(B)  Humanitarian Grounds.  In Beltran-Leon v. INS,[202] the Ninth Circuit handed down a troublesome and confused decision holding that a California state-court decision vacating a drug conviction pursuant to a writ of audita querela did not remove the conviction for immigration purposes, because the judgment was not vacated on a ground of legal invalidity.  The court therefore held the BIA was correct in denying the motion to reopen deportation proceedings to allow application for adjustment of status, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

 

In Beltran, the Ninth Circuit discussed federal law holding that it is improper for a federal court to grant a writ of audita querela, where no legal defect in a federal conviction appears, solely on equitable immigration grounds.[203]  The court noted, in a footnote: “Doe dealt with a writ of audita querela issued by a federal rather than a state court.  The principles remain the same, however.”[204] 

 

The Beltran-Leon holding suffers from a number of defects, however, and should be challenged in other circuits. 

 

(a)              The federal law referred to states the federal court may not grant the writ in the first place.  It does not say what happens when, as here, the state court does grant the writ vacating the conviction. 

(b)              This law is federal law, not state law.  Nowhere is it written the state courts may not grant a state writ of audita querela just because the federal courts do not do so under similar circumstances.  Under principles of federalism and comity, federal courts cannot control the requirements under which a state court grants a state writ.[205]  State habeas standards and state coram nobis standards are quite different than standards for the analogous federal writs. 

(c)              Not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit cited no authority for the dubious proposition quoted above. 

(d)              Even assuming the state court erroneously (under state law) granted the writ and erroneously (under state law) vacated the state conviction, the federal immigration court is required to accept the final state-court judgment which cannot be collaterally attacked in federal immigration court.  After all, it is the state conviction that triggers the adverse immigration consequences.  If the state erases the state conviction, then the conviction no longer exists to trigger them.

 

Even if the Beltran-Leon decision governs, it should have practically no impact on the day-to-day work of obtaining post-conviction relief for immigrants, since the decision can be distinguished as limited to audita querela cases.[206]

Moreover, in nearly all post-conviction cases, it is necessary for counsel, in the words of the court in Beltran, to “identify [a] new defense or legal defect[] in the criminal proceedings” (thus providing a ground on which to distinguish Beltran).  The knowledgeable petitioner will not “request[] that the conviction be set aside solely in order to prevent deportation . . . .”  And the normal habeas, coram nobis, or motion to vacate order will therefore effectively “remove the legal basis of [the] conviction for purposes of application of federal [immigration] law.”[207]

 

In order to ensure that an order vacating a conviction or sentence will be honored in immigration court, the face of the documents (equivalent to the “record of conviction”) must establish that the order was entered on the basis of some ground of legal invalidity.  If this is the case, it should not matter whether the adverse immigration consequences are also made known to the criminal court that issued the order, as this additional fact will not detract from the fact that the criminal conviction or sentence was legally void.[208]  The immigration courts in general do not go behind the face of the record in assessing the impact of criminal judgments, and they should not do so here.

[202]Beltran-Leon v. INS, 134 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1998).

[203] See Doe v. INS, 120 F.3d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1997).

[204] Beltran-Leon v. INS, supra, n.1, citing Doe v. INS, 120 F.3d 200 (9th Cir. 1997).

[205] Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1378 (BIA 2000) (referring to the federal obligation to give full faith and credit to state court judgments).

[206] In Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 747 n.31 (9th Cir. 2000), the court was careful to limit Beltran-Leon to its facts:  “At oral argument, INS counsel cited our decision in Beltran-Leon v. INS, 134 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1998), in support of the claim that we have already established the rule that guilt is sufficient, without more, to support a removal order.  Of course, if that were true with respect to offenses covered by the Federal First Offenders Act, then Beltran-Leon would be in conflict with Garberding and Paredes.  The INS’s interpretation of Beltran-Leon is far too broad.  In that case we said only that a particular common law writ -- the writ of audita querela -- cannot be given effect for deportation purposes absent a defect in the underlying legal proceedings. Id. at 1380.  We relied on Doe v. INS, 120 F.3d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1997), in which we held that for a writ of audita querela to issue, there must be a legal defect in the underlying conviction or sentence, which was absent in Beltran-Leon’s case.  Neither Petitioner here has sought the benefit of the writ of audita querela; instead both rely on state rehabilitation statutes.  In addition, we note that Beltran-Leon was convicted of the sale of cocaine, and therefore could not have received relief under the Federal First Offender Act.”  Id. at 747 n.31.

