(B)

Suspension Based on Ten Years.  A person who is deportable under one of the crime-related grounds of deportation, such as the moral turpitude, controlled substances, or aggravated felony provisions, must show ten years of continuous physical presence and Good Moral Character immediately following the event that rendered him or her deportable.[423]  Thus, even defendants who have a serious conviction in the distant past may still be eligible for this form of suspension (assuming, of course, that their deportation proceedings began before April 1, 1997 and that they are otherwise eligible).

 

Conviction of an aggravated felony is a permanent bar to a finding of Good Moral Character if the conviction occurred after November 29, 1990.  See N. Tooby & J. Rollin, Criminal Defense of Immigrants § 15.6 (4th ed. 2007).

 

Suspension may still be granted if the conviction occurred before that date. 

[423] INA § 244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2).  The BIA has held that where a conviction is the event that makes the person inadmissible, the ten years runs from the date of conviction, not the date of commission of the offense.  Matter of P, 6 I. & N. Dec. 788 (BIA 1955).

Third Circuit

RELIEF - SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION - CONTINUOUS PRESENCE REQUIREMENT - STOP-TIME RULE - RETROACTIVE APPLICATION DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
Arca-Pineda v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. May 28, 2008) (retroactive application of the stop-time rule did not violate due process).

RELIEF - CONTINUOUS PRESENCE REQUIREMENT - STOP-TIME RULE - EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL CLAIM REJECTED
Arca-Pineda v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. May 28, 2008) (respondent cannot re-start clock by failing to appear for removal proceeding and then waiting an additional 10 years).

RELIEF - SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION - STOP-TIME RULE
Arca-Pineda v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. May 28, 2008) (continuous physical presence clock did not begin to run again after an administrative closure; administrative closure is not a termination proceedings; it only removes the case from the IJs calendar).

Seventh Circuit

RELIEF " SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION
Torres-Rendon v. Holder, 656 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (application for suspension of deportation under former INA 244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(2), was properly denied for lack of the necessary period of continuous presence: The period of continuous physical presence ended at the time Torres"Rendon committed his drug crime in 1987, or, in the alternative, when an Order to Show Cause was issued to him in 1988. He cannot restart the clock and accrue time for purposes of establishing his continuous physical presence and thus cannot establish 10 years of continuous physical presence.); following Matter of Nolasco"Tofino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 632, 641 (BIA 1999) (holding that the stop-time rule applies to all suspension of deportation applications generally); see Angel"Ramos v. Reno, 227 F.3d 942 (7th Cir.2000); but see Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585 (3d Cir.2005) (because the alien lawfully re-entered the United States after committing a controlled substance offense, the continuous physical presence period should recommence); but cf. Briseno"Flores v. Atty. Gen. U.S., 492 F.3d 226 (3d Cir.2007) (finding that the alien stopped accruing time of continuous physical presence when he committed his first offense and noting: we conclude that the BIA's interpretation of 1229b(d)(1) in Mendoza is reasonable, even though others may disagree with it. Therefore, under Chevron, that interpretation is entitled to deference.).