(B)  Crimes of Moral Turpitude.[151]

 

Malicious destruction of property has been held to involve moral turpitude.[152]  On the other hand, damaging private property has been held not to involve moral turpitude where evil intent is not an essential element of the offense.

 

Board of Immigration Appeals:

 

Matter of N, 8 I. & N. Dec. 466 (BIA 1959) (Delaware conviction for malicious mischief, in violation of Delaware Penal Code § 692, held not to be crime of moral turpitude, since statute encompasses crimes which both do and do not involve moral turpitude, and record of conviction failed to show with particularity that misconduct on which conviction was based was inherently base or depraved).

 

Matter of B, 2 I. & N. Dec. 867 (BIA 1947) (Canadian conviction of malicious mischief for damaging a mailbox did not involve moral turpitude).

 

Matter of C, 2 I. & N. Dec. 716 (BIA 1946) (conviction of damaging private property, i.e., malicious mischief (“That he did without colour of right willfully do damage to private property, to wit, break a glass in the door of a certain building”) in violation of Canada Criminal Code § 539 does not involve moral turpitude).

 

Matter of M, 2 I. & N. Dec. 686 (BIA 1946) (conviction of unlawful destruction of railway telegraph property in violation of Canada Criminal Code § 517(c) does not involve moral turpitude).

 

Matter of M, 2 I. & N. Dec. 469 (BIA 1946) (conviction of malicious mischief in violation of New York Penal Law § 1433 is not a crime involving moral turpitude, where the statute is so broad as to include offenses which do and offenses which do not involve moral turpitude, and the record of conviction fails to show with sufficient particularity what offense was actually committed).

 

Ninth Circuit:

 

Rodriguez-Herrera v. INS, 52 F.3d 238 (9th Cir. 1995) (second-degree malicious mischief, knowingly and maliciously causing physical damage to property of another in amount exceeding $250, under Revised Code of Washington § 9A.48.080, was a relatively minor offense and did not necessarily involve a base act contrary to moral standards so as to qualify as a crime of moral turpitude).

[151] See N. Tooby, J. Rollin & J. Foster, Crimes of Moral Turpitude § 9.58 (2005).

[152] 9 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 40.21(a) N.2.3-1(b)(1).

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - ARSON - SAFE HAVEN - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - OFFENSE MUST BE AGAINST PERSON OR PROPERTY OF ANOTHER
Jordison v. Keisler, 501 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2007, amended Oct. 30, 2007) (California conviction for "recklessly set[ting] fire to ... a structure or forest land" in violation of Penal Code 452(c) is not categorically an aggravated felony "crime of violence" for purposes of removal since the offense may be committed by burning the defendant's own land or structure whereas a crime of violence is one that involves violence or potential violence against the person or property of others).