(D)

Special Suspension for Spouse or Child Abused by U.S. Citizen or Resident Spouse or Parent.  Battered spouses and children were eligible for a special three-year suspension of deportation, or eligible to “self-petition.”  A form of this relief was carried forward into cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents.  See § 3.37, infra.

Third Circuit

RELIEF - SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION - CONTINUOUS PRESENCE REQUIREMENT - STOP-TIME RULE - RETROACTIVE APPLICATION DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
Arca-Pineda v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. May 28, 2008) (retroactive application of the stop-time rule did not violate due process).

RELIEF - CONTINUOUS PRESENCE REQUIREMENT - STOP-TIME RULE - EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL CLAIM REJECTED
Arca-Pineda v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. May 28, 2008) (respondent cannot re-start clock by failing to appear for removal proceeding and then waiting an additional 10 years).

RELIEF - SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION - STOP-TIME RULE
Arca-Pineda v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. May 28, 2008) (continuous physical presence clock did not begin to run again after an administrative closure; administrative closure is not a termination proceedings; it only removes the case from the IJs calendar).

Seventh Circuit

RELIEF " SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION
Torres-Rendon v. Holder, 656 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011) (application for suspension of deportation under former INA 244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(2), was properly denied for lack of the necessary period of continuous presence: The period of continuous physical presence ended at the time Torres"Rendon committed his drug crime in 1987, or, in the alternative, when an Order to Show Cause was issued to him in 1988. He cannot restart the clock and accrue time for purposes of establishing his continuous physical presence and thus cannot establish 10 years of continuous physical presence.); following Matter of Nolasco"Tofino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 632, 641 (BIA 1999) (holding that the stop-time rule applies to all suspension of deportation applications generally); see Angel"Ramos v. Reno, 227 F.3d 942 (7th Cir.2000); but see Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585 (3d Cir.2005) (because the alien lawfully re-entered the United States after committing a controlled substance offense, the continuous physical presence period should recommence); but cf. Briseno"Flores v. Atty. Gen. U.S., 492 F.3d 226 (3d Cir.2007) (finding that the alien stopped accruing time of continuous physical presence when he committed his first offense and noting: we conclude that the BIA's interpretation of 1229b(d)(1) in Mendoza is reasonable, even though others may disagree with it. Therefore, under Chevron, that interpretation is entitled to deference.).