(A)  Dispositions in Juvenile Court.  Immigration authorities recognize that juvenile proceedings result in civil findings of delinquency and therefore do not constitute criminal convictions.[271]  Thus, the long-standing rule is that an adjudication of juvenile delinquency does not constitute a conviction for immigration purposes.  The enactment of the new definition of “conviction” by the IIRAIRA did not alter this result.[272]  Under federal gang legislation, Congress defined “conviction” to include “a finding, under State or Federal law, that a person has committed an act of juvenile delinquency involving a violent or controlled substances felony.”[273]  Since Congress knows how to define conviction to include a finding of juvenile delinquency, but did not do so in the immigration context, Congress did not intend juvenile adjudications to be considered to be convictions in the immigration context. 

 

            Therefore, a person in juvenile proceedings can be found guilty of theft, for example, and the DHS will not consider that to be a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.[274]  It simply is not considered a qualifying “conviction” for immigration purposes.[275]

[271] Matter of Devison, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000); Matter of De La Nues, 18 I. & N. Dec. 140 (BIA 1981); Matter of Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 135 (BIA 1981) (Cuban conviction); Matter of F, 4 I. & N. Dec. 726 (BIA 1952); Matter of A, 3 I. & N. Dec. 368 (BIA 1948); Matter of O’N, 2 I. & N. Dec. 319 (AG 1945). The BIA’s holdings in the earlier of these cases were adopted by the State Department in 52 Fed. Reg. 17,942 (May 13, 1987) (amending (former) 22 C.F.R § § 41.91(a)(9) and (10) and 42.91(a)(9) and (10)) (new rule inapplicable to a juvenile tried as an adult for a violent crime).

[272] Matter of Devison, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000).

[273] 18 U.S.C. § 521. 

[274] United States ex rel. Cerami v. Uhl, 78 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1935) (minor committed to juvenile facility, rather than prison, held not convicted of deportable offense); Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F.Supp. 433 (D.N.Y. 1958) (conviction for petty larceny in 1914, at the age of 16 or 17, for which noncitizen was committed to a juvenile house of refuge rather than to a prison, did not constitute conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude); Matter of CM, 5 I. & N. Dec. 327 (BIA 1953); Matter of Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 135 (BIA 1981); Matter of N, 3 I. & N. Dec. 723 (BIA 1949) (juvenile delinquency not considered deportable conviction).

[275] Counsel may also try challenging a conviction on a jurisdictional basis where a noncitizen client claims he was a juvenile at the time of the conviction.  See United States v. Ceja-Prado, 333 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. June 25, 2003) (case remanded for determination whether defendant was actually a juvenile at the time he entered his guilty plea, since federal courts have no jurisdiction over certain juvenile prosecutions).

Second Circuit

CONVICTION - JUVENILE
Savchuk v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2008) (New York conviction of grand larceny in the Fourth Degree, in violation of Section 155.30 of the New York Penal Law, a Class E felony, constituted a conviction, under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), for deportation purposes under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for multiple CMT convictions, despite the fact that it was committed while the noncitizen was under the age of 18 years, since he pled guilty after he turned eighteen and New York treated him as an adult offender, rejecting the argument that if this case had arisen under federal criminal law, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act would not have permitted transfer to adult court, and the federal juvenile adjudication would not have been considered a conviction for immigration purposes).

The court stated: "While Savchuck's approach is inventive, it finds no support in the text of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A) . . . . The statute encompasses state court adjudications and does not sanction disregarding them because of the theoretical possibility that criminal conduct might be treated differently by federal authorities. Savchuck's position has been rejected by the First and Ninth Circuits. See Vieira Garcia v. INS, 239 F.3d 409, 413 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Once adjudicated by the state court, as either a juvenile or an adult, we are bound by that determination."); Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding state treatment of petitioner as adult determinative). We join these Circuits and hold that, because Savchuck's grand larceny conviction qualifies as a conviction under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), the BIA correctly found him removable." (Savchuk v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2008).

