In order to be eligible for any form of cancellation of removal, except Special Rule Cancellation,[80] a noncitizen must have been lawfully present in the United States in any status continuously for a specified period of time prior to the date of commission of the offense or prior to the date of initiation of removal proceedings, whichever comes first.[81]  The required periods differ depending on whether the noncitizen is a lawful permanent resident (seven years),[82] a non-lawful permanent resident (ten years),[83] or a noncitizen that falls within the provisions of the Violence Against Women’s Act (three years).[84]

 

It was previously understood that for lawful permanent residents, the required period of residence since admission begins at any lawful admission, e.g., admission as a tourist, refugee, or lawful permanent resident.[6]  This may no longer be the case.  The BIA has recently held that the five-year admission requirement, to trigger[7] (deportation for single crime of moral turpitude within five years of admission), starts fresh with each admission.[8]  This decision could also mean that the continuous physical presence period for cancellation for lawful permanent residents restarts upon each admission (e.g., adjustment from H1-B status to LPR).  This issue will likely turn upon statutory language requiring the noncitizen to have seven years presence “after having been admitted in any status.”[9]  A number of courts disagree with this decision.  See § 5.5, infra.

 

Adjustment to lawful permanent residence should be held to constitute an admission for purposes of the seven-year continuous presence requirement even where the noncitizen did not initially enter lawfully.[10]  Neither the non-LPR nor VAWA forms of cancellation require that the initial admission be lawful.  The time a noncitizen is in the United States under Temporary Protected Status[11] is not counted toward the period of continuous physical presence.[12] 

 

            The seven years continuous residence ends either when a Notice to Appear is issued (except in the case of VAWA applicants), or the noncitizen “commits” certain offenses.  The offense committed must a) be referred to in INA § 212(a)(2), and b) cause the person to be deportable or inadmissible under the designated grounds.  Section 212(a)(2) lists grounds of inadmissibility triggered by convictions for CMTs and controlled substances offenses, and multiple convictions of any sort with a five-year sentence imposed, but not others.[85]  If an act or conviction is not referred to in INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), it does not stop accrual of time under INA § 240A(d), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d) for purposes of LPR cancellation of removal.  The offense need not have been charged in the NTA as a ground of removal.[14]

 

            Commission of a CMT also does not stop the clock where the Petty Offense, Youthful Offender, or Political Offense exceptions prevent the conviction from triggering inadmissibility.[86]  The BIA has held that the clock stops on the date of commission of the offense,[87] even where a conviction or some other act was needed to make the person inadmissible or deportable.[88]  However, if the first conviction is vacated on a ground of legal invalidity, this arguably un-stops the clock.  See § 10.3, infra.

            In Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales,[89] the Ninth Circuit has held that the stop-time rule did not apply to convictions[90] that occurred prior to April 1, 1997.  The court soon limited this holding to persons who were eligible for cancellation of removal on April 1, 1997, but for the stop-time rule.[91]  That is, the noncitizen must have accrued the full seven years physical presence before April 1, 1997 for the stop-time rule.  This limitation likely also requires that the noncitizen must have met the 5-year LPR requirement by April 1, 1997 as well.

 

            The Fifth Circuit had also found the stop-time rule to be impermissibly retroactive, but later de-published the decision.[92]  Four district courts had also held that the stop-time rule does not apply to convictions entered before April 1, 1997.[93]  Other courts, including the BIA, disagree.[94]

[95] See § 3.22, infra; 8 C.F.R. § 240.64(b).

[96] INA § 240A(d)(1).

[97] INA § 240A(a)(2).  The stop-time rule does not apply to accrual of the five years lawful permanent resident status required under INA § 240A(1).

[98] INA § 240A(b)(1)(A).

[99] INA § 240A(b)(2)(A)(ii).  Commencement of immigration proceedings does not stop the clock for noncitizens eligible for cancellation under this provision.

[100] A parent’s admission for permanent resident status is imputed to the parent’s unemancipated minor children residing with the parent.  Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2005).

[101] INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).

[102] Matter of Shanu, 23 I. & N. Dec. 754 (BIA 2005).

[80] INA § 240A(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2).

[81] See Matter of Rosas, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616 (BIA 1999).

