Kovacs v. U.S., 744 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2014) (Padilla rule on ineffective assistance in advising on deportation consequences of plea retroactively applied to petitioner's claim; petitioner demonstrated reasonable probability that he could have negotiated a plea that did not affect his immigration status; petitioner demonstrated reasonable probability that he would have proceeded to trial; and petitioner supplied sufficient reasons to justify delay in seeking relief).

Kovacs v. U.S., 744 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2014) (A petitioner seeking coram nobis relief must demonstrate that 1) there are circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice, 2) sound reasons exist for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief, and 3) the petitioner continues to suffer legal consequences from his conviction that may be remedied by granting of the writ. Foont v. United States, 93 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir.1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).).

1970s
Kovacs v. U.S., 744 F.3d 44, 50-51 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2014) (United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir.2002), holding that an affirmative misrepresentation of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea falls outside this range of professional competence, applies retroactively to this case even though Couto was decided the year after Kovacs' 2001 conviction became final: We have little trouble concluding that, by the time Kovacs' conviction became final, the Couto rule was indicated, and was awaiting an instance in which it would be pronounced.

Parra-Rojas v. Attorney General U.S., ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2014 WL 1230001 (3d Cir. Mar. 26, 2014) (federal conviction of Bringing In or Harboring Aliens for Financial Gain, in violation of INA 274(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), did not trigger inadmissibility under INA 212(a)(6)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) (the smuggling bar), which renders an alien inadmissible if he has knowingly ...

United States v. Urias-Marrufo, 744 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2014) (district court commits reversible error by failing to consider Padilla claim as a ground in support of a motion to withdraw a plea before imposition of sentence: We hold that when a Padilla claim is sufficiently presented during a motion to withdraw a plea, both legally and factually, a district court errs in failing to address the claim. Moreover, if the court finds that a Padilla violation occurred, that finding compels the court to permit the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea.).

United States v. Urias-Marrufo, 744 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2014) (To enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, the defendant must have a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence. (Footnote omitted.) The defendant must have notice of the nature of the charges against her, she must understand the consequences of her plea, and must understand the nature of the constitutional protections she is waiving. (Footnote omitted.) For a guilty plea to be voluntary, it must not be the product of actual or threatened physical harm, or ...

United States v. Urias-Marrufo, 744 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2014) (It is counsel's duty, not the court's, to warn of certain immigration consequences, and counsel's failure cannot be saved by a plea colloquy. Thus, it is irrelevant that the magistrate judge asked Urias whether she understood that there might be immigration consequences and that she and her attorney had discussed the possible adverse immigration consequences of pleading guilty.); citing Marroquin v. United States, 480 Fed.Appx. 294, 299 (5th Cir.

All circuits to consider the question have held that plain language of the statutory aggravated felony bar to the waiver in INA 212(h) applies only to individuals who entered the United States as lawful permanent residents (LPR), not to those who subsequently adjusted to LPR status. Papazoglou v. Holder, 725 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2013); Hanif v. Atty. General of the United States, 694 F.3d 479, 487 (3d Cir. 2012); Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 386"87 (4th Cir. 2012); Lanier v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1366"67 (11th Cir. 2011); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 546 (5th Cir.

The Immigrant Legal Resource Center has a declaration from a California attorney establishing that in San Bernardino County, the prosecutor prosecuted a felon in possession of two antique/replica civil war era guns, under Penal Code 12021(a). This is the same definition of firearm that is used in a number of California firearms statutes. This declaration establishes not only that there is a reasonable probability that the prosecutors in California prosecute antique firearms under the California definition of firearms, but that they have actually done so. Thanks to Daniel G. Degriselles.

Penal Code 273.5(a) has been amended to expand the list of persons who qualify as victims of this offense. It now includes the offender's fianc or fiance, or someone with whom the offender has or previously had, an engagement or dating relationship, as defined in Penal Code 243(f)(10). In Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058, 1-64-1065 (9th Cir.