[207] Beltran-Leon v. INS, 134 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1998).

[208] Sandoval v. INS, 240 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001).

POST CON RELIEF - STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF - INEFFECTIVE TO ELIMINATE CONVICTION FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A CONVICTION THAT HAS BEEN VACATED ON THE MERITS
Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 115 (1983) (Federal firearms disabilities applied with respect to one who pled guilty to a State offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, even if the record of the State criminal proceeding was subsequently expunged following a successfully served term of probation: "expunction under state law does not alter the historical fact of the conviction, . . . does not alter the legality of the previous conviction[,] and does not signify that the defendant was innocent of the crime to which he pleaded guilty"); United States v. Smith, 96 F.3d 1350, 1351 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Mejias, 47 F.3d 401, 403-404 (11th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Norbury, 492 F.3d 1012, 1014-1015 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Miller, 434 F.3d 820, 824 (6th Cir. 2006).

BIA

POST CON RELIEF - MODIFICATION OF RECORD OF CONVICTION SOLELY FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES MAY NOT BE AFFECTIVE
Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, ___ (BIA May 20, 2008) ("We are mindful of the fact that the respondent entered his plea to a charge that clearly identified his victim as a child. The language of that charge may well have been significant because the Supreme Court has explained that "the details of a generically limited charging document" are generally sufficient "in any sort of case" to establish "whether the plea had necessarily rested on the fact identifying the [offense] as generic." Shepard v. United States, supra, at 21. Yet as all parties recognize, we are precluded from relying on the original charge because, after these proceedings commenced, the State prosecutor removed all traces of the victim's juvenile status from the amended information and then interposed the expurgated, back-dated charge into the conviction record.").

POST CON RELIEF - EFFECTIVE ORDER - MODIFICATION OF RECORD OF CONVICTION
Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, __ (BIA May 20, 2008) ("We are mindful of the fact that the respondent entered his plea to a charge that clearly identified his victim as a child. The language of that charge may well have been significant because the Supreme Court has explained that "the details of a generically limited charging document" are generally sufficient "in any sort of case" to establish "whether the plea had necessarily rested on the fact identifying the [offense] as generic." Shepard v. United States, supra, at 21. Yet as all parties recognize, we are precluded from relying on the original charge because, after these proceedings commenced, the State prosecutor removed all traces of the victim's juvenile status from the amended information and then interposed the expurgated, back-dated charge into the conviction record.").

First Circuit

POST CON RELIEF - STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF - INEFFECTIVE TO ELIMINATE CONVICTION FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES
Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 304-06 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that the language of 1101(a)(48)(A) "leaves nothing to the imagination" and that state rehabilitative programs that do not vacate a conviction on the merits "have no bearing in determining whether an alien is to be considered convicted under section 1101(a)(48)(A)."); United States v. Campbell, 167 F.3d 94, 96-98 (2d Cir. 1999) (federal sentencing case); Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating, in case where petitioner successfully completed a one year probation sentence for a heroin possession charge in state court that would have made him eligible for FFOA relief had he been prosecuted by the federal government, that "[t]his language unambiguously points to the conclusion that the disposition of Acosta's criminal case in [state court pursuant to a state law permitting dismissal of charge after completion of probation without verdict] constitutes a conviction "); Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1005-06 (5th Cir.1999) (state delayed adjudication of guilt); Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Every court that has considered the subject believes that 1101(a)(48)(A) governs the handling of repeat offenders and that expungements (or restorations of civil rights) under state law do not negate a conviction for purposes of immigration law."); Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2001) (state conviction expunged); United States v. Zamudio, 314 F.3d 517, 522 (10th Cir. 2002) (adopting plain meaning of 8 U.S.C 1101(a)(48)(A) when interpreting U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)); Resendiz-Alcaraz v. United States Atty General, 383 F.3d 1262, 1269(11th Cir. Sept. 10, 2004) ("clear language of the statute [INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A) definition of conviction] includes [as convictions] state convictions expunged under state rehabilitative laws").

Second Circuit

POST CON RELIEF " CONVICTION VACATED SOLELY FOR REHABILITATIVE REASONS
Sutherland v. Holder, 769 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2014) (Arizona conviction for attempted possession for sale of four or more pounds of marijuana was vacated by an Arizona state court, but remains valid for federal immigration and removability purposes, since the order vacating the conviction was obtained under Arizona Revised Statutes 13-907 solely for rehabilitative reasons).