[82] See § 3.36, infra.

[83] INA § 244(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(e).

[84] Examples of offenses that are not referred to in § 212(a)(2) but that could make a person deportable under § 237(a)(2) or (4) are firearms offenses (basis for deportability but not inadmissibility), simple assault against a spouse or violation of a temporary restraining order (a basis for deportability under the domestic violence ground, but not a basis for inadmissibility unless it is found to be turpitudinous), and drug addiction or abuse (basis for inadmissibility, but in § 212(a)(1) rather than in 212(a)(2)). 

[85] Matter of Jurado-Delgado, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29 (BIA Sept. 28, 2006) (commission of offense stops the clock for cancellation of removal, by terminating a period of continuous residence in the United States pursuant to INA § 240A(d)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(i)(B), even though the offense was not charged as nor found to be a ground of inadmissibility or deportability), distinguishing Matter of Fortiz, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1199 (BIA 1998).  See also Salviejo-Fernandez v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting due process challenge to use of uncharged conviction to find a noncitizen ineligible for relief).

[86] Matter of Deanda-Romo, 23 I. & N. Dec. 597 (BIA 2003) (CMT conviction falling within petty offense exception does not trigger stop-time rule for cancellation of removal, under INA § 240A(d)(1)(B); noncitizen had accrued seven years before second CMT offense was committed).

[87] Even if a conviction constituted a CMT, respondent can argue that the stop-time rule of INA § 240A(d) does not apply to pre-IIRAIRA acts. See Henry v. Ashcroft, 175 F. Supp. 2d 688 (S.D. N.Y. 2001); but see Matter of Perez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 689 (BIA 1999) (decided prior to St Cyr).  See also Otarola v. INS, 270 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing BIA decision to apply stop-time rule because frivolous INS appeal kept case alive until stop-time rule came into effect).

[88] Matter of Perez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 689 (BIA 1999).  See dissent by four Board members for appellate arguments.

[89] Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. Nov. 22, 2006).

[90] Not commission.

[91] Valencia-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1319 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2006).

[92] Gonzalez-Garcia v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. Nov. 16, 2005) (convictions that pre-date the April 1, 1997 effective date of INA § 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) [cancellation stop-time rule] do not stop the clock for purposes of cancellation of removal), withdrawn from publication.

[93] Mulholland v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-0701 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2004) (unpublished) (IIRAIRA stop-time rule cannot be applied to bar cancellation of removal based upon pre-IIRAIRA conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude); Generi v. Ashcroft, No. 4:03-CV-15 (W.D.Mi. Feb. 19, 2004) (unpublished) (stop-time provision may not be applied retroactively to guilty pleas entered prior to the passage of IIRAIRA where proceedings were begun post-IIRAIRA); Henry v. Ashcroft, 175 F.Supp.2d 688 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).  One court held this rule does not apply to the offense date.  Worrell v. Ashcroft, 207 F.Supp.2d 61, 67 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (stop-time rule is not an impermissibly retroactive application to someone who committed the crime before the effective date).

[94] Peralta v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. Mar. 23, 2006) (stop-time rule for cancellation of removal applies retroactively to convictions prior to IIRAIRA); Matter of Jurado-Delgado, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29 (BIA Sept. 28, 2006) (commission of criminal offense mentioned in INA § 212(a)(2) that constitutes a ground of inadmissibility or deportability stops accrual pursuant to INA § 240A(d)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(i)B) of period of continuous residence for cancellation of removal even though committed prior to effective date of IIRAIRA), following Matter of Perez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 689 (BIA 1999); Matter of Robles, 24 I. & N. Dec. 22 (BIA 2006) (Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), does not require different conclusion). 

RELIEF " LPR CANCELLATION " CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE " CANNOT IMPUTE PARENTS RESIDENCE TO MINOR
Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (May 21, 2012) (LPR cancellation applicant cannot impute parent's time or residence or continuous residence to establish eligibility; BIA construction of the statute is reasonable under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)), abrogating Cuevas"Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005), and Mercado"Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). NOTE: This decision made no mention of Brand-X.

