(B)  Fraud Against the Government.  Fraud against the government is not limited to pecuniary fraud, since an intent to undermine or subvert governmental authority is also considered to be an intent to defraud the government.  Therefore, where intent to defraud the government by subverting its authority is a necessary element of an offense, the offense is generally held to be a crime involving moral turpitude.[58]  The rule has been extended to include other crimes as well, e.g., counterfeiting coins.[59]

 

[58] Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (195l).  The most obvious crime to illustrate this rule is perjury.  E.g., United States ex rel. Karpay v. Uhl, 70 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. den., 293 U.S. 573 (1934); United States ex rel. Cumberbatch v. Shaughnessy, 117 F.Supp. 152 (D.N.Y. 1953); United States ex rel. Carella v. Karnuth, 2 F.Supp. 998 (D.N.Y. 1933).

[59] Bisaillon v. Hogan, 257 F.2d 435 (9th Cir.), cert. den. sub nom. Bisaillon v. Sureck, 358 U.S. 872 (1958) (willfully and knowingly making a false statement in a passport application with intent to obtain the issuance of a passport contrary to law constituted a fraud on the United States, although not measurable in dollars and cents, being in that regard akin to perjury); United States ex rel. Giglio v. Neelly, 208 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1953) (the absence of fraudulent intent as an essential element of counterfeiting coins indicated that Congress did not intend to impute moral turpitude in the offense).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FRAUD OFFENSES " DEFINITION AGGRAVATED FELONIES " FRAUD OFFENSES " DEFINITION
The Supreme Court has held that "[T]he well-settled meaning of 'fraud' require[s] a misrepresentation or concealment of material fact" and "materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23, 25 (1999). Since Neder, the federal circuits have uniformly ruled that schemes criminalized by the mail or wire fraud statutes must involve material false representations, material omissions of fact, or both. Federal prosecutors in the Ninth Circuit recently have advanced the proposition that the federal wire and mail fraud statutes criminalize two different types of schemes: (1) those involving the common law element of material false statements and omissions; and (2) those covered by the term "scheme to defraud," as used in those fraud statutes, which omits this common law requirement and requires only an intent to deceive; nothing deceptive need actually ever be said or done. In a recent case in the Central District of California, the defendant was charged with obtaining funds by means of fraudulent representations and omissions, an allegation necessary to adequately state a fraud offense under Neder. But at trial the government argued that the wire fraud statute reaches "schemes" involving an intent to deceive or cheat, even absent the making of a material falsehood or omission. Over Namvar's objection, the district court took the unprecedented step of redacting from the Circuit's model instruction the element of a material misrepresentation and/or omission of fact, and Namvar was convicted. In an unpublished opinion, a three judge panel affirmed. In fact, the term "scheme to defraud," has always been interpreted to incorporate the core element of fraud at common law: "everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestion, or promises as to the future." McNally v. United States, Id. 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (quoting Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896)) (emphasis added). Neder rejected the argument that the federal fraud statutes can be read to require no more than an intent to deceive. 527 U.S. at 23-24 (emphasis in original) That a panel decision could approve a sea change in the law of fraud in an unpublished opinion is deeply disturbing, not least of all because unpublished opinions rarely are reviewed by the Circuit sitting en banc. A group of ex-federal prosecutors, however, has taken the highly unusual step of filing an amicus in support of Namvar's petition for rehearing en banc. The amicus support provides hope that the Namvar opinion will receive reconsideration. If it does not, more fraud-less fraud prosecutions can be expected in the Ninth Circuit, and defense counsel will need to be prepared to counter them on the basis of Neder and McNally. Thanks to Dennis Riordan.

BIA

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - FRAUD - WELFARE FRAUD
Matter of Cortez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 301 (BIA Aug. 13, 2010) (California violation of Welfare and Institutions Code 10980(c)(2), welfare fraud, is a crime involving moral turpitude).

