Cuevas-Gaspar v. Ashcroft, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2005) (Washington conviction of accomplice to residential burglary, under in violation of Washington Revised Code 9A.52.025(1), 9A.08.020(3), constituted a crime involving moral turpitude under modified categorical approach for removal purposes because noncitizen admitted in signed plea statement to entering a residence with the intent to steal property from the residence).

Cuevas-Gaspar v. Ashcroft, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. Dec.

Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2005) (Washington conviction of being an accomplice to residential burglary, in violation of Wash. Rev.

Rodriguez-Herrera v. INS, 52 F.3d 238 (9th Cir. April 6, 1995).

Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279 (3rd Cir. Oct. 26, 2004) (receiving stolen property under 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. 3925(a) is a crime involving moral turpitude).

See Matter of Arreguin, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38  (BIA 1995) (establishing standard for significance of dismissed charges in discretionary decision); Billeke-Tolosa v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. Sep. 30, 2004) (reversing BIA's failure to follow its case law on significance of dismissed charges in discretionary decision); Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 846 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring BIA to follow its own precedent). But see Matter of Thomas, 20 I. & N, Dec.

turpitude \TUR-puh-tood; -tyood\, noun: 1.  Inherent  baseness  or  vileness  of  principle, words, or actions; depravity. 2. A base act.

Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 2004) ("In general, crimes [of more turpitude] . . . are (1) serious crimes, in terms either of the magnitude of the loss that they cause or the indignation that they arouse in the law-abiding public (hence during the Prohibition era Judge Learned Hand refused to declare every violation of a prohibition law a crime involving moral turpitude . . . ), that are (2) deliberate, because a person who deliberately commits a serious crime is regarded as behaving immorally and not merely illegally. . . .

Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 2004) (A requirement of willfulness found to be inherent in the aggravated form of evading a police officer, under 625 ILCS 5/11-204, where willfulness is an element of the unaggravated form of the offense, "because the legislature might think that the requirement for the aggravated offense that the defendant has exceeded the speed limit by at least 21 m.p.h.

Reyes-Morales v. Ashcroft, ___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006) (Minnesota conviction for making harassing phone calls, under Minn.Stat. 609.749, is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it does not require intentional transmission of threats: "Reyes-Morales was convicted of intentionally making telephone calls with reason to know that such calls would cause, and did cause, the recipient to feel frightened. A reckless mental state, without more, typically does not give rise to a finding of moral turpitude. See In re Fualaau, 21 I. & N. Dec.