinclusive and includes both drug trafficking offenses that properly trigger 16-level sentence enhancement for illegal reentry after deportation under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) (Nov. 2005), and other offenses that do not).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
United States v. Gonzalez-Corn, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 4385278 (9th Cir. Jul. 17, 2015) (federal conviction for possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute, resulting in a sentence exceeding one year, was for an aggravated felony drug trafficking offense, without need to apply the categorical analysis, since the INA specifically incorporates felony violations of the CSA on its face).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " DRUG TRAFFICKING " TRANSPORTATION CAL CRIM DEF -- CALIFORNIA SAFE HAVENS " TRANSPORTATION FOR SALE
Starting January 1, 2014, a conviction for transportation under Health & Safety Code 11352 and 11379 will automatically qualify as a drug trafficking aggravated felony if the record of conviction identifies a federally listed controlled substance. AB 721, signed into law on Oct. 3, 2013, redefines transport to include only transportation for sale and now excludes transportation for personal use. While this is a positive development for most defendants, for noncitizen defendants who are facing serious drug charges, including possession for sale, this eliminates a key strategy to avoid an aggravated felony triggering mandatory deportation and detention, even for long-time lawful permanent residents. The ILRC has written a practice advisory for criminal defenders available at http://www.ilrc.org/resources/transportation-advisory. The practice advisory includes alternative strategies to avoid an aggravated felony conviction.

Other

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES " COUNTERFEIT DRUG OFFENSES IN LIEU OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Practice Advisory, Su Yon Yi and Katherine Brady, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Burn Statutes and Counterfeit Drug Offenses (2015), see ILRC.org (discussing Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I&N Dec. 273 (BIA 2010) (the offense of delivery of a simulated controlled substance in violation of Texas law is not an aggravated felony, as defined by INA 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006), but it is a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance under former INA 241(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 125l(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994))