BIA

RELIEF " LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CONTINUOUS PRESENCE "VOLUNTARY RETURN
Matter of Castrejon-Colino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 667 (BIA 2015) (where an alien has the right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge, a voluntary departure or return does not break the aliens continuous physical presence for purposes of cancellation of removal under INA 240A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2012), in the absence of evidence that he or she was informed of and waived the right to such a hearing; although the taking of photographs and fingerprints in conjunction with a voluntary return may be part of a formal, documented process, it is insufficient to meet the requirements of Matter of Avilez without any evidence that it was associated with a legally enforced refusal of admission and return); clarifying Matter of Avilez, 23 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 2005). CD4:24.6;AF:2.6;CMT3:3.6 RELIEF " LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CONTINUOUS PRESENCE "VOLUNTARY RETURN Matter of Garcia Ramirez, 26 I&N Dec. 674 (BIA 2015) (where an alien has the right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge, a voluntary departure or return does not break the aliens continuous physical presence for purposes of cancellation of removal under INA 240A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2012), in the absence of evidence that he or she was informed of and waived the right to such a hearing); clarifying Matter of Avilez, 23 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 2005).

RELIEF " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " STOP-TIME RULE IS NOT TRIGGERED BY A NOTICE OF APPEAR THAT WAS NEVER SERVED ON THE COURT
Matter of Ordaz, 26 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 2015) (a notice to appear that was served on an alien but never resulted in the commencement of removal proceedings does not have "stop-time" effect for purposes of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal pursuant to INA 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)). NOTE: This decision could potentially be used to argue for something like repapering (issuing a new NTA to allow noncitizen to have 10 years presence) as a form of prosecutorial discretion, except one would need to intercept the NTA before it is served on the court.

RELIEF " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " SPECIAL RULE CANCELLATION "212(H) CANNOT WAIVE INADMISSIBILITY FOR PURPOSES OF SPECIAL RULE CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL
Matter of Y-N-P-, 26 I&N Dec. 10 (BIA 2012) (an applicant for special rule cancellation of removal under INA 240A(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2), cannot utilize a waiver of inadmissibility INA 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), to overcome the cancellation bar of INA 240A(b)(2)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. 12296(b)(2)(A)(iv), bar for crimes).

RELIEF " WAIVERS " NON-LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE CONVICTION BAR CANNOT BE OVERCOME BY WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY UNDER INA 212(h)
Matter of Bustamante, 25 I&N Dec. 564 (BIA 2011) (the bar to cancellation of removal, in INA 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C), which precludes an alien who has been convicted of an offense under INA 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2), from establishing eligibility for relief, may not be overcome by a waiver under INA 212(h)). http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol25/3722.pdf

RELIEF " CANCELLATION " STOP-TIME RULE " PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION
Matter of Garcia, 25 I.& N. Dec. 332 (BIA 2010) (conviction for a single crime involving moral turpitude that qualifies as a petty offense is not for an offense referred to in section 212(a)(2), for purposes of triggering the stop-time rule even if it renders the alien removable under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C 1227 (a)(2)(A)(i).)

RELIEF"WAIVERS"CANCELLATION"STOP-TIME RULE"NOTICE TO APPEAR
Matter of Cisneros, 23 I. & N. Dec. 668, 672 (BIA 2004) ([B]oth the overall design of the statute and Congress' concerns leading to its enactment indicate that the ``stop-time'' rule was not intended to extend to charging documents issued in earlier proceedings. Consequently, we conclude that the ``notice to appear'' referred to in section 240A(d)(1) pertains only to the charging document served in the proceedings in which the alien applies for cancellation of removal, and not to charging documents served on the alien in prior proceedings.). Thanks to Jonathan Moore.

RELIEF " CANCELLATION FOR LPRS " CONTINUOUS PRESENCE " ADMISSION IN ANY STATUS " AMNESTY TEMPORARY RESIDENT DATE COUNTS AS ADMISSION
Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 689 (BIA 1999) (admission as a temporary resident for amnesty applicants " prior to grant of permanent residency " counts as admission in any status for purposes of continuous presence requirement for cancellation of removal for Lawful Permanent Residents, under INA 240 A (a), 8 U.S.C. 12296 (a)).

First Circuit

RELIEF " CANCELLATION " STOP-TIME RULE
Soto v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1009 (1st Cir. Dec. 3, 2013) (clock for purposes of stop-time rule for cancellation of removal ended on date NTA was served on the noncitizen, even though it was not served on the Immigration Court until two years later).