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - FRAUD - SOCIAL SECURITY
Hyder v. Keisler, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 3105905 (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 2007) (federal conviction for misuse of a social security number [applying for drivers license] obtained by fraud, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(A), is a crime involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes, since the statute requires an "intent to deceive"), disagreeing with Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir.2000).

Second Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " COUNTERFEITING " POSSESSION OF COUNTERFEIT SECURITY
Vartelas v. Holder, 620 F.3d 108, 2010 WL 3515503 (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010)(federal conviction of conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, 513(a), constituted a conviction of a crime of moral turpitude); citing United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, Director of Immigration, 289 U.S. 422, 423 (1933). CD:20.6;CMT:8.6, 9.33

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - FRAUD - FALSE CLAIM FOR BENEFITS
Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 2008) (Connecticut conviction for violation of C.G.S 53a-119(6), 53a-122(a)(4), first degree larceny by defrauding a public community, which requires intent to wrongfully deprive another of property by making a knowingly false claim for benefits, is a crime involving moral turpitude).

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - FRAUD - DEFRAUDING THE PUBLIC
Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 2008) (Connecticut conviction of first degree larceny in the form of "defrauding a public community," in violation of Connecticut General Statutes 53a-122(a)(4) and 53a-119(6), is a crime involving moral turpitude for the purposes of INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), " a conviction for defrauding a public community requires proof of an intent to wrongfully deprive another of property by making a knowingly false claim for benefits").

Fifth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FRAUD " POSSESSION OF FALSE ID
Nino v. Holder, 690 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2012) (Texas conviction of unlawful possession of fraudulent identifying information, in violation of Texas Penal Code 32.51(b)(2007) [obtains, possesses, transfers, or uses identifying information of another person without the other person's consent and with intent to harm or defraud another.], categorically constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, even when considering that the offense may be committed only with intent to harm).

Sixth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FALSE STATEMENT TO GOVERNMENT
Fayzullina v. Holder, __ F.3d __ (6th Cir. Jan 6, 2015) (federal conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(3), willful false statement, for false statements related to marriage fraud, is categorically a crime of moral turpitude).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " COUNTERFEITING " TRAFFICKING IN UNLAWFUL IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS
Yeremin v. Holder, 738 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. Apr. 16, 2013) (federal conviction of one count of violating 18 U.S.C. 1028(f), for conspiracy to traffic in identification documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(3), which prohibits knowingly possessing with intent to use unlawfully or transfer unlawfully five or more identification documents or false identification documents, which requires proof of an intent to use or transfer the identification documents or false identification documents unlawfully, is a crime involving moral turpitude because fraud or deceit is inherent in the elements of the offense); citing Matter of Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 228-230 (BIA 1980) (federal conviction for uttering or selling false or counterfeit paper relating to registry of aliens with knowledge of their counterfeit nature . . . inherently involves a deliberate deception of the government and an impairment of its lawful functions, and that therefore fraudulent conduct is implicit in the statute, even absent a requirement of a specific intent to defraud; the government need not have been defrauded out of money or property for moral turpitude to be involved; rather, [i]t is enough to impair or obstruct an important function of a department of the government by defeating its efficiency or destroying the value of its lawful operations by deceit, graft, trickery, or dishonest means.), superceding Yeremin v. Holder, 707 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2013). NOTE: This decision preceded Moncrieffe and Descamps, and the basis for the courts argument, i.e., that an offense can inherently involve fraud even when there is no such express element in the statute, has arguably been abrogated.

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FORGERY " TRAFFIC IN ID DOCUMENTS
Yeremin v. Holder, 707 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2013) (federal conviction of 18 U.S.C. 1028(f), for conspiracy to traffic in identification documents in violation of 1028(a)(3), which prohibits knowingly possessing with intent to use unlawfully or transfer unlawfully five or more identification documents or false identification documents, constituted a crime of moral turpitude because the conduct prohibited by the statute inherently involves deceit).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FORGERY " TRAFFIC IN ID DOCUMENTS
Yeremin v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 535755 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2013) (federal conviction of 18 U.S.C. 1028(f), for conspiracy to traffic in identification documents in violation of 1028(a)(3), which prohibits knowingly possessing with intent to use unlawfully or transfer unlawfully five or more identification documents or false identification documents, constituted a crime of moral turpitude because the conduct prohibited by the statute inherently involves deceit).

