Generi v. Ashcroft, ___ F.Supp.2d ___2004 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 6396 (W.D. Mi., Feb. 19, 2004) (stop time provision may not be applied retroactively to guilty pleas entered prior to the passage of IIRAIRA where proceedings were begun post-IIRAIRA); Henry v. Ashcroft, 175 F.Supp.2d 688 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same). But see, Worrell v. Ashcroft, 207 F.Supp.2d 61, 67 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (stop time rule is not a retroactive application to someone who committed the crime before the effective date).      In IIRAIRA, "The clock-stopping provision contains no language addressing its retroactive applicability as to either of these two triggering events." Generi, at *11. The IIRAIRA Transitional Rule speaks to the retroactivity of prong (A) - the issuance of the notice to appear before, on or after the 4/1/97 effective date of IIRAIRA. 110 Stat. at 3009-546. However, IIRAIRA is completely silent as to the retroactivity of prong (B) of the clock-stopping statute. When NACARA amended the IIRAIRA Transitional Rule to include retroactive application to "order to show cause" cases, again, Congress was completely silent as to the retroactivity of the second prong (B). Congress was capable of making the prong (B) provision retroactive but chose not to do so. Generi, at *18. "[W]hile Congress had expressly stated that the clock-stopping provision was to be retroactively applied as to orders to show cause issued prior to the enactment of IIRAIRA, Congress made no such affirmative declaration that the clock-stopping was to be applied to crimes committed prior to the enactment of IIRAIRA. Generi, at *17-18.