RELIEF " CANCELLATION " STOP-TIME RULE
Cheung v. Holder, 678 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. May 2, 2012)(service of Notice to Appear was effective to stop accrual of continuous presence, even though the fraud charge filed in the NTA was withdrawn and a new charge, overstaying, was later added, since the NTA itself was never withdrawn).

Second Circuit

RELIEF " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT " STOP-TIME RULE
Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 2365838 (2d Cir. May 19, 2015) (notice to appear triggered the stop-time rule, under INA 240A(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(A), for the continuous residence requirement for cancellation of removal, even though it omitted the date and time of the initial removal hearing).

RELIEF"CANCELLATION FOR NON-LPRS"STOP-TIME RULE"SERVICE OF NTA
Guamanrrigra v. Holder, 670 F.3d 404 (2d cir. Feb. 24, 2012) (service of a Notice to Appear, which did not specify the time or date of the hearing, followed by an NTA that did, stopped the clock for the 10-year continuous presence requirement for non-LPR cancellation of removal under INA 240A(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(A) as of the date of the second notice).

RELIEF - CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL - STOP-TIME RULE NOT IMPERMISSIBLY RETROACTIVE
Martinez v. INS, 523 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2008) (application of the stop-time rule under INA 240A(d)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(B), as applied to a conviction occurring before IIRAIRA effective date was not impermissibly retroactive).

Third Circuit

WAIVERS " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " STOP-TIME RULE
Guzman v. Attorney General U.S., 770 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. Nov. 3, 2014) (the stop-time rule, as enacted by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104"208, div. C., 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (IIRIRA) (effective April 1, 1997), codified at INA 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1), is not impermissibly retroactive as applied to a 1995 criminal offense, where the commission and conviction pre-date the effective date of the stop-time rule, since the passage of IIRIRA did not change the legal consequences that faced petitioner as a result of his 1995 conviction; he was deportable in 1995 with no avenue for relief, just as he is deportable today, and the loss of an opportunity to delay deportation proceedings does not create a "new disability" under Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994)). Note: Unlike Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006), and Guzman v. Attorney General U.S., 770 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. Nov. 3, 2014), the noncitizen in this case would not have been eligible for cancellation of removal on April 1, 1997, but for the stop-time rule

RELIEF " WAIVERS " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT " STOP-TIME RULE
Nelson v. Attorney General of U.S., 685 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. May 22, 2012) (when a qualifying conviction stops the accrual of continuous presence, under INA 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229B(d)(1) for purposes of cancellation of removal, the noncitizen may not thereafter begin a new period); following Briseno"Flores v. Attorney General, 492 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2007); Matter of Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1236, 1241 (BIA 2000) (once an alien's period of continuous presence or residence is terminated by the stop-time provision, INA 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229B(d)(1) " through service of a notice to appear or commission of a specified offense " it does not restart, and the alien does not automatically begin accruing a new period following the cessation of the first one)

RELIEF " LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CONTINUOUS PRESENCE REQUIREMENT " STOP-TIME RULE
Santos-Reyes v. Attorney General, 660 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2011) (date of commission of an offense, rather than date of arrests, tiggers the stop-time rule under INA 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)).

RELIEF " WAIVERS " NON-LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE
Flores-Nova v. Attorney General of the U.S., __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 2989709 (3d Cir. Jul. 25, 2011) (no humanitarian exception exists to the 90/180 day absence rule breaking periods of continuous physical presence for non-LPRs).

RELIEF " WAIVERS " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL FOR NON-LPRS " CONTINUOUS PRESENCE REQUIREMENT
Demandstein v. Attorney General of the US, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 652751 (3d Cir. May 10, 2011) (deportation and illegal re-entry breaks period of continuous physical presence). CD4:24.6;AF:2.6;CMT3:3.6

RELIEF - CONTINUOUS PRESENCE REQUIREMENT - STOP-TIME RULE - EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL CLAIM REJECTED
Arca-Pineda v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. May 28, 2008) (respondent cannot re-start clock by failing to appear for removal proceeding and then waiting an additional 10 years).