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - FRAUD OFFENSES - FALSE STATEMENT TO GOVERNMENT AGENT
Kellerman v. Holder, 592 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. Jan. 25, 2010) (applying divisible statute analysis to 18 U.S.C. 371, 1001 [conspiracy to commit crime or defraud United States; false or fraudulent statement to government agent], presumably accepting argument that a conviction for these offenses might not necessarily involve moral turpitude).

Seventh Circuit

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FRAUD " FALSE SOCIAL SECURITY CARD
Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 710 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. Mar. 6, 2013) (federal violation of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), where the noncitizen was charged with using a social security card, knowing that card was not assigned to him and had been unlawfully obtained, to secure and maintain employment, was a crime of moral turpitude as a fraud offense).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - FRAUD - FALSE DOCUMENTS - TRANSFER
Lagunas-Salgado v. Holder, 584 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. Oct. 13, 2009) (federal conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(2) ("knowingly transfers an identification document or a false identification document knowing that such document was stolen or produced without lawful authority"), categorically constituted a crime of moral turpitude, for purposes of triggering inadmissibility; the BIA reasonably concluded that knowingly selling false official identification documents involves inherently deceptive conduct and is, therefore, a crime involving moral turpitude), distinguishing Matter of Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 1992) (possession of altered documents, without use, is not categorically a CMT).

Eighth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FORGERY
Miranda-Romero v. Lynch, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 4746166 (8th Cir. Aug. 12, 2015) (California conviction of forgery, under Penal Code 472, categorically constitutes crime of moral turpitude, since entire statute requires intent to defraud). Note: This decision is erroneous. The plain language of the statute includes three groups of offenses, of which only the first expressly requires intent to defraud. The Eighth Circuit relies on California decisions discussing the statute as a whole, which do not consider whether there is a different mental element for each of the three groups of offenses stated in the disjunctive. In particular, the third group of offenses, penalizing one who has in his possession any such [fraudulently] counterfeited seal or impression thereof, knowing it to be counterfeited, and willfully conceals the same, is guilty of forgery, is innocent of an intent to defraud under the plain language of the statute. It is doubtful that most Ninth Circuit panels would agree with this sloppy decision.

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - FRAUD - MISUSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. Aug. 4, 2010) (federal conviction of violating 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B) constituted crime of moral turpitude, since intent to deceive for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining a benefit was an essential element of this offense; the fact that Congress chose to exempt a certain class of noncitizens from prosecution for certain acts did not necessarily mean that those acts do not involve moral turpitude).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - FRAUD - MISUSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. Aug. 4, 2010) (federal conviction of misusing a social security number, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B), constituted a crime of moral turpitude, since the offense is committed with intent to deceive the government), following Lateef v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 592 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir.2010).

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - FALSE DOCUMENTS - FALSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
Lateef v. DHS, 592 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. Jan. 29, 2010) (federal conviction for violation of 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(A), using unlawfully obtained social security number, is a crime involving moral turpitude for immigration purposes), declining to follow Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000).

