(B)  State Adult Convictions of Juvenile Offenders.  A state conviction in adult court of a noncitizen who was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offense does not automatically constitute a conviction for immigration purposes.  Many states allow juveniles to be transferred from juvenile court to adult court under certain circumstances, and an adult-court criminal conviction results.  State procedures must be evaluated by comparison to the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA),[276] to determine whether a state adult conviction of someone who was a juvenile at the time the crime was committed could have been transferred from federal juvenile court to federal adult court under federal law and therefore constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes.[277]  The basic principle is that a juvenile who is transferred to adult court and suffers an adult conviction will be held to have suffered a “conviction” for immigration purposes only if s/he could have been transferred to adult court under the FJDA.[278]  Therefore, even if a juvenile is in fact transferred to an adult state criminal court, the resulting state court conviction will not be considered a “conviction” for immigration purposes unless this transfer would have been allowed under the FJDA if the proceedings had occurred in federal court. 

 

            The First Circuit, however, has held that a state court conviction as an adult for an offense committed when petitioner was seventeen years old constituted a conviction for purposes of immigration law, and the fact that he might have been treated as a juvenile in another jurisdiction was not a violation of his right to equal protection.[279] The Sixth Circuit has held a Youthful Trainee Act designation and sentence to probation constituted a conviction for immigration purposes.[280]

 

The argument outlined here, however, should be pursued before the BIA and in other circuits. 

 

The BIA has been attempting to establish uniform national definitions of terms in immigration statutes, so the outcome of a removal case does not depend on the many variations in criminal laws among the 50 states.  The Ninth Circuit, as well, has recognized that making such important consequences depend on the happenstance of the state of conviction violates Equal Protection.[281]  Therefore, if the following argument prevails in the BIA, it will protect juveniles everywhere but in the First Circuit, and if it prevails in other circuits, the circuit conflict may enable the United States Supreme Court to resolve the conflict.  In addition, it is not clear from the First Circuit opinion that all of the arguments in favor of this position were in fact raised in that case, so obtaining a reversal of the First Circuit position may be possible by raising additional arguments effectively, since a case cannot be read as rejecting an argument that was not made in that case.[282]

[276] 18 U.S.C. § 5031.

[277] The statute at issue in Devison involved the New York “youthful offender” act that applied to youths who committed offenses between ages 16 and 19.  Although the statute required a conviction and then allowed it to be vacated once youthful status was established, the BIA found that the state provision “reflect[s] the core criteria for a determination of juvenile delinquency” under the FDJA and was “sufficiently analogous” to the FDJA even though the maximum age under state law was 19 instead of 18 under federal law.  Devison at pp. 7-9.

[278] Matter of Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 135 (BIA 1981) (since the juvenile’s foreign crime could not have been transferred to adult court under the FJDA, it will not be considered a conviction for immigration purposes regardless of how the foreign country treated it); Matter of De La Nues, 18 I. & N. Dec. 140 (BIA 1981) (foreign offense which might or might not be transferred to adult court under FJDA must be treated as adult conviction by foreign jurisdiction in order to be held a conviction for immigration purposes). 

[279] Vieira-Garcia v. INS, 239 F.3d 409 (1st Cir. 2001).

[280] Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2005) (sentence of probation and a designation of “youthful trainee” under Michigan’s Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (“YTA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § § 762.11-16, constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes).

[281] Lujan-Armendarez v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000); Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1994).

[282] R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2545 (1992) (“It is of course contrary to all traditions of our jurisprudence to consider the law on [a] point conclusively resolved by broad language in cases where the issue was not presented or even envisioned”); United States v. Vroman, 975 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir. 1992) (precedent not controlling on issue not presented to prior panel), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 996, 113 S.Ct. 1611 (1993); United States v. Faulkner, 952 F.2d 1066, 1071 n.3 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); DeRobles v. INS, 58 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Second Circuit

CONVICTION - JUVENILE
Savchuk v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2008) (New York conviction of grand larceny in the Fourth Degree, in violation of Section 155.30 of the New York Penal Law, a Class E felony, constituted a conviction, under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), for deportation purposes under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for multiple CMT convictions, despite the fact that it was committed while the noncitizen was under the age of 18 years, since he pled guilty after he turned eighteen and New York treated him as an adult offender, rejecting the argument that if this case had arisen under federal criminal law, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act would not have permitted transfer to adult court, and the federal juvenile adjudication would not have been considered a conviction for immigration purposes).