POST CON RELIEF " STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF " FEDERAL FIRST OFFENDER ACT
Wellington v. Holder, 623 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 2010) (We hold that an alien who receives state rehabilitative treatment for a removable offense under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) remains "convicted" of that offense pursuant to the definition of "conviction" in the Immigration and Nationality Act, see INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), even if the alien would have been eligible for relief under the Federal First Offender Act had she been prosecuted in federal court. See 18 U.S.C. 3607.).

POST CON RELIEF - CONVICTION - EFFECTIVE ORDER - NONCITIZEN REMAINS CONVICTED FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES EVEN IF A STATE CONVICTION HAS BEEN VACATED UNDER A REHABILITATIVE STATUTE
Saleh v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2033497 (2d Cir. July 17, 2007) ("the BIA has reasonably concluded that an alien remains convicted of a removable offense for federal immigration purposes when a state vacates the predicate a conviction pursuant to a rehabilitative statute."), citing Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2006), vacating Matter of Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621 (BIA 2003); Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1249-50 (11th Cir.2006); Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2005); Ramos v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 800, 805-06 (7th Cir. 2005); Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2005); Resendiz-Alcaraz v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1262, 1268-71 (11th Cir. 2004); Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2001); Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 305 (1st Cir. 2000), and following Sanusi v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 341, 342-43 (6th Cir. 2007) ("We deny the petitions for review on the ground that the state court's vacation of Sanusi's conviction was ineffective for immigration purposes because it was done solely for the purpose of ameliorating the immigration consequences to petitioner.") (citing Zaitona v. INS, 9 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 1993); Ali v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 722, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2005).

JUDICIAL REVIEW - BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Chhetry v. US Dep't of Justice, 490 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. Jun. 20, 2007) (BIA may not take administrative notice of facts without affording other party to rebut the inferences drawn from those facts).

Lower Courts of Second Circuit

EXPUNGEMENT - FALSE STATEMENT FOR IMMIGRATION BENEFIT
Szpak v. DHS, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 2128366 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 25, 2007) (the fact that applicant stated that he had not been arrested [after prior indication that he had] was not an intentional misstatement to the government where applicant could have believed that the expungement of the records of those arrests meant that he could state to the government that he had no longer been arrested). http://bibdaily.com/pdfs/Szpak%207-25-07.pdf

Fifth Circuit

POST CON - EXPUNGEMENT FOREIGN
Danso v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 709 (5th Cir. June 15, 2007) (rejecting equal protection argument that noncitizens British expungement should be given effect for immigration purposes where noncitizen could hypothetically have availed himself of the expungement procedures set forth in the Federal First Offenders Act (FFOA)).

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - LUJAN EXPUNGEMENT - EXPUNGEMENT OF SECOND CONVICTION EFFECTIVE WHERE FIRST CONVICTION NOT FINAL AT TIME OF SECOND CONVICTION
Smith v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3012856 (5th Cir. Oct. 24, 2006) (for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act, a conviction does not become final until time for direct appeal and time for discretionary review have elapsed).

NOTE: This case can be cited to support the position that a second controlled substances offense may be expunged under Lujan in the Ninth Circuit as long as the first conviction had not become final by the time of the second conviction.

Seventh Circuit

POST-CON RELIEF " STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF " EXPUNGEMENT " REHABILITATIVE EXPUNGEMENT REMAINS A CONVICTION FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES
Estrada-Ramos v. Holder, 611 F.3d 318 (7th Cir. 2010) (expungement of a conviction for a drug charge involving cocaine upheld as a conviction for INA purposes, because guilty plea was set aside and dismissed for ameliorative purposes, not for any procedural or substantial defects in the proceedings.), following Ali v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2005), Matter of Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003). PCN:8.3;CD4:11.18;AF:6.12;CMT3:10.11;SH:4.27

POST CON RELIEF - CONVICTION VACATED PURSUANT TO EXTRAORDINARY MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, FOLLOWED BY DISMISSAL OF CHARGES, REMAINED A CONVICTION FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES SINCE NONCITIZEN FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT CONVICTION HAD BEEN VACATED BASED ON A PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE DEFECT IN THE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Ali v. U.S. Attorney General, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 709870 (7th Cir. Mar. 22, 2006) (per curiam) (Georgia conviction of two counts of child molestation, followed by the granting of an extraordinary motion for a new trial, and the State of Georgia's motion to nolle prosse charges, continued to constitute a conviction under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), for removal purposes, since noncitizen failed to establish that conviction had been vacated based on a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceedings; noncitizen bears burden to show conviction was vacated on a basis of legal invalidity). This decision violates the long-standing rule that the government bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence every fact necessary to prove deportability. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).

