Matter of Chairz-Castaneda, 21 I. & N. Dec. 44, 1995 WL 314390 (BIA April 28, 1995) (right to appeal such issues as whether a violation of probation has occurred or the sentence imposed upon entry of judgment was correct will not prevent a finding of a final conviction for immigration purposes; to disturb finality, issues on appeal must relate to the issue of "guilt or innocence of the original charge.").

United States v. Garcia-Echavarria, 374 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. July 1, 2004) (request to begin belated appeal does not affect finality of a conviction).

United States v. Garcia-Echavarria, 374 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. July 1, 2004) (Kentucky conviction was sufficiently final, at the time of defendant's deportation, to qualify as aggravated felony conviction for purposes of enhancing sentence for illegal reentry, since original conviction had become final; direct appeal from two judgments denying relief in a collateral attack on judgment of conviction was not a direct appeal from judgment of conviction).

Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. Jan. 22, 2004) (IIRAIRAs new definition of conviction eliminated finality requirement for a conviction, set forth in Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901, 75 S.Ct. 576, 99 L.Ed.

Valderrama-Fonseca v. INS, 116 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. June 24, 1997)(failing to reach argument that the Immigration Judge committed reversible error by basing removal upon a conviction that had been expunged pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b), since respondent had failed to present it first to the BIA), citing Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562, 1567 (9th Cir. 1994).

Matter of Suh, 23 I. & N. Dec. 626 (BIA 2003)(presidential or gubernatorial pardon waives only the grounds of removal specifically set forth in INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v) (2000), and no implicit waivers may be read into the statute, so the respondent's pardon did not waive removability for a conviction of a crime of domestic violence or child abuse under INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), because that section is not specifically included in INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(v)).
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/libindex.html

The statute that repealed JRADs did not revoke the authority of JRADs granted before November 29, 1990. The regulations reflect this view. Section 240.10(d) of 8 CFR says: (d) Issues of removability. . . . The alien shall provide a court certified copy of a Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation (JRAD) to the immigration judge when such recommendation will be the basis of denying any charge(s) brought by the Service in the proceedings against the alien.

Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382 (3rd Cir. Dec. 4, 2003) (common law doctrine of innocent, casual, and brief departure in Fleuti did not survive the passage of IIRIRA).
http://www.ilw.com/lawyers/immigdaily/cases/2003,1205-Tineo.pdf

Gonzalez-Martinez v. INS, 58 F.3d 307 (9th Cir. 2003) (court affirmed BIA decision that respondents were properly treated as arriving aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(iii) for engaging in alien-smuggling after departing the United States, because substantial evidence in the record supports the BIA's holding.

In re Suh, 23 I. & N. Dec. 626 (BIA 2003) (a presidential or gubernatorial pardon waives only those grounds of removal specifically set forth in 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(v), INA 237(a)(2)(A)(v))