Matter of Aldabesheh, 22 I. & N. Dec. 983 (BIA Aug. 30,
1999) (en banc) (New York conviction for forgery in the second
degree, in violation of section 170.10(2) of the New York
Penal Law, is an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(R),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R)).

Matter of Martinez-Recinos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 175 (BIA Oct.
15, 2001) (California conviction for perjury in violation
of California Penal Code § 118(a) constitutes a conviction
for an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(S), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(S) for immigration purposes).

Mathews v. Reno, 52
F.Supp.2d 195 (D.Mass. May 18, 1999) (Rhode Island conviction
of second-degree child abuse, the infliction upon a child
of any "serious physical injury," in violation of
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-9-5.3(2), constitutes a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), and is considered an aggravated felony
under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), for
immigration purposes).

United States v. Gracia-Cantu,
302 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2002) (Texas conviction of
injury to child, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 22.04(a),
was not "crime of violence," and so did not qualify
as an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
purposes).

United States v. Contreras-Salas,
387 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. Nov. 3, 2004) (Nevada conviction of
child abuse under Nev. Rev. Statutes § 200.508 does not qualify
as a crime of violence for purposes of enhancement of sentence
for unlawful re-entry after deportation, since statute may
be violated by negligence alone, and record of conviction
was unclear as to level of intent).

Washington v. Recuendo, __ U.S. __ (Jun. 27, 2006) (failure to submit firearm enhancement to jury, in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 541 U.S. 296 (2004), is not structural error requiring reversal without showing of prejudice).



Note: Justice Stevens, in dissent, points out that the majority did not reach the issue whether Blakely errors are structural because they deprive defendants of sufficient notice regarding the charges they must defend against. So that argument is still available.

State v. Quintero-Morelos, 133 Wn. App. 591, 2006 Wash. App. LEXIS 1301 (Jun. 22, 2006) (trial court had discretion, under CrR 7.8, to grant a motion to vacate judgment imposing sentence of 365 days, in order to impose one of 364 days, to avoid aggravated felony mandatory deportation, on the basis of "excusable neglect . . . in obtaining a judgment . . . ." based on defense counsel's failure to inform the sentencing court of defendant's noncitizen status), distinguishing State v. Cortez, 73 Wn. App. 838, 871 P.2d 660 (1994).

A court does not circumvent federal law by vacating a deportable sentence, to impose a non-deportable equivalent sentence, when informed of the immigration consequences. State v. Quintero-Morelos, 133 Wn. App. 591, ___, 2006 Wash. App. LEXIS 1301 (June 22, 2006) ("We simply are not prepared to hold that a state sentencing judge exercising traditional sentencing discretionary authority runs afoul of the Supremacy Clause by imposing a sentence of one day less than a year to avoid the defendant's deportation by federal authorities. The judge here is not circumventing federal law.

Matter of O'Cealleagh, 23 I. & N. Dec. 976 (BIA 2006) ("purely political offense" exception to CMT ground of inadmissibility under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) must be determined to have been completely/totally political in view of the totality of the circumstances).



The BIA noted three possible definitions of "political offense":



One sort, which the respondent essentially contends is applicable to his conviction, involves baseless, trumped-up, or fabricated charges.

Matter of O'Cealleagh, 23 I. & N. Dec. 976 (BIA 2006) ("purely political offense" exception to CMT ground of inadmissibility under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) must be determined to have been completely/totally political in view of the totality of the circumstances).



The BIA noted three possible definitions of "political offense":



One sort, which the respondent essentially contends is applicable to his conviction, involves baseless, trumped-up, or fabricated charges.