CONVICTION - JUVENILE - NEW YORK YOUTHFUL CONVICTION PROPERLY CONSIDERED AGGRAVATED FELONY FOR ILLEGAL REENTRY SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT PURPOSES
United States v. Pereira, 465 F.3d515, 2006 WL 2925642 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 2006)( New York conviction of robbery, with term of imprisonment of 62 months, constituted aggravated felony conviction for purposes of 16-level illegal reentry sentence enhancement, even though the defendant was adjudicated a youthful offender under New York State law).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/2nd/055969p.pdf

JUVENILES - CONSIDERATION OF JUVENILE DEFENSES IN DENIAL OF RELIEF AS A MATTER OF DISCRETION
Wallace v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 2588018 (2nd Cir. Sept. 1, 2006) (adjudication as a "Youthful Offender" under New York State criminal law, N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law 720.10-720.35, may be used in determining whether noncitizen should be granted adjustment of status as a matter of discretion, even those the adjudication is not a "conviction" for removability purposes).

Sixth Circuit

JUVENILES " CONVICTION " EXISTENCE OF CONVICTION
Hanna v. Holder, 740 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2014) (adjudication under Michigan's Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (YTA), Mich. Comp. Laws 762.11"16, is a conviction under the INA, since it is more similar to a deferred adjudication for youthful offenders than a true finding of juvenile delinquency); following Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 735 (6th Cir. 2005) (YTA adjudications are convictions under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), because they are not analogous to determinations of juvenile delinquency under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031"42).

Seventh Circuit

CONVICTION"JUVENILE
Rangel-Zuazo v. Holder, 2012 WL 432283 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 2012) (unpublished) (state decision to try a youthful offender as a juvenile or as an adult determines whether juvenile has suffered a "conviction" for purposes of removal under the INA; federal immigration law distinctions between juvenile and adult offenders, and between minors tried as juveniles and those tried as adults, are rational and do not violate the Equal Protection Clause).

RELIEF - NATURALIZATION - GOOD MORAL CHARACTER - AGGRAVATED FELONY BAR
O'Sullivan v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. Jul. 6, 2006) (affirming denial of naturalization where Congress has called for de novo review of naturalization cases; wartime veterans are not excused from showing good moral character before naturalizing; CIS regulation setting forth a time period for which a wartime veteran must show good moral character was a valid exercise of delegated power; and aggravated felony bar applies to wartime veterans). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/7th/052943p.pdf

Ninth Circuit

JUVENILE - ADJUDICATION REVERSED FOR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER FJDA TO IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION AND PROMPT ARRAIGNMENT, AND TO THE RIGHT TO ADVISE FROM RESPONSIBLE ADULT PRIOR TO INTERROGATION REQUIRING SUPPRESSION OF C
United States v. C.M., 485 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. May 8, 2007) (adjudication of delinquency of a juvenile Mexican national for transporting illegal aliens and related counts is reversed, and the juvenile information dismissed, where the juvenile was deprived of his rights under the Juvenile Delinquency Act to immediate notification and prompt arraignment, and to the advice and counsel of a responsible adult prior to interrogation; and a resulting confession was highly prejudicial and should not have been used against him to initiate his proceedings).

JUVENILE - FEDERAL - TRANSFER TO ADULT COURT
United States v. Juvenile, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Jun. 22, 2006) (district court may assume a juvenile's guilt of the crime charged for purposes of a motion to transfer a juvenile to adult status pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 5032 for criminal prosecution; assumption may not be expanded beyond the offense or offenses charged in the information). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0530410p.pdf

JUVENILES - FEDERAL - TRANSFER TO ADULT COURT
United States v. Juvenile, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jun. 22, 2006) (in deciding whether to transfer juvenile to adult court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. . 5032 for criminal prosecution, district court may, but is not required to, assume guilt; if it does, it must confine the assumption to the elements of the offense charged).

