(A)

General Requirements.  Suspension of deportation is available only as a defense in deportation proceedings, and no independent application may be made.[421]  A noncitizen is statutorily eligible for suspension if:

(1)   the person has been continuously present in the United States for at least seven years at the time of submitting the application,

 

(2)   the person can show Good Moral Character during that period, and deportation would result in extreme hardship to the person, or to a spouse, parent or child who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. ­                 

 

Suspension of deportation is not available to noncitizens paroled into the United States and placed into exclusion proceedings.[422]

[421] Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. May 27, 2004) (noncitizen in exclusion proceedings is not eligible for suspension of deportation, even taking effect of NACARA into account).

[422] See, e.g., Geach v. Chartoff, 444 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. Mar. 2, 2006) (advance parole regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(4)(ii) (1991) (amended 1996), denies suspension of deportation to noncitizens admitted on advance parole, but who otherwise meet the statutory requirements for suspension); Tanov v. INS, 443 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2006) (former suspension of deportation is unavailable to noncitizens who were paroled into and then ordered excluded from the United States prior to April 1, 1997).

Third Circuit

RELIEF - SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION - CONTINUOUS PRESENCE REQUIREMENT - STOP-TIME RULE - RETROACTIVE APPLICATION DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
Arca-Pineda v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. May 28, 2008) (retroactive application of the stop-time rule did not violate due process).

RELIEF - CONTINUOUS PRESENCE REQUIREMENT - STOP-TIME RULE - EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL CLAIM REJECTED
Arca-Pineda v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. May 28, 2008) (respondent cannot re-start clock by failing to appear for removal proceeding and then waiting an additional 10 years).

RELIEF - SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION - STOP-TIME RULE
Arca-Pineda v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. May 28, 2008) (continuous physical presence clock did not begin to run again after an administrative closure; administrative closure is not a termination proceedings; it only removes the case from the IJs calendar).

Seventh Circuit

RELIEF " SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION
Torres-Rendon v. Holder, 656 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (application for suspension of deportation under former INA 244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(2), was properly denied for lack of the necessary period of continuous presence: The period of continuous physical presence ended at the time Torres"Rendon committed his drug crime in 1987, or, in the alternative, when an Order to Show Cause was issued to him in 1988. He cannot restart the clock and accrue time for purposes of establishing his continuous physical presence and thus cannot establish 10 years of continuous physical presence.); following Matter of Nolasco"Tofino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 632, 641 (BIA 1999) (holding that the stop-time rule applies to all suspension of deportation applications generally); see Angel"Ramos v. Reno, 227 F.3d 942 (7th Cir.2000); but see Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585 (3d Cir.2005) (because the alien lawfully re-entered the United States after committing a controlled substance offense, the continuous physical presence period should recommence); but cf. Briseno"Flores v. Atty. Gen. U.S., 492 F.3d 226 (3d Cir.2007) (finding that the alien stopped accruing time of continuous physical presence when he committed his first offense and noting: we conclude that the BIA's interpretation of 1229b(d)(1) in Mendoza is reasonable, even though others may disagree with it. Therefore, under Chevron, that interpretation is entitled to deference.).