United States v. Arnett, 327 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. April 24, 2003)(collateral estoppel prevented petitioner from relitigating an issue litigated and lost in an Oregon federal trial - that the short-barreled shotgun he used in both the California and Oregon robberies was an "antique" under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(3) and (a)(16)(A)).

Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. Nov. 19. 2004) ("Potential or intended loss can satisfy the second element under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), which defines an aggravated felony as "an attempt or conspiracy to commit" another aggravated felony defined in 1101(a)(43). See In re Onyido, 22 I. & N. Dec. 552 (BIA 1999) (concluding that submission of a false insurance claim qualified as an aggravated felony under 1101(a)(43)(U), even though the petitioner's scheme was unsuccessful and he received no payment from the insurance company).").

Burrell v. United States, 384 F.3d 22 (2th Cir. Sept. 14, 2004) (Connecticut state conviction from Alford plea constitutes a conviction within meaning of federal firearms statute)

Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. Jan. 29, 2004), vacating and withdrawing previous opinion, 335 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.

The Full Faith and Credit doctrine does not require the immigration courts to follow state definitions of what constitutes a "conviction" for immigration purposes. This issue is determined by reference to the statutory definition of conviction. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A). Thus, the District Court for the Northern District of Texas rejected a claim that because Texas law did not consider a "deferred adjudication" to be a conviction, the Full Faith & Credit statute required the federal court to accept this state rule. Bui v. Ashcroft, 2003 WL 251929 at p. *3 (N.D. Tex.

United States v. Zamudio, 314 F.3d 517 (10th Cir. 2002) (Utah plea in abeyance is a conviction for immigration purposes, satisfying 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A), INA 101(a)(48)(A), as a plea, "to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt.").

There is a grave risk that a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) disposition constitutes a conviction, at least under California procedure, since the defendant is required first to enter a guilty plea, and in effect be convicted, before entering a NGI plea, and receiving treatment rather than a sentence. It is possible to argue to the contrary, based on "basic principles" such as the "not guilty" part of the "not guilty by reason of insanity" plea.

United States v. Ceja-Prado, 333 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. June 25, 2003) (where proof of defendant's age is lacking, and s/he may have been a juvenile at the time the crime was committed, there may be no federal
jurisdiction over defendant's case pursuant to the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5031).

Matter of Leon-Ruiz, 21 I. & N. Dec. 154, 1996 WL 23408 (BIA Jan. 3, 1996) (availability of post-conviction collateral attack does not affect the finality of the conviction for immigration purposes, unless and until the conviction has been overturned pursuant to such a motion). See Okabe v. INS, 671 F.2d 863, 865 (5th Cir.1982); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 570 (6th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); Matter of Gabryelsky, Interim Decision 3213, at 3-4 (BIA 1993); Matter of Adetiba, Interim Decision 3177, at 4-5 (BIA 1992).

Matter of Polanco, 20 I. & N. Dec. 894, 1994 WL 601592 (BIA Oct. 21, 1994) (noncitizen who has waived or exhausted the right to a direct appeal of a conviction is subject to deportation, and the potential for discretionary review on direct appeal will not prevent the conviction from being considered final for immigration purposes).