The basic elements of the aggravated felony ground for removal are: (1) alienage, see § 3.3, infra; (2) conviction, see § § 3.7, 3.31-3.47, infra; (3) for a crime, see § 3.8, infra; (4) committed after the effective date, see § 3.9, infra; (5) after admission, see § 3.10, infra; (5) of attempt, conspiracy, or a substantive offense, see § § 3.15, 3.48-3.54, infra; (6) that falls within a generic aggravated felony category, see § 3.19, infra; (7) in violation of the law of a listed jurisdiction.  See § § 3.20-3.30, infra.  Unless each of these elements exists, the noncitizen is not deportable on account of this ground of deportation.  Whether a particular offense meets the federal “aggravated felony” definition is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 (Aggravated Felony categories) and Appendix A (complete index of cases concerning whether a particular conviction falls within a particular Aggravated Felony category).

 

AGGRAVATED FELONY"STATUTORY INTERPRETATION"INVOLVING MEANS NECESSARILY ENTAILS
Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 1166 (Feb. 21, 2012) (statutory definition of fraud aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), courts general test for whether the conviction was for an offense involving fraud or deceit was whether it was an offense with elements that necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct.).

BIA

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - IIRAIRA CRIMINAL DEPORTATION GROUNDS - CONGRESSIONAL INTENT - BROAD INTERPRETATION
Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, ___ (BIA May 20, 2008) ("In seeking to identify the "federal policies" underlying section 237(a)(2)(E)(i), we find it significant that the provision was enacted pursuant to the IIRIRA as part of an aggressive legislative movement to expand the criminal grounds of deportability in general and to create a "comprehensive statutory scheme to cover crimes against children" in particular. Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, supra, at 994. In addition to the changes brought about through the enactment of section 237(a)(2)(E)(i), for example, Congress also expanded the aggravated felony definition to encompass offenses involving the "sexual abuse of a minor." See IIRIRA 321(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 3009-627 (amending section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Act); see also United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 234 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 2000) (referring to the IIRIRA as "expansive legislation" and recognizing, in the aggravated felony context, that the statute was "intended to sweep a broad range of offenses" into the grounds of deportability); H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 505-06 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference). Prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA, the immigration laws did not subject aliens convicted of crimes against children to any particular disadvantage vis-a-vis other criminal aliens. By enacting section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act and other provisions augmenting the aggravated felony definition, however, Congress clearly intended to single out those who have been convicted of maltreating or preying upon children. In view of the fact that section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act is the product of a significant expansion of the grounds of deportability and was aimed at facilitating the removal of child abusers in particular, it is our view that the term "crime of child abuse" should be interpreted broadly in this context.").

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - IIRAIRA CRIMINAL DEPORTATION GROUNDS - CONGRESSIONAL INTENT - BROAD INTERPRETATION
Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, ___ (BIA May 20, 2008) (broad statutory purposes cannot carry interpretation past the language of the statute: "Thus, while we agree with the DHS that Congress intended section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) to be construed broadly, the statute's general purpose cannot supersede its language, which plainly focuses on those crimes of which an alien has been "convicted." We note in this regard that Congress's broad, enforcement-oriented purposes have not prevented courts from determining that other criminal grounds of deportability are subject to the categorical approach. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 127 S. Ct. at 818 (discussing the applicability of the categorical approach in the context of a "theft offense" aggravated felony); Medina v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying the categorical approach in the context of a "controlled substance violation" under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act); United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the categorical approach in the context of a "sexual abuse of a minor" aggravated felony).").