(A)  Sentence Imposed of One Year.  Many common convictions constitute aggravated felonies only if a sentence of one year or more was imposed for the offense.  See § 3.61, infra.  Others are aggravated felonies regardless of sentence.  See § 3.64, infra.

AGGRAVATED FELONIES - AGGRAVATED MISDEMEANOR
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S.Ct 2577 (Jun. 14, 2010) ("We do not usually think of a 10-day sentence for the unauthorized possession of a trivial amount of a prescription drug as an "aggravated felony." A "felony," we have come to understand, is a "serious crime usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death." Black's Law Dictionary 694 (9th ed.2009) (hereinafter Black's). An "aggravated" offense is one "made worse or more serious by circumstances such as violence, the presence of a deadly weapon, or the intent to commit another crime.").

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SENTENCE
CD4:20.31;CMT3:4.7 INADMISSIBILITY - CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. ___ (May 19, 2008) (for purposes of considering whether a state drug-trafficking offense, for which a ten-year recidivism-based sentence was imposed, qualifies as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)), the federal sentencing court must consider the recidivist sentence enhancement in determining the sentence imposed), disagreeing with United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (petty theft conviction could not qualify as an aggravated felony because the maximum possible sentence for a violation without statutory recidivist enhancements was six months).

BIA

SENTENCE -- SENTENCE TO TREATMENT FACILITY
Sentence to a state mental hospital following conviction of a crime is a "sentence" for immigration purposes. Matter of V, 7 I. & N. Dec. 242 (BIA 1956). Sentence to a drug treatment facilities is considered a sentence for purposes of the satisfying the definition of "convicted." Dunn-Martin v. District Director, 426 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1970); Matter of Robinson, 15 I. & N. Dec. 197 (BIA 1975); United States ex rel. Abbenante v. Butterfield, 112 F. Supp. 324, 326 (E.D. Mich. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 212 F.2d 794 (6th Cir. 1954) (drug addict committed to public health service hospital was "sentenced to confinement" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C.A. 1251(a)(4)). But see, Holzapfel v. Wyrsch, 259 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1958) (a sentence for primarily rehabilitative confinement is not necessarily a "sentence to confinement" under 1251(a)(4)), Matter of M, 8 I & N 256 (BIA 1959).

Third Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SENTENCE
Chavez-Alvarez v. Attorney General, 783 F.3d 478, 484 (3rd Cir. Apr. 16, 2015) (government failed to show noncitizens sentence for violation of Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 125, 10 U.S.C. 925 (sodomy), was for at least one year to qualify as an aggravated felony crime of violence; noncitizen was sentenced to 18 months jail total following conviction of several offenses, but the record did not specify a sentence of more than one year specifically for the sodomy offense; The record is devoid of any indication as to how or if the military judge apportioned the general sentence among Chavez"Alvarez's various convictions. Nor does the Manual for Courts"Martial contain any suggestion that a military judge should do so.),

AGGRAVATED FELONY - ALIEN SMUGGLING - MISDEMEANOR
Biskupski v. Attorney Gen. of the US, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2774528 (3d Cir. Sept. 25, 2007) (federal misdemeanor conviction of violating 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(2)(A), aiding and abetting alien smuggling, is an "aggravated felony" even though only punishable as a misdemeanor under federal law).

SENTENCE - CONFINEMENT - HOME DETENTION - ANKLE BRACELET
Ilchuk v. Attorney General of U.S., 434 F.3d 618 (3d Cir. Jan. 17, 2006) (house arrest with electronic monitoring constitutes "imprisonment" for purposes of deportation under INA 237(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)); Rodriguez v. Lamer, 60 F.3d 745, 749 (11th Cir. 1995) (home confinement may constitute custody); see also Salim v. Reno, 2000 WL 33115910, at *4-*5 (E.D.Pa. Jan.16, 2001) (finding that a convict whose sentence was suspended in favor of mental treatment in a state hospital and later in his home "was sentenced and imprisoned within the meaning of the INA").

Fifth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SENTENCE IMPOSED
United States v. Narez-Garcia, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 1274034 (5th Cir. March 31, 2016) (Arkansas conviction of third-degree domestic battery, with a sentence to confinement of ___ months and Suspended Imposition of Sentence: 72 months, did not warrant reversal as the basis for imposing an 8-level enhancement in the federal sentence for illegal reentry after deportation, since the defendant did not sufficiently raise the insufficient sentence argument in the trial court, and the significance of the suspended imposition of sentence in Arkansas law, was not sufficiently clear). NOTE: While the noncitizen in this case was limited in his ability to argue the point because he had failed to raise it earlier, the dissenting opinion lays out a good argument on the difference between directly suspending a sentence, versus imposing and then suspending a sentence. Apparently there is room to argue that there is a distinction between these two judicial acts that may mean that a straight suspended sentence is more similar to execution of sentence suspended under California law, which does not count as a sentence for immigration purposes.