RELIEF - CANCELLATION - STOP-TIME RULE
Arca-Pineda v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. May 28, 2008) (continuous physical presence clock did not begin to run again after an administrative closure; administrative closure is not a termination proceedings; it only removes the case from the IJs calendar).

Fourth Circuit

RELIEF " NON-LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION
Hernandez v. Holder, 783 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 2015) (deferring to Matter of Cortez Canales, 25 I. & N. Dec. 301, 306"08 (2010), to find noncitizen barred from non-LPR cancellation of removal under INA 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), due to being removable under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), even though the noncitizens only crime fits within the petty offense exception to inadmissibility). Note: This is the first circuit court opinion to address Matter of Cortez.

WAIVERS " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " STOP-TIME RULE
Jaghoori v. Holder, 772 F.3d 764 (4th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014) (stop-time rule for cancellation of removal does not apply retroactively against convictions where offense and guilty plea occurred before April 1, 1997, the effective date of the legislation by which Congress promulgated the rule in INA 240A(d)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(B), because considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations militate against retroactivity here, so the "traditional presumption" against retroactivity applies). NOTE: Noncitizen in this case would have been eligible for cancellation on April 1, 1997, but for the stop-time rule. See Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006).

Fifth Circuit

RELIEF " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE " STOP-TIME RULE
Calix v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 2015) (lawful permanent resident seeking cancellation of removal who committed an offense that would make him or her inadmissible if actually seeking admission, within seven years of lawful admission, is barred from applying for cancellation of removal under the stop-time rule, INA 240A(d)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(B)).

RELIEF " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL FOR LPRS " CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT " STOP-TIME RULE
Miresles-Zuniga v. Holder, 743 F.3d 110 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2014) (stop time rules requirement that offense must be referred to in INA 212(a)(2), does not mean that the stop-time rule is met only if a comparable ground of deportation is triggered; respondent was barred from cancellation of removal where conviction was a CMT, triggering inadmissibility, and a domestic violence offense triggering deportability, even though the offense did not trigger deportability as a CMT).

RELIEF - CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL - CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT
Deus v. Holder, 591 F.3d 807 (5th Cir. Dec. 23, 2009) (noncitizen cannot impute mother's years of residence in the United States as a lawful permanent resident for purposes of qualifying for cancellation of removal), disagreeing with Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005).

Note: although the court seemed sympathetic to the Cuevas-Gaspar argument, it found that the BIAs interpretation of the statute was reasonable under Chevron.

Sixth Circuit

RELIEF " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " STOP-TIME RULE
Gonzalez-Garcia v. Holder, __ F.3d __ (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2014) (service of NTA stops time for purposes of non-LPR cancellation of removal, even if NTA fails to indicate date and time of hearing).

Seventh Circuit

RELIEF " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL FOR NON-LPRS " CONTINUOUS PRESENCE " EXPEDITED REMOVAL
Nunez-Moron v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 5315860 (7th Cir. Oct. 30, 2012) (expedited removal broke noncitizens continuous physical presence period for purposes of non-LPR cancellation of removal).

RELIEF " NON-LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
Duron-Ortiz v. Holder, 698 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2012) (ten year good moral character period ends upon the date of the final administrative hearing, not when the NTA is served; noncitizen who committed act of moral turpitude after NTA had been served could therefore be barred from non-LPR cancellation of removal), upholding Matter of Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I. & N. Dec. 793 (BIA 2005)

RELIEF " NON-LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " THIRD PARTY STANDING
Marin-Garcia v. Holder, 647 F.3d 666, 2011 WL 3130273 (7th Cir. Jul. 22, 2011) (noncitizen applicant for non-LPR cancellation has third party standing to challenge BIA determination that denial of his cancellation of removal was unconstitutional as applied to his two USC daughters, who were required to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship).

RELIEF NON-LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " STOP-TIME RULE
Reyes-Sanchez v. Holder, 646 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. Jul. 14, 2011) (In determining whether an encounter at the border is sufficient to break a petitioner's continuous physical presence and render her ineligible for cancellation of removal, the court must determine whether the petitioner faced a formal, documented process at the border, and chose to depart under threat of removal.), citing Matter of Avilez"Nava, 23 I. & N. Dec. 799 (BIA 2005).

