Orabi v. Attorney General of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 540-541 (3d Cir. Jan. 2, 2014) (New York convictions were pending on direct appeal before the Second Circuit, and were therefore not sufficiently final to form a basis for removal: We do not agree that the IIRIRA eliminated a direct appeal from the finality rule in its definition of conviction. Hence, we do not agree with those Courts that have adopted this interpretation. See, e.g., id. (collecting cases). By doing so, they have vitiated, without reason, the BIA's rule formulated and established in In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 552 n.

United States v. Aparicio-Soria, 740 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2014) (en banc) (Maryland conviction of resisting arrest, in violation of Md. Code, Crim. Law 9"408(b)(1) [[a] person may not intentionally ... resist a lawful arrest.], does not qualify categorically as a "crime of violence" within the meaning of the residual force clause of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), because it does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another).

Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 200 (5th Cir. Jan. 30, 2014) (immigration judge cannot consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether an alien was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude: We have long held that, in making this determination, judges may consider only the inherent nature of the crime, as defined in the statute, or, in the case of divisible statutes, the alien's record of conviction. Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); U.S. ex rel. McKenzie v. Savoretti, 200 F.2d 546, 548 (1952).

Hanna v. Holder, 740 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2014) (noncitizen was qualified to challenge concession of removability by counsel where a change in the law occurred, concerning how that evaluation of deportability is made, that would render removal as charged unjust).

The court explained the conditions under which a noncitizen could challenge counsels concession of removability as follows:

In a removal proceeding, petitioners are bound by the concessions of their attorneys to the IJ unless they can show ineffective assistance of counsel or some other egregious circumstances. Gill v.

United States v. Tucker, 740 F.3d 1177 (8th Cir. Jan. 29, 2014) (under the Supreme Courts decision in Descamps, the court may not apply the modified categorical approach to a statute that is textually indivisible, such as the Missouri statute penalizing a walk-away escape from a half-way house, to hold the offense to be a crime of violence under the residual otherwise clause of the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), because there was a guard on duty when the escape occurred); partially overruling United States v. Parks, 620 F.3d 911 (8th Cir.

Aguilar-Turcios v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2014) (military conviction for violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, providing that official use of government computers does not include viewing pornography, does not categorically constitute a aggravated felony, because one could violate the article without necessarily being guilty of all the elements of a generic federal child pornography offense).

Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2014) (the aggravated felony bar to a waiver of inadmissibility under INA 212(h) for a noncitizen previously admitted to the US as a LPR does not apply to someone who adjusted status without leaving the United States: only non-citizens who entered the United States as lawful permanent residents are barred from eligibility to apply for waiver).

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (mandatory immigration detention pursuant to INA 236(c) detention is limited to six months; anything longer without an individualized hearing is presumptively unreasonable); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, 656 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2011) (individualized hearing required to determine what is reasonable in a given case); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 272 (6th Cir. 2003); Bourguignon v. MacDonald, 667 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D. Mass. 2009).

United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013) (Florida conviction for "lewd and lascivious battery," in violation of Florida Statutes 800.04(4)(a) [[e]ngag[ing] in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age.], did not categorically constitute a crime of violence for illegal reentry sentencing purposes, since lack of consent is not an element of the crime; nor is the statute divisible, so the modified categorical analysis cannot be employed); United States v. Gomez"Mendez, 486 F.3d 599, 604 (9th Cir.

People v. Superior Court (Sanchez), 223 Cal.App.4th 567, 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 115 (3d Dist. Jan. 29, 2014) (granting prosecution petition for a writ of mandate challenging the trial court's order reforming a plea bargain detrimentally to the People by reducing the penalty to the term of imprisonment authorized by law for the crime, where the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by reforming the negotiated plea to conform with the applicable law because the reformation denied the People the benefit of their bargain).