Matter of O'Cealleagh, 23 I. & N. Dec. 976 (BIA 2006) ("purely political offense" exception to CMT ground of inadmissibility under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) must be determined to have been completely/totally political in view of the totality of the circumstances).



The BIA noted three possible definitions of "political offense":



One sort, which the respondent essentially contends is applicable to his conviction, involves baseless, trumped-up, or fabricated charges. There is no dispute among the parties that a fabricated or trumped-up charge may be a "purely political offense," as indeed we held in Matter of B-, supra. A second type of "political" offense, not involved here, is one that consists of an act or acts directed against the State, such as treason, sedition, or espionage, that contains
none of the elements of ordinary crimes. The third kind of "political" crime, again not at issue here and denominated under extradition law as a "relative" political offense, is one in which a common offense such as murder, assault, or theft is so connected with a political act that the offense is regarded as "political." See 31A Am. Jur. 2d Extradition 44 (2002); see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1986). We have no occasion to explore the extent of portability of extradition principles to the "purely political offense" language we must apply, except to note the very different purposes served by extradition and removal or exclusion proceedings.



Matter of OCealleagh, 23 I. & N. Dec. Dec. 976, 980 (BIA 2006). However, for purposes of this decision the BIA looked solely to the first definition given, and did not determine whether the other two definitions have any part in defining a "purely political offense" for purposes of INA 212(a)(2)(A)(I)(i).