Eighth Circuit

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES " STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF " FEDERAL FIRST OFFENDER ACT POST CON RELIEF " REHABILITATIVE RELIEF " STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF " FEDERAL FIRST OFFENDER ACT
Brikova v. Holder, 699 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. Nov. 7, 2012) (Minnesota conviction of possession of cocaine, for which defendant would have been eligible for Federal First Offender Act treatment, under 18 U.S.C. 3607(a), was not eliminated for immigration purposes by state rehabilitative relief, since equal protection challenge fails because there are multiple potential rational bases for distinguishing between federal and state defendants).

Ninth Circuit

POST CON RELIEF - EFFECT OF VACATUR - REHABILITATIVE PURPOSE
Mendoza v. Holder, 606 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. Jun. 2, 2010) (conviction still exists after vacatur granted for rehabilitative purposes only; any vacatur granted under Ariz.Rev.Stat. 13-907 is rehabilitative, and therefore still a conviction for immigration purposes), following Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2001).

POST CON RELIEF - STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF - CONVICTION EXPUNGED UNDER STATE LAW CONTINUED TO EXIST BECAUSE DEFENDANT VIOLATED PROBATION AND WOULD THUS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ELIGIBLE TO OBTAIN FEDERAL FIRST OFFENDER ACT EXPUNGEMENT
Estrada v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2009) (a noncitizen whose state conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia was expunged under state law, but who violated the terms of his probation before expungement was granted, would not have been eligible for relief under the Federal First Offender Act (FFOA), 18 U.S.C. 3607(a), since the FFOA expressly limits relief to cases where "the person has not violated a condition of his probation"; state expungement therefore did not eliminate the conviction for immigration purposes).

POST CON RELIEF - STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF - REHABILITATIVE RELIEF DOES NOT ELIMINATE CONVICTION FOR PURPOSES OF IMPOSING FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT
United States v. Norbury, 492 F.3d 1012, ___ (9th Cir. Jun. 25, 2007) (determination of whether current controlled substances offense was committed after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, so as to enhance federal sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)((A)-(D) is made under federal law, not state law; under federal law: "An expunged or dismissed state conviction qualifies as a prior conviction if the expungement or dismissal does not alter the legality of the conviction or does not represent that the defendant was actually innocent of the crime."), following Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 115, 103 S.Ct. 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983).

POST CON RELIEF - STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF - LOPEZ STRENGTHENS ARGUMENT THAT STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF ANALOGOUS TO THE FEDERAL FIRST OFFENDER ACT ELIMINATES QUALIFYING CONVICTIONS FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES
United States v. Norbury, 492 F.3d 1012, ___ (9th Cir. Jun. 25, 2007) (determination of whether current controlled substances offense was committed after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, so as to enhance federal sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)((A)-(D) is made under federal law, not state law; under federal law: "An expunged or dismissed state conviction qualifies as a prior conviction if the expungement or dismissal does not alter the legality of the conviction or does not represent that the defendant was actually innocent of the crime."), following Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 115, 103 S.Ct. 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983).

POST CON RELIEF - STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF - STATE EXPUNGEMENT STATUTE DOES NOT HAVE TO BE EQUIVALENT TO FFOA TO ELIMINATE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION
Under Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1994), the state expungement statute does not have to be identical to the FFOA: "We rejected this narrow approach in Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1994). Garberding involved Montana's expungement statute, which was not limited to first-time simple drug possession offenses but allowed expungement of a broad range of more serious offenses. Id. at 1189. Considering Garberding's challenge on Equal Protection grounds, we concluded that the INS had no rational basis for treating her differently simply because Montana's statute covered a broader range of offenses than did the FFOA, id. at 1190-91, and held that "persons who received the benefit of a state expungement law were not subject to deportation as long as they could have received the benefit of the federal Act if they had been prosecuted under federal law." Chavez-Perez v Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 2004). This interpretation accepted in Matter of Manrique, 21 I. & N. Dec. 58, 64 (BIA 1995), which requires only that the defendant be a simple possession first offender and that a "court has entered an order pursuant to a state rehabilitative statute under which the alien's criminal proceedings have been deferred pending successful completion of probation or the proceedings have been or will be dismissed after probation." Matter of Manrique, 21 I. & N. Dec. 58, 64 (BIA 1995). Therefore, the statute expungement statute need not be equivalent to the FFOA if the conduct could have been covered under the FFOA if the case had been prosecuted in federal court, and rehabilitative treatment resulting in dismissal was granted. Thanks to Jonathan Moore.

