Aggravated Felonies

 

Some of the aggravated felony sections include the phrase “relating to.”[348]  For example, INA § 101(a)(43)(R) defines aggravated felony to include “an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification number of which have been altered for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.” (Emphasis supplied.)  This “relating to” language sometimes appears where the definition is not by reference to a federal statute, but also frequently appears in parentheticals, describing aggravated felonies defined by federal statute.[349]  See discussion in § 4.38, infra.  The courts generally construe the “relating to” language broadly, but there are some limits.

 

            The Ninth Circuit held that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 472 for felony possession of counterfeit U.S. obligations is an aggravated felony as an offense “relating to . . . counterfeiting.”[350]  While possession of a counterfeit instrument is not the same act as counterfeiting (manufacturing or altering) one, the court stated that the phrase “relating to” means that the aggravated felony definition “necessarily covers a range of activities beyond those of counterfeiting or forgery itself.”  The federal statutory definition of counterfeiting at 18 U.S.C. § 471 punishes anyone who “with intent to defraud, falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, or alters any obligation or other security of the United States.”  The court noted that to be guilty of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472, the offense at issue, the defendant had to have passed or possessed the bill knowing it was counterfeit and intending to defraud.  It found that the “requisite knowledge and intent to defraud was sufficient to make a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 472 one that is ‘related to’ the act of counterfeiting itself.”[351]

 

            In Luu-Le v. INS, the Ninth Circuit found that an Arizona conviction for possession of paraphernalia was “related to” a controlled substances offense because that statute “is plainly intended to criminalize behavior involving the production or use of drugs . . . .  The statute makes abundantly clear that an object is not drug paraphernalia unless it is in some way linked to drugs.”[352]

 

            On the other hand the Ninth Circuit found, in Lara-Chacon v. Ashcroft,[353] that a conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of Arizona law, was not an offense “related to” a controlled substances, even though the offense in fact involved proceeds from drug trafficking, and even though the Arizona definition of money laundering included proceeds derived from controlled substances.[354]  The court found that the money laundering statute described a crime distinct from controlled substances, because the conviction does not require any proof of the underlying offense.  “Because racketeering statutes are not intended to be a vehicle to redress aliens’ controlled substance violations, the Arizona statute does not qualify as one ‘relating to’ a controlled substance.”[355]

 

            In the context of non-substantive offenses, the Ninth Circuit limited the “related to” language “where to read it broadly would render meaningless other words in the statutory language.”[356]  To read the “related to” language in the definition of offenses relating to failure to appear,[357] for example, to include aiding and abetting offenses would render meaningless the “conspiracy or attempt” language applicable to all aggravated felonies,[358] since conspiracy or attempt to commit an aggravated felony offense would certainly be “related to” the aggravated felony offense as well.  If the generic offenses of conspiracy and attempt were automatically included as offenses “related to” an aggravated felony offense, there would have been no need for Congress specifically to add to the aggravated felony ground of deportation the language “an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph.”[359]

           

            If faced with “relating to” language in a specific ground of removal, counsel is advised to look for cases that define the “related to” language as it has been applied to that specific ground.  Beyond that, however, if the government is arguing the "relating to" language within a parenthetical in the definition means Congress intended to sweep more broadly than the words of the non-parenthetical statute denote, counsel can argue Congress meant no such thing; Congress was merely giving a meaningless parenthetical label to the statute listed in the aggravated felony definition, and cite the cases that hold the parenthetical language does not restrict or limit the meaning of the statute.  If the parenthetical cannot restrict, it cannot enlarge the meaning of the statute.  See § 4.38, infra.

[348] See INA § § 101(a)(43)(K)(i), (Q), (S), (T), 8 U.S.C. § § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i), (Q), (S), (T)

[349] This language also appears in other grounds of removal, such as INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (controlled substances conviction).  The analysis should be the same regardless of the ground involved.

[350] Albillo-Figueroa v. INS, 221 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2000).  See also Richards v. Ashcroft, 400 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2005) (Connecticut conviction of possession of a forged document with intent to defraud, deceive, or injure, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-139, is “an offense relating to ... forgery” within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R), and is therefore an aggravated felony for deportation purposes under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).

[351] Id. at 1073.

[352] Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 915 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000).

[353] Lara-Chacon v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2003).  See also Castaneda de Esper v. INS, 557 F.2d 79, 83-84 (6th Cir. 1977) (false imprisonment not “related to” a controlled substance offense); Matter of Carrillo, 16 I. & N. Dec. 625, 626 (BIA 1978) (“[W]hen a criminal statute does not by its language indicate [that] it was contemplated to be a ‘narcotic law’ and historically has contituted a criminal offense separate and distinct from the [underlying] felony, such a statute is not a law relating to [a controlled substance].”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[354] Lara-Chacon v. Ashcroft, supra, 345 F.3d at 1155.

[355] Id. at 1156.

[356] Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2000), citing Leyva-Licea, supra, and Coronado-Durazo, supra.

[357] INA § 101(a)(43)(T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(T).

[358] INA § 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U).

[359] INA § 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U).