Ninth Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " CONSPIRACY TO POSSESS CREDIT CARD WITHOUT CONSENT
Mancilla-Delafuente v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2015) (Nevada conviction for conspiracy to possess credit card without cardholder's consent, in violation of NRSA 199.480, 205.690(2) (possess[ion of] a credit card or debit card without the consent of the cardholder and with the intent to circulate, use, sell or transfer the credit card or debit card with the intent to defraud.), required intent to defraud and was therefore a crime involving moral turpitude); see Matter of Cortez, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 307 (explaining that an offense is described under 1227(a)(2) if the alien was convicted of a CIMT for which a sentence of a *1266 year or longer could have been imposed) (emphasis added).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FORGERY
Espino-Castillo v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 5462309 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2014) (Arizona conviction of forgery, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes 13-2002, is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute requires fraudulent intent; Beltran-Tirado v. INS, has not been applied to a state statute); discussing Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. May 31, 2000) (an amendment to the social security laws that granted immunity from prosecution for longstanding resident aliens who used a false social security number to obtain employment expressed congressional intent that such conduct did not establish moral turpitude for immigration purposes).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FRAUD " CRIMINAL IMPERSONATION
De Martinez v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 5394445 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2014) (per curiam) (Arizona conviction of criminal impersonation, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes 13"2006(A)(1), is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, because the statute explicitly requires proof of fraudulent intent).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " COUNTERFEITING " TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING
Rodriguez-Valencia v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2899605 (9th Cir. Jul. 21, 2011) (per curiam) (California offense of willfully manufacturing, intentionally selling, and knowingly possessing for sale more than 1,000 articles bearing a counterfeit trademark, in violation of Penal Code 350(a)(2), has intent to defraud as an element); see Tall v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1115, 1117, 1119-1120 (9th Cir.2008) (California Penal Code 350 is an inherently fraudulent crime.).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " FRAUD OFFENSES
Planes v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL 2619105 (9th Cir. Jul. 5, 2011) (Accordingly, nothing in Navarro"Lopez disturbs the longstanding rule that crimes that have fraud as an element, such as Planes's convictions at issue here, are categorically crimes involving moral turpitude.); citing Navarro"Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1074 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " BANK FRAUD " PASSING BAD CHECK
Planes v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL 2619105 (9th Cir. Jul. 5, 2011) (California conviction of delivering or making a check with insufficient funds with intent to defraud, in violation of Penal Code 476a(a), was a fraud offense and thus categorically a crime involving moral turpitude).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " BANK FRAUD " POSSESSION OF ACCESS DEVICES
Planes v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL 2619105 (9th Cir. Jul. 5, 2011) (federal conviction of possessing 15 or more access devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3), was a fraud offense and thus categorically a crime involving moral turpitude). Note. This decision seems very poorly reasoned. It ignores pertinent authority. E.g., Paredes v. Attorney General, 528 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2008); Matter of Cardenas-Abreu, 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009). It ignores the argument that since the sentence was appealed, there was no sentence at all in effect in the case, and thus there was no complete judgment (which includes sentence), and no restraint portion of the conviction under INA 101(a)(48)(A) in effect. See Griffiths v. INS, 243 F.3d 45, 50"51 (1st Cir.2001), which the Planes court described as observing that finality is not required under the deferred-adjudication portion of 1101(a)(48)(A), but which actually held there to be no conviction in that case, since no sentence at all had been imposed " a circumstance far closer to the situation in Planes. Finally, the general rule is that Congress is deemed to approve judicial decisions that are in effect concerning a point when it legislates. The universal rule, at the time the new statutory definition of conviction came into effect, was that a conviction must be final before it can be the basis of immigration consequences. Congress did not disturb this rule. Therefore, it must be deemed to have approved of it. This argument was apparently not made in Planes, which therefore did not reject it. The question before us is whether a conviction is final for purposes of deportation proceedings once any appeal as a matter of right has been exhausted. Morales-Alvarado v. Immigration and Naturalization Service 655 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir.1981) By any appeal, the court must have meant any appeal of the judgment of guilt, as in any level of an appeal of right, not an appeal of the sentence only. There is also a great deal of authority in support of the view that without a sentence, there is no conviction. This point, as well, was not addressed in Planes. There may also be an argument under Chenery v. SEC that the Ninth Circuit can only affirm the case under the grounds set forth in the opinion, and the BIA never affirmed on the basis that the Ninth affirmed. Thanks to Katherine Brady, Michael Mehr, and Jonathan Moore.