Other

POST CON RELIEF " EFFECTIVE POST-CONVICTION ORDER " CONVICTION
In an EOIR Newsletter, an article describes the difference in immigration consequences between a conviction vacated on a ground of legal invalidity, and one expunged solely for purposes of rehabilitation or to avoid immigration consequences: The expungement of a record of conviction is [t]he removal of a conviction (esp. for a first offense) from a persons criminal record. Blacks Law Dictionary 621 (8th ed. 2004). A vacatur is [t]he act of annulling or setting aside [or a] rule or order by which a proceeding is vacated. Id. at 1546. In the immigration context, the difference between a vacatur and an expungement involves intent. Criminal courts typically expunge convictions in order to rehabilitate offenders or, in the case of noncitizens, to prevent negative immigration consequences. Criminal courts typically vacate convictions because the convictions are substantively defective, for example a due process or the right to counsel violations at trial. Accordingly, this article uses the term vacatur to mean removal of a conviction because of substantive defects in the conviction and uses the term expungement to mean removal of a conviction to rehabilitate or to prevent immigration consequences. Some courts use the terms vacatur and expungement differently, however, and some courts use entirely different terms to express these concepts. The Act is silent as to whether a criminal conviction that has been vacated or expunged has immigration consequences. The Attorney General, the Board, and, with one exception, the circuit courts of appeals have adopted the following rule: [I]f a court with jurisdiction vacates a conviction based on a defect in the underlying criminal proceedings, the respondent no longer has a conviction within the meaning of section 101(a) (48)(A). If, however, a court vacates [or expunges] a conviction for reasons unrelated to the merits of the underlying criminal proceedings, the respondent remains convicted for immigration purposes. Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003) (footnote omitted). Accord Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2006); Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1248"49 (11th Cir. 2006); Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 215 (3d Cir. 2005); Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2005); Sandoval v. INS, 240 F.3d 577, 583 (7th Cir. 2001); Matter of Marroquin-Garcia, 23 I&N Dec. 705, 713 (A.G. 2005). The Fifth Circuit, by contrast, has held that convictions vacated for any reason, including substantive defects, retain their immigration consequences. Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284, 291 (5th Cir. 2007). Josh Adams, Treatment of Criminal Convictions in the Immigration Context, 2 Immigration Law Advisor (October 2008) (emphasis in original), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILA-Newsletter/ILA%20Vol%202/vol2no10.pdf.

POST CON RELIEF - EFFECTIVE ORDER - STATE REHABILITATIVE RELIEF
Argument: An expungement or other rehabilitative relief should be effective to eliminate any conviction for purposes of eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal, because these statutes use the term "judgment of conviction" rather than "conviction." Since INA 101(a)(48)(A) merely defines "conviction," and discusses when a disposition that is not a judgment of conviction will constitute a "conviction" for immigration law, it arguably do not define what constitutes a "judgment of conviction" and 101(a)(48)(A) does not control in asylum and withholding context. Therefore, Matter of Roldan and subsequent cases holding that rehabilitative relief does not eliminate a conviction do not apply in this context. Thanks to Manny Vargas. Immigration counsel can also argue that post-conviction relief effectively eliminates the conviction. Thanks to Katherine Brady.

PRACTICE ADVISORY " POST CON RELIEF " TEXAS " GROUNDS " INVALID PLEA " INEFFECTIVE ASSITANCE OF COUNSEL "CONVICTION " DEFERRED ADJUDICATION
Texas law conflicts with federal immigration law as to whether deferred adjudication constitutes a conviction. Ex parte Welch, 981 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Deferred adjudication is not a conviction.). But see Matter of Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224, 230 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding that deferred adjudication in Texas constitutes a conviction for purposes of immigration law). This may give Texas defendants a ground of legal invalidity by which to set aside their convictions, if they were incorrectly informed the Deferred Adjudication disposition does not constitute a conviction, whereas it does constitute a conviction under federal immigration law. This may render the plea not knowing, intelligent, free or voluntary. It may also constitute a ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of Padilla v. Kentucky, because of affirmative misadvice or failure to advise that this disposition does indeed constitute a conviction for immigration purposes.