Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 2004) (Illinois conviction of aggravated fleeing from a police officer in violation of 625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1), constitutes a CMT: "It seems to us that a person who deliberately flees at a high speed from an officer who, the fleer knows, wants him to stop, thus deliberately flouting lawful authority and endangering the officer, other drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, is deliberately engaged in seriously wrongful behavior, as held in People v. Dewey, supra, albeit under a somewhat differently worded statute. See also Knapik v.

Hernandez-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2003) (Arizona conviction under former ARS 28-697A is "divisible" in that the offense can be committed by either driving on a suspended license while under the influence of alcohol [a crime of moral turpitude], or by merely being in actual physical control of a vehicle [not a crime of moral turpitude]).

A conviction of child abuse or child endangerment by omission (i.e., neglect), does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, even where the statute and complaint allege willfulness. Certain forms of child abuse may be CMTs, as held in Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407 F. 2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1969), which case concerned California Penal Code 273d, which is significantly different from Penal Code 273a(b).

Matter of Olquin-Rufino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 896 (BIA Mar. 23, 2006) (Florida conviction of possession of child pornography, in violation of Florida Statutes 827.071(5) ("knowingly possess a photograph, motion picture, exhibition, show, representation, or other presentation which, in whole or in part, he or she knows to include any sexual conduct by a child."), is a crime involving moral turpitude). This badly reasoned decision ignores the distinction between production of child pornography, and mere possession.

Donaldson v. Dept of Real Estate, ___ Cal.App.4th ___, ___ Cal. Rptr. 2d ___ (6th Dist. Dec. 9, 2005) (agency lacked authority to revoke license based on the licensees conviction of unlawful intercourse with a minor, where evidence failed to establish that the minor participated unwillingly in the conduct underlying the conviction).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/californiastatecases/h027112.doc

Matter of Marroquin, 23 I. & N. Dec. 705 (AG Jan. 18, 2005) ("This definition [of conviction, under INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A)], though broad, is clearly not intended to encompass convictions that have been formally entered but subsequently reversed on appeal or in a collateral proceeding for reasons pertaining to the factual basis for, or procedural validity of, the underlying judgment. Cf. In re P-, 9 I&N Dec. 293 (A.G.

Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2005) (where Government bears the burden in immigration proceedings, the Government must prove by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that a vacated criminal conviction remains a conviction for immigration purposes).      In deportation proceedings, the government must prove a noncitizens deportability by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R 242.14(a) (1997); 8 C.F.R. 1240.8 (as amended by 68 Fed. Reg. 9824, 9839 (Feb. 28, 2003); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S.

Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2005) (approving the Boards distinction between "convictions vacated for rehabilitative purposes and those vacated because of underlying defects in the criminal proceedings").

Misprision of a felony should not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of SC, 3 I. & N. Dec. 350 (BIA 1948). Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2002) should not control, at least outside the Eleventh Circuit.

Argaw v. Ashcroft, __ F.3d __ (4th Cir. Jan 31, 2005) (khat, a plant used as a traditional herbal stimulant in Africa is not a controlled substance listed under federal law, and therefore noncitizen bringing khat into the United States could not be found inadmissible for having committed a controlled substance offense or for drug trafficking).