Specific protections also exist for minors applying for asylum. See 76 Interpreter Releases 1 (January 4, 1999) for a summary of the INS Asylum Guidelines for children. A copy of the entire INS Guidelines for Children’s Asylum Claims can be found on the web at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/10a_ChldrnGdlns.pdf

A valuable chart of the immigration consequences of California crimes is available on the Immigrant Legal Resource Center web site at www.ilrc.org/Cal_DIP_Chart_by_section.pdf. A chart for federal offenses, and charts for several other states, are available in the Free Resources section of our site: http://www.criminalandimmigrationlaw.com/_imm_cons.php.

United States v. Rios-Beltran, 361 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. March 24, 2004) (the statutory maximum, not the sentence range under applicable State sentencing guidelines, determines whether given offense qualifies as felony for federal sentencing purposes; prior Oregon conviction punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year is an "aggravated felony" for federal sentencing purposes).

United States v Gonzalez-Tamariz, 310 F3d 1168 (9th Cir 2002) (no error in applying 16-level enhancement to sentence for illegal re-entry because battery causing substantial bodily harm meets federal definition of aggravated felony regardless of state law label as a misdemeanor, and aggravated felony definition plainly provides that a crime of violence is an aggravated felony when the term of imprisonment is at least one year)

Page 226, footnote153,of Criminal Defense of Immigrants: Delete all language in second sentence following "Five years" Thanks to Sheila Quinlan.

Lagadon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2004) (for purposes of cancellation of removal residence requirement, 10 year period that starts on January 1, 1990, ends on December 31, 2000).

Generi v. Ashcroft, ___ F.Supp.2d ___2004 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 6396 (W.D. Mi., Feb. 19, 2004) (stop time provision may not be applied retroactively to guilty pleas entered prior to the passage of IIRAIRA where proceedings were begun post-IIRAIRA); Henry v. Ashcroft, 175 F.Supp.2d 688 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same). But see, Worrell v. Ashcroft, 207 F.Supp.2d 61, 67 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (stop time rule is not a retroactive application to someone who committed the crime before the effective date).

If an act or conviction is not referred to in INA 212(a)(2), it does not stop accrual of time under INA 240A(d) for purposes of LPR cancellation of removal.  Even if a conviction constituted a CIMT, respondent can argue that the stop-time rule of INA 240A(d) does not apply to pre-IIRAIRA acts.  See Henry v. Ashcroft, 175 F. Supp. 2d 688 (S.D. N.Y. 2001); but see Matter of Perez, Int. Dec. 3389 (BIA 1999) (decided prior to St Cyr).  This argument would be more difficult in a non-guilty plea situation. Thanks to Lynn Marcus for this argument.

Boonkue v. Ridge, (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d), 2004 WL 1146525 (E.D. Ore. May 7, 2004) (granting habeas under 28 U.S.C. 2241, ordering USICE to release returning LPR with CMT conviction; INA 236(c)(1) does not require mandatory detention where respondent was not arrested by immigration authorities directly upon release from criminal custody). Accord, see Pastor-Camarena v. Smith, 977 F. Supp. 1415, 1418 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (construing temporary rules in effect before 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which also used the phrase "when the alien is released"); Alikhani v. Fasano, 70 F. Supp.

Zavala v. Ridge, 310 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Cal. March 1, 2004) (the automatic stay at 8 C.F.R. 3.19(i)(2) is ultra vires to the statute, and facially violates substantive and procedural due process).