RELIEF - CANCELLATION - RETROACTIVITY - CONVICTION BAR TO CANCELLATION APPLIES EVEN THOUGH CONVICTION PREDATED IIRAIRA
Obi v. Holder, 558 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2009) (IIRAIRA bar to cancellation of removal properly applied retroactively to visa fraud conviction occurring before IIRAIRA effective date).

RELIEF - CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL - RETROACTIVITY
Obi v. Holder, 558 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. Mar. 03, 2009) (per curiam) (use of pre-IIRAIRA conviction to create bar to cancellation of removal under the stop-time rule is not impermissibly retroactive).

RELIEF - LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL - CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE
Bakarian v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2008) (noncitizen with 1996 conviction could not show 7 years continuous residence for LPR cancellation where he had been admitted in 1987 as a visitor, and traveled between the U.S. and Russia numerous times before his admission as an LPR in 1990; residence period did not start in 1987, given noncitizens numerous and length trips to Russia before his LPR admission in 1990).

Ninth Circuit

RELIEF " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " ADMISSION IN ANY STATUS
(respondent was admitted in 1993 when he was waved across the border after inspection by an immigration officer, since the phrase in any status plainly encompasses every status recognized by immigration statutes, lawful or unlawful, his procedurally regular admission in 1993 was an admission in any status under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2)).

RELIEF " NON-LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL" CONTINUOUS PRESENCE " SERVICE OF NTA
Mocoso-Castellanos v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. Oct. 13, 2015) (respondent did not continue to accrue continuous physical presence, for purposes of non-LPR cancellation of removal, after being served with a notice to appear in removal proceedings that did not contain the date and time of appearance); see Matter of Camarrillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (BIA 2011).

RELIEF " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT " NO IMPUTATION OF PARENTS TIME TO CHILD
Mojica v. Holder, 689 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2012) (rejecting petitioner's imputation argument making use of her father's lawful permanent residence to qualify for cancellation of removal, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez).

RELIEF " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CONVICTION BAR
Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, *982 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2012)(en banc) (In Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, the Supreme Court imposed evidentiary limitations on the types of documents that we may consider under the modified categorical approach; we may review only the charging instrument, transcript of the plea colloquy, plea agreement, and comparable judicial record of this information. Id . That holding applies here [when determining eligibility for cancellation of removal because the statute refers to generic crimes.]).

RELIEF " WAIVERS " LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE OF PARENT MAY NOT BE IMPUTED TO CHILD
Sawyers v. Holder, 684 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. Jun. 29, 2012) (per curiam) (Cuevas"Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005), and Mercado"Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) are no longer valid precedent on the issue of imputation under 8 U.S.C. 1229b); following Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2011 (2012).

RELIEF"WAIVERS"NON-LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL"CONTINUOUS PHYSICAL PRESENCE REQUIREMENT
Zarate v. Holder, 671 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012) (apprehension at border followed by arrest and being given the option of either seeing an IJ or withdrawing his application for admission and voluntarily returning to Mexico was sufficient to break continuous presence for non-LPR cancellation of removal), compare Valadez"Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1311 (9th Cir. 2010) (informal voluntary return, including making of a record of a turnaround, photographing and fingerprinting, does not break continuous residence).

RELIEF " NON-LPR CANCELLATION " TEN-YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT " IMPUTATION OF PARENTS PHYSICAL PRESENCE TO PETITIONER
Saucedo-Arevalo v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1126039 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2011) (requirement of 10 years physical presence in the United States cannot be imputed from a parent to the applicant), applying reasoning of Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 862"65 (9th Cir. 2009). Compare, Cuevas"Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1024 (9th Cir. 2005) (imputing parent's seven years presence after lawful admission for LPR cancellation); Mercado"Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009) (imputing parents 5 year LPR status for LPR cancellation).

RELIEF " CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CONTINUOUS PRESENCE
Padilla-Romero v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. Jul. 9, 2010) (removal of LPR interrupts continuous presence for purposes of INA 240A(a)(1); a noncitizen who was once a lawful permanent resident for five years, but lost such status following an order of removal, is no longer eligible for LPR cancellation of removal).