Sixth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - CRIME OF VIOLENCE - SENTENCE - SENTENCE IMPOSED IS THE SENTENCE ACTUALLY SERVED, OR THE MINIMUM SENTENCE GIVEN, WHICHEVER IS GREATER, RATHER THAN THE MAXIMUM PERIOD UNDER AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
Shaya v. Holder, 586 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. Nov. 9, 2009) ("for the purposes of Section 1101(a)(43)(F), indeterminate prison sentences in Michigan must be measured by the term actually . . . served or the minimum sentence given, whichever is greater, as this better incorporates the judge's discretion and determinations than the statutory maximum term."; "Because the maximum term of a Michigan sentence will always be the maximum statutory term, measuring a Michigan sentence by its maximum term would thwart Congress's intent to measure some aggravated felonies by the statutory maximum and others, like crimes of violence, by the sentence actually imposed.").

NOTE: The reasoning of this decision was based upon the particularities of Michigan indeterminate sentencing, and may or may not be applicable to other states, even within the Sixth Circuit.

Ninth Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY " SENTENCE IMPOSED " ONE YEAR IS DEFINED AS 365 DAYS, REGARDLESS OF LEAP YEARS
Habibi v. Holder, 658 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2011) (the phrase "one year" is defined as 365 days, regardless of leap years; noncitizen was deportable for aggravated felony, under INA 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), even though his sentence was served during a leap year).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SENTENCE - UNLAWFUL SENTENCE - SENTENCE UNLAWFUL ON ITS FACE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR PURPOSES OF AGGRAVATED FELONY SENTENCE REQUIREMENT
Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3302660 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2006) (Arizona court order imposing a twelve-month sentence, for Arizona misdemeanor conviction of "theft by control of property with a value of $250 or more," in violation of A.R.S. 1301802(A)(1), (C), arguably would not constitute a one-year sentence imposed for removal purposes since the state at the time of sentence designated the conviction a misdemeanor, and under Arizona law the maximum term of imprisonment for a misdemeanor was then six months, see A.R.S. 13-707, rendering the twelve-month sentence illegal on its face, requiring remand to the BIA to consider the issue in the first instance).

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SENTENCE - MAXIMUM SENTENCE AND ACTUAL SENTENCES ARE COMPUTED REGARDLESS OF SENTENCE REQUIRED BY RECIDIVIST SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT
United States v. Rodriquez, 464 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 2006) (Washington convictions for delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of Wash. Rev.Code 9A.20.021(1)(c), did not qualify as predicate "serious drug offense" "for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law," under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), since the statutory maximum for each offense was five years, and was increased only as a result of a recidivist sentence enhancement, which cannot be considered as punishment for the offense itself), following United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0430397p.pdf

Lower Courts of Ninth Circuit

SENTENCE - PUNISHMENT AS CONDITION OF PROBATION DISTINGUISHED FROM PUNISHMENT FOR CONVICTION
Penal Code 1203.1 authorizes the sentencing court to impose a fine or county jail incarceration as a condition of probation. This fine or jail is not considered to be imposed on account of the conviction, however, but instead as a condition of probation. (See League of Women Voters of California v. McPherson (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1469, 1481 ["The defendant who has been placed on probation, therefore, is imprisoned by the court in a local facility as a condition of probation, not as a result of the conviction of a felony"].) This statute may be used only when the court "suspend[s] the imposing or the execution of the sentence . . . ." (Penal Code 1203.1; see (People v. Mauch (2008) ___ Cal.App.5th ___.) "Fixing the penalty for crimes is the province of the Legislature, which is in the best position to evaluate the gravity of different crimes and to make judgments among different penological approaches." (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 494.) "The definition of crime and the determination of punishment are foremost among those matters that fall within the legislative domain." (People v. Mills (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 171, 176-177; accord, Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 765 ["the Legislature has the power and duty to define and classify crimes and offenses"].)

Eleventh Circuit

AGGRAVATED FELONY - SENTENCE.JUDICIAL REVIEW - RES JUDICATA
Singh v. US Attorney Gen., __ F.3d __ (11th Cir. Dec. 31, 2008) (respondent was initially convicted of robbery and sentenced to less than 365 days, he was charged with deportability based on two crimes of moral turpitude, but was granted cancellation of removal, respondent then violated probation and was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment, the DHS brought new proceedings charging the same robbery conviction was an aggravated felon; this was not barred by res judicata, because the probation violation made the offense an aggravated felony, and cancellation of removal only works to avoid being removed on the basis of the current charges, but not any subsequent proceeding).