SAFE HAVEN - CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE
United States v. Youssef, 547 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2008) (federal conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. 1015(a), making a false statement in an immigration document, does not require the false statement to be material; even though prior conviction qualified for the petty offense exception to inadmissibility, and was therefore immaterial to admission, the noncitizen was required to disclose the fact of conviction).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - DRIVING OFFENSES - HIT AND RUN
Latu v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. Nov. 3, 2008) (Hawaii conviction for hit & run, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statute 291C-12.5, is not a crime of moral turpitude), following Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2008).

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - FALSE STATEMENT - FALSE IDENTIFICATION TO POLICE OFFICER
Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) (California conviction of providing false identification to a police officer, in violation of Penal Code 148.9(a), is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, under INA 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2), because the offense does not require fraudulent intent under California law).

MORAL TURPITUDE - FRAUD - WHERE FRAUD NOT AN EXPLICIT ELEMENT, BUT IMPLICIT IN NATURE OF OFFENSE
CD4:19.73;AF:5.55;SH:7.81 AGGRAVATED FELONY - FRAUD - WHERE FRAUD NOT AN EXPLICIT ELEMENT, BUT IMPLICIT IN NATURE OF OFFENSE Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2008) ("Our cases hold that intent to defraud is implicit in the nature of the crime when the individual makes false statements in order to procure something of value, either monetary or non-monetary. See id. (holding that fraud is not inherent where crime "does not involve the use of false statements ... nor does the defendant obtain anything" of value); see also Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1076 (Reinhardt, J., concurring); cf. Notash v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 693, 698 (9th Cir.2005) (holding fraud not inherent where statute "did not require an intent to deprive the United States of revenue"). Fraud therefore does not equate with mere dishonesty, because fraud requires an attempt to induce another to act to his or her detriment. See Black's Law Dictionary 685 (8th ed.2004). One can act dishonestly without seeking to induce reliance. . . .").

Tenth Circuit

CRIME OF MORAL TURPTIUDE " CRIMINAL IMPERSONATION " SSN
Veloz-Luvevano v. Lynch, __ F.3d __ (10th Cir. Aug. 31, 2015) (Colorado conviction for criminal impersonation, in violation of Col.Rev.Stat. 18"5"113(1)(d), for possession of a forged social security card to allow him to work, is a categorical crime of moral turpitude for immigration purposes). NOTE: The judge in this case had clear distain for the noncitizen, and dismissed out of hand, what were likely legitimate minimum conduct arguments. The court also made no mention of Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000).

Eleventh Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " UTTERING A FORGED INSTRUMENT
Walker v. U.S. Atty. Gen., ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 1782677 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015) (Florida conviction of uttering a forged instrument, under Fla. Stat. 831.02, is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, under INA 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i): Because uttering a forged instrument involves deceit, we hold that it is a crime of moral turpitude. Uttering a forged instrument is behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal duties and involves dishonest or fraudulent activity.); quoting and following Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2002).

Other

PRACTICE ADVISORY " MISUSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER UNDER 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B)
The offense of misuse of a social security number, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B), may or may not be considered a crime of moral turpitude. For example, use of the card to open a checking account would not appear to be fraudulent, and thus not a CMT. The statute should therefore be considered divisible. Sale of fraudulent immigration documents is clearly CMT. Matter of Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 1980 WL 121870 (BIA 1980). Use or possession of a false social security document with specific intent to defraud is a CMT. Matter of Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581 (BIA 1992). Knowing possession of false immigration documents, however, is not a CMT. Matter of Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581 (BIA 1992). See Matter of Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506 (BIA 1992) which is (erroneously) argued by the Service to have ruled that 408(a)(7)(B) is a CIMT, and the Ninth Circuits decision in Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000), that found it is not. See Wheeler, The Immigration Consequences of Using A False Social Security Number, 8 Bender's Imm. Bull. 952 (June 1, 2003).