RELIEF - CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL FOR LPRS - FIVE-YEAR LPR REQUIREMENT - IMPUTATION OF PARENT'S LPR STATUS TO CHILD
Escobar v. Holder, 567 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. May 27, 2009) (a parent's status as a Lawful Permanent Resident may be imputed to an unemancipated minor child residing with that parent, for purposes of satisfying the five-year permanent residence requirement for cancellation of removal under INA 240A(a)(1); the rationale and holding of Cuevas-Gaspar applies equally to the five-year permanent residence and the seven-year continuous residence requirements at issue in that case), following Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005).

NOTE: Escobars mother adjusted status in 1992. Escobar turned 18 in 1997, but did not adjust herself until 2003. The NTA was served in 2006. Thus there was a gap between 1997 and 2003 when Escobar was neither a minor, nor an LPR. It is unclear whether the period between 1992 and 1997 was a full five years. The court may have imputed 4 years LPR via Escobars parents, plus her own LPR years to come up with 5 years LPR status.

RELIEF - NON-LPR CANCELLATION - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONVICTION DID NOT BAR CANCELLATION BECAUSE COMMITTED PRIOR TO EFFECTIVE DATE OF DEPORTATION GROUND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - EFFECTIVE DATE
Mota v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.Sept. 17, 2008) (domestic violence conviction does not bar non-LPR cancellation of removal under INA 240A(b)(1)(B), since the conviction occurred prior to Sept. 30, 1996, the effective date of the domestic violence ground of removal).

NON-LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL - CONTINUOUS PRESENCE
Gutierrez v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2008) (leaving the United States under voluntary departure broke continuous residence for purposes of non-LPR cancellation of removal).

Lower Courts of Ninth Circuit

RELIEF - CANCELLATION FOR NON-LPRS - DV CONVICTION BAR
Brady, "Defense Strategies: Matter of Almanza Arenas" at www.ilrc.org/criminal.php or in July 2009 Benders Immigration Bulletin.

Tenth Circuit

RELIEF " NON-LPR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL " CONTINUOUS PHYSICAL PRESENCE REQUIREMENT
Barrera-Quintero v. Holder, 699 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 2012) (voluntary departure under threat of deportation breaks physical presence for purposes of non-LPR cancellation of removal).

Other

PRACTICE ADVISORY POST CON RELIEF " MOTION TO REDUCE FELONY TO MISDEMEANOR RELIEF " WAIVERS " NON-LPR CANCELLATION " CMT CONVICTION BAR " BAR DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE CONVICTION ACTUALLY TRIGGER INADMISSIBILITY OR DEPORTABILITY
A reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor, in a jurisdiction in which the maximum sentence for a misdemeanor is no greater than one year, may enable a client to qualify for the Petty Offense Exception to CMT inadmissibility if the other requirements for the POE are met. INA 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). See, e.g., California Penal Code 17(b)(3). If the felony is reduced to a misdemeanor, the maximum punishment for the offense is reduced to one year, which is small enough to qualify for the Petty Offense Exception. LaFarga v. INS, 170 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1999). This conviction, however, may still disqualify the client from eligibility for non-LPR cancellation. This bar for being convicted under INA 212(a) or 237(a)(2) does not require that a noncitizen actually be inadmissible or deportable under one of these statutes. Matter of Cortez, 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010); Matter of Gonzalez-Silva, 24 I&N Dec. 218 (BIA 2007). The Ninth Circuit shares this view. Vasquez-Hernandez v. Holder, 90 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2010); Mota v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.2008). In deciding whether a person has been convicted of an offense under INA 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), and 237(a)(3) for purposes of non-LPR cancellation, the BIA will look only to language specifically pertaining to the criminal offense, such as the offense itself and the sentence imposed or potentially imposed. Matter of Cortez, 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010). In deciding whether a conviction is described under INA 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), and 237(a)(3) for eligibility for non-LPR cancellation, the BIA will not consider whether the conviction was within five years of admission or other immigration requirements necessary for deportability. Matter of Cortez, 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010). If an offense qualifies for the Petty Offense Exception and is punishable by less than a year, the noncitizen is eligible for cancellation because offense is not described under INA 237(a)(2), the crime of moral turpitude ground of deportability. Matter of Pedroza, 25 I&N Dec. 312 (BIA 2010).