The court stated: "While Savchuck's approach is inventive, it finds no support in the text of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A) . . . . The statute encompasses state court adjudications and does not sanction disregarding them because of the theoretical possibility that criminal conduct might be treated differently by federal authorities. Savchuck's position has been rejected by the First and Ninth Circuits. See Vieira Garcia v. INS, 239 F.3d 409, 413 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Once adjudicated by the state court, as either a juvenile or an adult, we are bound by that determination."); Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding state treatment of petitioner as adult determinative). We join these Circuits and hold that, because Savchuck's grand larceny conviction qualifies as a conviction under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), the BIA correctly found him removable." (Savchuk v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2008).

CONVICTION - JUVENILE - NEW YORK YOUTHFUL CONVICTION PROPERLY CONSIDERED AGGRAVATED FELONY FOR ILLEGAL REENTRY SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT PURPOSES
United States v. Pereira, 465 F.3d515, 2006 WL 2925642 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 2006)( New York conviction of robbery, with term of imprisonment of 62 months, constituted aggravated felony conviction for purposes of 16-level illegal reentry sentence enhancement, even though the defendant was adjudicated a youthful offender under New York State law).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/2nd/055969p.pdf

JUVENILES - CONSIDERATION OF JUVENILE DEFENSES IN DENIAL OF RELIEF AS A MATTER OF DISCRETION
Wallace v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 2588018 (2nd Cir. Sept. 1, 2006) (adjudication as a "Youthful Offender" under New York State criminal law, N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law 720.10-720.35, may be used in determining whether noncitizen should be granted adjustment of status as a matter of discretion, even those the adjudication is not a "conviction" for removability purposes).

Sixth Circuit

JUVENILES " CONVICTION " EXISTENCE OF CONVICTION
Hanna v. Holder, 740 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2014) (adjudication under Michigan's Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (YTA), Mich. Comp. Laws 762.11"16, is a conviction under the INA, since it is more similar to a deferred adjudication for youthful offenders than a true finding of juvenile delinquency); following Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 735 (6th Cir. 2005) (YTA adjudications are convictions under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), because they are not analogous to determinations of juvenile delinquency under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031"42).

Seventh Circuit

CONVICTION"JUVENILE
Rangel-Zuazo v. Holder, 2012 WL 432283 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 2012) (unpublished) (state decision to try a youthful offender as a juvenile or as an adult determines whether juvenile has suffered a "conviction" for purposes of removal under the INA; federal immigration law distinctions between juvenile and adult offenders, and between minors tried as juveniles and those tried as adults, are rational and do not violate the Equal Protection Clause).

RELIEF - NATURALIZATION - GOOD MORAL CHARACTER - AGGRAVATED FELONY BAR
O'Sullivan v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. Jul. 6, 2006) (affirming denial of naturalization where Congress has called for de novo review of naturalization cases; wartime veterans are not excused from showing good moral character before naturalizing; CIS regulation setting forth a time period for which a wartime veteran must show good moral character was a valid exercise of delegated power; and aggravated felony bar applies to wartime veterans). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/7th/052943p.pdf

Ninth Circuit

JUVENILE - ADJUDICATION REVERSED FOR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER FJDA TO IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION AND PROMPT ARRAIGNMENT, AND TO THE RIGHT TO ADVISE FROM RESPONSIBLE ADULT PRIOR TO INTERROGATION REQUIRING SUPPRESSION OF C
United States v. C.M., 485 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. May 8, 2007) (adjudication of delinquency of a juvenile Mexican national for transporting illegal aliens and related counts is reversed, and the juvenile information dismissed, where the juvenile was deprived of his rights under the Juvenile Delinquency Act to immediate notification and prompt arraignment, and to the advice and counsel of a responsible adult prior to interrogation; and a resulting confession was highly prejudicial and should not have been used against him to initiate his proceedings).

