United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d
691 (5th Cir. Dec. 4, 1997) (Texas felony conviction for possession
of marijuana, in violation of Texas Health & Safety Code
§ 481.121, was "aggravated felony" as defined by
INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) requiring 16-level
increase under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) for illegal re-entry
conviction), superseded by statute as stated in United States
v.

United States v. Sanchez,
179 F.Supp.2d 689 (W.D.Tex. Dec. 26, 2001) (Texas felony conviction
for possession of cocaine for personal use was not an aggravated
felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (effective Nov. 1,
2001), requiring eight-level increase in offense level of
illegal re-entry conviction, since the new Guidelines in U.S.S.G.

United States v. Saenz-Mendoza,
287 F.3d 1011 (10th Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (Utah misdemeanor
conviction of child abuse, cruelty toward a child, constituted
an "aggravated felony" as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(F),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), for purposes of sentence enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2), for illegal re-entry).

Matter of Sweetser, 22 I.
& N. Dec. 709 (BIA May 19, 1999) (Colorado conviction
of criminally negligent child abuse under sections 18-6-401(1)
and (7) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, where negligence
in leaving stepson alone in a bathtub resulted in the childs
death, was not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.

Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 410
F.3d 585 (9th Cir. June 1, 2005) (Arizona misdemeanor conviction
of domestic violence assault, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-1203(A)(1) or (2), which both require the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
or property of another, therefore both qualify as crimes of
violence under 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Nobriga, 408
F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. May 20, 2005) (per curiam) (Hawaii conviction
of abuse of a family or household member, in violation of
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 709-906(A), did not invariably constitute
a crime of domestic violence, under 18 U.S.C.

United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez,
374 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. June 30, 2004) (California misdemeanor
conviction of corporal injury on spouse, in violation of Penal
Code § 273.5(a), cannot constitute a crime of violence aggravated
felony conviction, so as to support a 16-level enhancement
of sentence for illegal re-entry under U.S.S.G.

United States v. Jimenez,
258 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. July 31, 2001) (California conviction
for inflicting corporal injury on spouse was "aggravated
felony," on which district court could rely to enhance
sentence for illegal re-entry offense, though defendant was
originally sentenced to probation with only a 365-day jail
condition, and was not sentenced to two-year term of imprisonment
until after he violated his probation), cert.

Berhe v. Gonzales,
___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 2729689 (1st Cir. Sept. 26, 2006) (Massachusetts
1996 conviction of misdemeanor simple possession of crack
cocaine under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 34, and Massachusetts
2003 misdemeanor conviction of simple possession of crack
cocaine, were not aggravated felony drug trafficking convictions
under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C.

United States v. Clase-Espinal, 115 F.3d
1054 (1st Cir. June 19, 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 957
(1997) (Texas felony conviction for possession of cocaine,
under Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.115(f) (1996), was
an "aggravated felony" under INA § 101(a)(43)(B),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) for illegal re-entry sentence enhancement
purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2)).