Criminal Defense of Immigrants

(D)  Seventh Circuit Definition.  The Seventh Circuit in Mei[24] announced that “time has only confirmed Justice Jackson’s powerful dissent in the De George case, in which he called ‘moral turpitude’ an ‘undefined and undefinable standard.’  The term may well have outlived its usefulness.”[25]  The court rejected the usefulness of the traditional malum prohibitum/malum in se distinction in determining whether an offense is one that involves moral turpitude, stating that this distinction is “paper thin.”[26]  It also rejected the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that there be some ‘evil intent’ present beyond the intent to commit the offense.[27]

                Instead, the Seventh Circuit held that for an offense to be considered a crime involving moral turpitude, the offense must be:

(1) [a] serious crime[], in terms either of the magnitude of the loss that [it] cause[s] or the indignation that [it causes] in the law-abiding public, . . . that [is] (2) deliberate, because a person who deliberately commits a serious crime is regarded as behaving immorally and not merely illegally.

An offense that either is extremely minor, or is not done deliberately, on the other hand, will not be considered a crime of moral turpitude.[28] 

                Applying this new definition of crime of moral turpitude to the conviction for aggravated fleeing an officer, the court found that to sustain a conviction under the statute and the judicial law of the state, the offense had to have been committed “wilfully.”  Finding that a high speed chase, as required by the statute, would place the chasing police officer, other drivers, and passengers in danger, the court found that any person convicted under the statute must have been “deliberately engaged in seriously wrongful behavior.”[29] 

Although the court recognized that this new interpretation of “crime of moral turpitude” bears a resemblance to the traditional malum prohibitum/malum in se distinction, this case could mark a significant departure from over 100 years of “moral turpitude” case law.

[24] Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 2004) (unaggravated form of evading a police officer, under 625 ILCS 5/11-204, is a crime of moral turpitude; any person who violates this statute “may not want to endanger anyone, but he has to know that he is greatly increasing the risk of an accident (and for the further reason that a fleeing driver is dividing his attention between the road ahead and his pursuer); and he is doing so as a consequence of his deliberate and improper decision to ignore a lawful order of the police.”).  See also Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2005) (applying same standard to find obstruction of justice [knowingly providing false information to police officer to prevent apprehension or to obstruct prosecution of any person] is a crime of moral turpitude).

[25] Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d., at 741 (internal citations omitted).

[26] Id.

[27] Id., citing Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 188 (5th Cir. 1996).

[28] Mei, supra, at 740.

[29] Mei, supra, at 742.