JUVENILE - FEDERAL - TRANSFER TO ADULT COURT
United States v. Juvenile, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Jun. 22, 2006) (district court may assume a juvenile's guilt of the crime charged for purposes of a motion to transfer a juvenile to adult status pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 5032 for criminal prosecution; assumption may not be expanded beyond the offense or offenses charged in the information). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0530410p.pdf

JUVENILES - FEDERAL - TRANSFER TO ADULT COURT
United States v. Juvenile, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jun. 22, 2006) (in deciding whether to transfer juvenile to adult court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. . 5032 for criminal prosecution, district court may, but is not required to, assume guilt; if it does, it must confine the assumption to the elements of the offense charged).

Eleventh Circuit

CONVICTION - ADULT CONVICTION OF JUVENILE
Singh v. U.S. Atty. Gen., ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2009 WL 604370 (11th Cir. Mar. 10, 2009) (per curiam) (a conviction of a noncitizen in adult court constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes, under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), no matter how old the person was at the time of the commission of the offense); accord, Vieira Garcia v. INS, 239 F.3d 409, 413-414 (1st Cir. 2001) (petitioner who was 17 years old at the time of the offense and who was convicted as an adult in Rhode Island, had suffered a conviction for immigration purposes because the INA's definition of conviction was clear and unambiguous, the immigration authorities were bound by the state court's determination to adjudicate the petitioner as an adult: "if Congress had wanted the INS to follow the FJDA at all times, it would have so stated."); Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2007) (16 year-old's state court conviction as an adult constituted a conviction under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A)); Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (definition of conviction under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), includes state court convictions and "does not sanction disregarding them because of the theoretical possibility that criminal conduct might be treated differently by federal authorities.").

CONVICTION - JUVENILE - ADULT COURT CONVICTION OF JUVENILE CONSTITUTES A CONVICTION FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES
Singh v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 553 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 2008) (conviction rendered in adult court constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes, no matter how old the noncitizen was at the time of the offense).

INADMISSIBILITY - REASON TO BELIEVE - ADMISSION OF RESPONDENT - YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE IMMIGRATION COURT FROM USING RESPONDENT'S ADMISSIONS TO ESTABLISH REASON TO BELIEVE GROUND OF INADMISSIBILITY
Castano v. INS, 956 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1992) (factual admissions could properly be considered by immigration courts in establishing the "reason to believe" ground of inadmissibility where a noncitizen's plea did not result in a conviction under the former Federal Youth Corrections Act: "We conclude that conviction and sentencing under the FYCA ought not actually improve petitioner's immigration status by disallowing the admission of the factual basis merely because of the invocation of the FYCA. (emphasis in original)."); contra, Matter of Seda, 17 I. & N. 550 (BIA 1980)(guilty plea cannot have greater consequences than the ultimate disposition of a case), modified on other grounds Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1988).

Other

CONVICTION - JUVENILE OFFENSES
Congress knows how to include adjudications of juvenile delinquency when it wishes to do so. For example, Congress recently provided, with respect to a specific new statute, that "The term `convicted' or a variant thereof, used with respect to a sex offense, includes adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for that offense, but only if the offender is 14 years of age or older at the time of the offense and the offense adjudicated was comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse (as described in section 2241 of title 18, United States Code), or was an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense." The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, H.R. 4472, Pub. L. 109-248, 111(8) (July 27, 2006).

CONVICTION - JUVELINE DELINQUENCY NOT A "CONVICTION"
United States v. Davis, 234 F.Supp.2d 601 (E.D.Va.2002), affirmed 359 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2002) (adjudications of juvenile delinquency, under Virginia law, did not constitute prior "convictions" sufficient to constitute predicate conviction for federal offense of being felon in possession of firearm).

GOOD MORAL CHARACTER - CHILD - PRESUMPTION
A child who is less than 14 years of age is presumed to be a person of good moral character and is not required to submit affidavits of good moral character, police clearances, criminal background checks, or other evidence of good moral character. INA 204.2(e)(2)(iv).

INADMISSIBILITY - VISA FRAUD - FRAUD BY MINORS
When the child is under 18, there is a good argument that he or she cannot knowingly commit fraud. If someone else (but not the child) indicated that the child was a USC by presenting a USC birth certificate at the border, the child did not make a false claim to United States citizenship, or engage in visa fraud, but merely made an EWI entry. Thanks to Leonor Perretta.

CRIM DEF - JUVENILE
National Juvenile Defender Center has recently updated their Juvenile Delinquency Notebook, available here: http://www.njdc.info/publications.php