Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. June 30, 2003)(traffic ticket form, incompletely executed, held insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had been convicted of a firearms offense for purposes of disqualifying him from INA § 212(c) relief, even though it showed he had been arrested and charged with a firearms offense, where it did not identify the offense of conviction and respondent may have entered a plea to a lesser non-firearms offense). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/11th/0015783p.pdf

Even where statute said "crime of violence" means (I) "and" includes (II), the court interpreted it as (I) "or" (II). "Bonilla urges that because the Guideline lists the crime of violence definition in the conjunctive, the government must prove that the offense has a particular element and that the offense constitutes a specific type of crime. Contrary to Bonilla's position, we have held that a statute's use of disjunctive or conjunctive language is not always determinative. See Alaska v. Lying, 797 F.2d 1479, 1483 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986).

The Department of Justice Criminal Manual instructs U.S. attorneys to "plead in the conjunctive, but instruct in the disjunctive." Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 216, n.10 (3d Cir. 2002), quoting from DEP'T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 227. In Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962), the Ninth Circuit interpreted a guilty plea to an indictment alleging "false and fraudulent statements" to mean either a false or a fraudulent statement for purposes of whether 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was a crime involving moral turpitude.

If several acts are charged, and any one of them would be sufficient if proven to sustain the jury verdict, the court must assume the least turpitudinous act was the basis of the verdict where the record does not conclusively establish which act the jury found true. [Matter of R, 6 I. & N. Dec.

Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir. September 28, 2004) (ambiguous court record held sufficient to establish that respondent had been convicted of a firearms offense, and was thus not eligible for a waiver of deportability under INA 212(c)).

Chanmouny v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810 (8th Cir. July 16, 2004) (defendant's factual admissions during plea hearing may be used to identify particular elements of divisible statute that form the offense of conviction).

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (June 24, 2004) (clarifying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) rule that any factual sentence enhancement that increases potential punishment over statutory maximum constitutes an element of the offense and must be found true by the jury; relevant "statutory maximum" is not maximum sentence judge may impose after finding additional facts, but maximum judge may impose without any additional findings).

United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 374 F.3d 808 (9th Cir.

The charging paper is not specifically listed in INA § 240(c)(3)(B) ("Proof of Convictions"), nor in 8 CFR § 3.41 ("Evidence of criminal conviction"). Thanks to Jonathan Moore for this analysis.

United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2006) (in conducting modified categorical analysis, record of conviction excludes police reports).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0530066p.pdf