BIA

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - IIRAIRA CRIMINAL DEPORTATION GROUNDS - CONGRESSIONAL INTENT - BROAD INTERPRETATION
Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, ___ (BIA May 20, 2008) ("In seeking to identify the "federal policies" underlying section 237(a)(2)(E)(i), we find it significant that the provision was enacted pursuant to the IIRIRA as part of an aggressive legislative movement to expand the criminal grounds of deportability in general and to create a "comprehensive statutory scheme to cover crimes against children" in particular. Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, supra, at 994. In addition to the changes brought about through the enactment of section 237(a)(2)(E)(i), for example, Congress also expanded the aggravated felony definition to encompass offenses involving the "sexual abuse of a minor." See IIRIRA 321(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 3009-627 (amending section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Act); see also United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 234 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 2000) (referring to the IIRIRA as "expansive legislation" and recognizing, in the aggravated felony context, that the statute was "intended to sweep a broad range of offenses" into the grounds of deportability); H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 505-06 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference). Prior to the enactment of the IIRIRA, the immigration laws did not subject aliens convicted of crimes against children to any particular disadvantage vis-a-vis other criminal aliens. By enacting section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act and other provisions augmenting the aggravated felony definition, however, Congress clearly intended to single out those who have been convicted of maltreating or preying upon children. In view of the fact that section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act is the product of a significant expansion of the grounds of deportability and was aimed at facilitating the removal of child abusers in particular, it is our view that the term "crime of child abuse" should be interpreted broadly in this context.").

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - IIRAIRA CRIMINAL DEPORTATION GROUNDS - CONGRESSIONAL INTENT - BROAD INTERPRETATION
Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, ___ (BIA May 20, 2008) (broad statutory purposes cannot carry interpretation past the language of the statute: "Thus, while we agree with the DHS that Congress intended section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) to be construed broadly, the statute's general purpose cannot supersede its language, which plainly focuses on those crimes of which an alien has been "convicted." We note in this regard that Congress's broad, enforcement-oriented purposes have not prevented courts from determining that other criminal grounds of deportability are subject to the categorical approach. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 127 S. Ct. at 818 (discussing the applicability of the categorical approach in the context of a "theft offense" aggravated felony); Medina v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying the categorical approach in the context of a "controlled substance violation" under section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act); United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the categorical approach in the context of a "sexual abuse of a minor" aggravated felony).").

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - DEPORTATION GROUND - CRIME OF CHILD ABUSE - CONGRESS DID NOT INVITE "EXTRA ELEMENT" EXCEPTION TO CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS LIMITATION TO ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE OR RECORD OF CONVICTION
Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, ___ (BIA May 20, 2008) ("Yet there is nothing in the language of the "crime of child abuse" clause of section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) that invites inquiry into facts unrelated to an alien's "convicted conduct." Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that application of the categorical approach will render section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) so underinclusive as to defeat the purpose of the statute. Most States have criminal statutes that are designed to punish child abuse in its various forms, and many of these statutes protect children exclusively.").

Second Circuit

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - STALKING - INA NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2008) (stalking provision of the removal statute, INA 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), is not unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied).