(B)  Convictions of U.S. Territories Considered Equivalent to State Convictions.  Convictions in Puerto Rico,[148] the U.S. Virgin Islands,[149] and the District of Columbia[150] are considered state convictions for purposes of determining whether to impose a federal sentence enhancement.  Puerto Rico is considered equivalent to a state, for purposes of determining whether a noncitizen was convicted of a crime for deportation purposes, giving the same effect to its judicial decrees as if they were orders of a state court and the same effect to its legislative enactments as it would to state statutes.[151]  Persons born in Puerto Rico are United States citizens, although there are some issues if the birth date was prior to 1941.[152]

[148] United States v. Cirino, 419 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2005) (Puerto Rico conviction constitutes a conviction “under federal or state law” for purposes of enhancing a sentence under the federal career offender guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(2002)).

[149] United States v. John, 936 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1991) (Virgin Islands conviction constitutes a conviction “under federal or state law” for purposes of enhancing a federal sentence).

[150] United States v. Thomas, 361 F.3d 653 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (District of Columbia conviction constitutes a conviction “under federal or state law” for purposes of enhancing a federal sentence); see United States v. Torres-Rosa, 209 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Morales-Diaz, 925 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1991).

[151] Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 304 n.1 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (extending full faith and credit doctrine to Puerto Rico); 48 U.S.C. § 734 (providing that, unless otherwise specified, federal statutes applicable to states apply to Puerto Rico)); see also Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2000).

[152] INA § 302, 8 U.S.C. § 1402.

AGGRAVATED FELONY - STATE CONVICTIONS - AGGRAVATED FELONY CATEGORIES SPECIFICALLY COUCHED AS FEDERAL OFFENSES MAY NOT INCLUDE STATE CONVICTIONS
Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. ___,127 S.Ct. 638 (Dec. 5, 2006) (the language in the aggravated felony definition including certain state convictions "has two perfectly straightforward jobs to do: it provides that a generic description of "an offense . . . in this paragraph," one not specifically couched as a state offense or a federal one, covers either one, and it confirms that a state offense whose elements include the elements of a felony punishable under the CSA is an aggravated felony.").

     Footnote 6 in Lopez indicates that INA 101(a)(43)(B) -- the drug trafficking crime prong -- indicates some state convictions are included as drug trafficking crimes in 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(2) and therefore in 101(a)(43)(B), but that's a separate question from the question whether the sentence at the foot of 101(a)(43) after (U) means that all the aggravated felony categories, even those defined by reference to a specific federal statute, include state analogues. The post-U language can be explained as necessary to clarify that (B) includes some state offenses, and that the generic "murder"-type offenses include state offenses, without forcing the conclusion that the offenses defined in terms of specific federal statutes include state analogues as well. Can you really say that a state offense is "described in" a federal statute? There is a perfectly good plain meaning argument that it is not.