A conviction of child abuse or child endangerment by omission (i.e., neglect), does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, even where the statute and complaint allege willfulness. Certain forms of child abuse may be CMTs, as held in Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407 F. 2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1969), which case concerned California Penal Code 273d, which is significantly different from Penal Code 273a(b). The former statute requires the willful infliction of either "cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or an injury resulting in a traumatic condition." By contrast, the latter, divisible statute is satisfied by willfully permitting a child to be placed in a situation where his or her health is endangered, such as where a four-year old child is willfully placed in a car without a seatbelt, because the parent is in a hurry to do an errand. Divisible parts of this statute do not require there to have been any injury. There has been no published case in which a conviction of Penal Code 273a(b) has been held to be or to not be a CMT, so we must look to analogies. In In re Fualauu, 21 I. & N. Dec. 475 (BIA 1996), the conviction was for violation of an assault statute. In a child abuse case, there is no showing of an assault. The holding in Fualauu that an assault with a reckless state of mind is not a CMT unless there is also traumatic or serious bodily injury provides a useful analogy. Recklessness, like willfulness, is a culpable state of mind, but, by itself, it does not prove the baseness or depravity required of moral turpitude. In the case of Rodriguez-Herrera v. INS, 52 F.3d 238 (9th Cir. 1995), the Court used the test of baseness and depravity to rule that the Washington statute prohibiting malicious mischief did not describe a crime involving moral turpitude: To determine whether the Washington crime of malicious mischief is one that necessarily involves moral turpitude, we must determine whether malicious mischief necessarily involves an "act of baseness or depravity contrary to accepted moral standards." See Grageda v. INS, 12 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407 F.2d 1405, 1406 (9th Cir. 1969)). In answering this question, we must focus on the crime categorically as defined by the statute, and not on the specific conduct of Rodriguez-Herrera. Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 1993). For crimes like malicious mischief that are not of the gravest character, a requirement of fraud has ordinarily been required. [Citations omitted.] . . . On the other hand, certain crimes necessarily involving rather grave acts of baseness or depravity may qualify as crimes of moral turpitude even though they have no element of fraud. Applying this standard we have found that spousal abuse, child abuse, first-degree incest, and having carnal knowledge of a 15 year old female, all involve moral turpitude. See Grageda, 12 F.3d at 921-22; Guerrero de Nodahl, 407 F.2d at 1406-07; Gonzalez-Alvarado, 39 F.3d at 246-47; and Bendel v. Nagle, 17 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1927). While mental state is an important factor, we reject the contention that all crimes requiring some degree of evil intent are necessarily crimes involving moral turpitude. Here, for example, the Washington statute permits malice (which imports an evil intent) to "be inferred from an act done in wilful disregard of the rights of another, or an act wrongfully done without just cause or excuse, or an act or omission of duty betraying a wilful disregard of social duty." RCW 9A.04.110(12). Under this definition, evil intent may become much too attenuated to imbue the crime with the character of fraud or depravity that we have associated with moral turpitude. At least outside of the fraud context, the bare presence of some degree of evil intent is not enough to convert a crime that is not serious into one of moral turpitude leading to deportation under section 241(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Rodriguez-Herrera, supra, 52 F.3d 238. Child endangerment by omission and without injury, even if the omission is willful, is distinguishable from child abuse committed by the willful infliction of bodily injury, and the latter may be a CMT while the former is not. The California jury instruction defining a violation of Penal Code 273a(b) defines the word "willfully" as requiring only a will to commit the act or make the omission (e.g., leave the child unbuckled in the car); it does not require any intent to violate law, injure the child or gain advantage. In Toutounjian v. INS, 959 F. Supp. 598 (W.D.N.Y. 1997), the court considered whether the Canadian crime of willfully committing an indecent act is a crime of moral turpitude. The court noted that "there is evidence in the present case that the term "wilfully" in section 173 could encompass negligent conduct." It concluded: "This court therefore assumes that the conduct allegedly at issue in this case is more analogous to reckless behavior. To find moral turpitude, the element of a reckless state of mind must be coupled with an offense involving the infliction of serious bodily injury. Matter of Fualaau, Interim Decision 3285 (BIA 1996)." Thus, the mere fact that the statute contains the word "willfully" to indicate the culpable state of mind does not mean that the conduct was base, depraved or morally turpitudinous.