Eleventh Circuit

CONVICTION - ADULT CONVICTION OF JUVENILE
Singh v. U.S. Atty. Gen., ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2009 WL 604370 (11th Cir. Mar. 10, 2009) (per curiam) (a conviction of a noncitizen in adult court constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes, under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), no matter how old the person was at the time of the commission of the offense); accord, Vieira Garcia v. INS, 239 F.3d 409, 413-414 (1st Cir. 2001) (petitioner who was 17 years old at the time of the offense and who was convicted as an adult in Rhode Island, had suffered a conviction for immigration purposes because the INA's definition of conviction was clear and unambiguous, the immigration authorities were bound by the state court's determination to adjudicate the petitioner as an adult: "if Congress had wanted the INS to follow the FJDA at all times, it would have so stated."); Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2007) (16 year-old's state court conviction as an adult constituted a conviction under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A)); Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (definition of conviction under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), includes state court convictions and "does not sanction disregarding them because of the theoretical possibility that criminal conduct might be treated differently by federal authorities.").

CONVICTION - JUVENILE - ADULT COURT CONVICTION OF JUVENILE CONSTITUTES A CONVICTION FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES
Singh v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 553 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 2008) (conviction rendered in adult court constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes, no matter how old the noncitizen was at the time of the offense).

INADMISSIBILITY - REASON TO BELIEVE - ADMISSION OF RESPONDENT - YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE IMMIGRATION COURT FROM USING RESPONDENT'S ADMISSIONS TO ESTABLISH REASON TO BELIEVE GROUND OF INADMISSIBILITY
Castano v. INS, 956 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1992) (factual admissions could properly be considered by immigration courts in establishing the "reason to believe" ground of inadmissibility where a noncitizen's plea did not result in a conviction under the former Federal Youth Corrections Act: "We conclude that conviction and sentencing under the FYCA ought not actually improve petitioner's immigration status by disallowing the admission of the factual basis merely because of the invocation of the FYCA. (emphasis in original)."); contra, Matter of Seda, 17 I. & N. 550 (BIA 1980)(guilty plea cannot have greater consequences than the ultimate disposition of a case), modified on other grounds Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546 (BIA 1988).

Other

CONVICTION - JUVENILE OFFENSES
Congress knows how to include adjudications of juvenile delinquency when it wishes to do so. For example, Congress recently provided, with respect to a specific new statute, that "The term `convicted' or a variant thereof, used with respect to a sex offense, includes adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for that offense, but only if the offender is 14 years of age or older at the time of the offense and the offense adjudicated was comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse (as described in section 2241 of title 18, United States Code), or was an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense." The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, H.R. 4472, Pub. L. 109-248, 111(8) (July 27, 2006).

CONVICTION - JUVELINE DELINQUENCY NOT A "CONVICTION"
United States v. Davis, 234 F.Supp.2d 601 (E.D.Va.2002), affirmed 359 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2002) (adjudications of juvenile delinquency, under Virginia law, did not constitute prior "convictions" sufficient to constitute predicate conviction for federal offense of being felon in possession of firearm).

GOOD MORAL CHARACTER - CHILD - PRESUMPTION
A child who is less than 14 years of age is presumed to be a person of good moral character and is not required to submit affidavits of good moral character, police clearances, criminal background checks, or other evidence of good moral character. INA 204.2(e)(2)(iv).

INADMISSIBILITY - VISA FRAUD - FRAUD BY MINORS
When the child is under 18, there is a good argument that he or she cannot knowingly commit fraud. If someone else (but not the child) indicated that the child was a USC by presenting a USC birth certificate at the border, the child did not make a false claim to United States citizenship, or engage in visa fraud, but merely made an EWI entry. Thanks to Leonor Perretta.

CRIM DEF - JUVENILE
National Juvenile Defender Center has recently updated their Juvenile Delinquency Notebook, available here: http://www.njdc.info/publications.php