(A)  Traditional Definition.  Justice Jackson offered the following insight into the legislative history of the Immigration Act of 1917,[3] the first to authorize deportation of resident noncitizens convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude”:

 

The uncertainties of this statute do not originate in contrariety of judicial opinion. Congress knowingly conceived it in confusion. During the hearings of the House Committee on Immigration, out of which eventually came the Act of 1917 in controversy, clear warning of its deficiencies was sounded and never denied.  “Mr. SABATH. . . . [Y]ou know that a crime involving moral turpitude has not been defined. No one can really say what is meant by saying a crime involving moral turpitude . . . .”  Despite this notice, Congress did not see fit to state what meaning it attributes to the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude.” Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 233-34, 71 S.Ct. 703, 709, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting from House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization Hearings on H.R.Rep. No. 10384, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1916)).  The legislative history leaves no doubt, therefore, that Congress left the term “crime involving moral turpitude” to future administrative and judicial interpretation.[4] 

 

“A Senate subcommittee report accompanying the Immigration Act of 1952 relating to the exclusion of aliens convicted of a CIMT notes that the term ‘moral turpitude’ has not been definitively and conclusively defined by the courts. One INS decision held that ‘moral turpitude’ is a vague term . . . .”[5]  Nevertheless, the Senate subcommittee did not adopt the suggestion that “there be a listing of crimes and circumstances comprehended within the meaning of moral turpitude,” id. at 353, so as to remove some of the interpretive discretion left to those who must apply the term in excluding noncitizens.  Moreover, although the term has been part of our immigration laws for more than 100 years, Congress has never chosen to define it, either in the deportation or exclusion contexts.[6]

 

Courts have held that moral turpitude “refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one’s fellow man or society in general.”[7]  One common definition  applied by the courts is “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity.”[8]  Some cases define an act of moral turpitude as one which “grievously offends the moral code of mankind.”[9]

Immigration Law and Procedure state:

 

Some authorities have said that the crime must be accompanied by an evil intent or a depraved nature. One court has declared that under the deportation statute the question is whether “the alien has a criminal heart and a criminal tendency.”  Other courts have declared that the offense must be intrinsically and morally wrong. . . .  It has also been said that the statute contemplates “an act of baseness and depravity contrary to accepted moral standards,” and that in dealing with a patently “heinous” crime “willful conduct and moral turpitude are synonymous terms.”  Courts have also stated that whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude “depends upon the inherent nature of the crime, as defined in the statute concerned, rather than the circumstances surrounding the transgression.” The turpitudinous nature of an offense may not be altered by the fact that it may have been motivated by economic hardship. Some courts have held that crimes of moral turpitude typically involve fraud, but acts of baseness or depravity contrary to accepted moral standards are also included in the category.[10]

 

Black’s Law Dictionary defined the term as follows:

 

an act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. . . .  Act or behavior that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offenses as distinguished from others. . . .  The quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from statutory mala prohibita.[11] 

Generally speaking, court have found that crimes that are merely malum prohibitum, rather than malum in se, are not considered crimes involving moral turpitude.[12]  Some courts have held that all malum in se crimes involve moral turpitude.[13]  Other courts have held that the malum in se or malum prohibitum distinction is not necessarily determinative of the CMT question.[14]

 

                The fact that conduct violates a criminal law, standing alone, is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that the conviction constitutes a CMT.[15]

[3] See S.Rep. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 390 (1916).

[4] Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 194-195 (1st Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted).

[5] S.Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 351 (1950).

[6] See Gordon, supra, § 71.05[1][d].

[7] Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 227 (4th Cir. 2001), quoting Matter of Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (BIA 1988). 

[8] See United States v. Smith, 420 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1970).  Gordon, supra, § 71.05[1][d][i]; Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571(8th Cir. 1995); Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1931); Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F.Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867 (BIA 1994), aff’d sub nom., Matter of Mueller, 11 I. & N. Dec. 268 (BIA 1965).  See also Matter of Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 139(BIA 1989) (“Moral turpitude is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct that shocks the public conscience”).

[9] See Coykendall v. Skrmetta, 22 F.2d 120  (5th Cir. 1927); United States v. Carrollo, 30 F.Supp. 3 (D. Mo. 1931); United States ex rel. De George v. Jordan, 183 F.2d 768 (7th Cir. 1950), rev’d on other grounds, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).

[10] Gordon, supra, § 71.05[1][d][i] (footnotes omitted).

[11] Black’s Law Dictionary 1008-09 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).  This definition originated in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawles 3d Revision. Annot., What Constitutes “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude” Within Meaning of § § 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(5) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § § 1182(a)(9), 1251(a)(4)), and Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation of Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. Fed. 480, § 3, n.11 (1975).

[12] Coykendall v. Skrmetta, 22 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1927) (ordinarily the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” does not include conduct which was not generally regarded as morally wrong or corrupt, nor as offensive to the moral sense as ordinarily developed, before it was criminalized); United States ex rel. Andreacchi v. Curran, 38 F.2d 498 (D.N.Y. 1926); Matter of B, 2 I. & N. Dec. 617 (BIA 1946); Matter of H, 1 I. & N. Dec. 394 (BIA 1943).

[13] Matter of Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 1992); Castle v. INS, 541 F.2d 1064, 1066 (4th Cir. 1976).

[14] Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 2004); United States ex rel. Griffo v. McCandless, 28 F.2d 287 (E.D. Pa. 1928). See also Justice Jackson’s dissent in Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 236, 237 (1951).

[15] Skrmetta v. Coykendall, 16 F.2d 783 (D. Ga.), aff’d, 22 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1927); United States v. Carrollo, 30 F.Supp. 3 (D. Mo. 1939).

BIBIOGRAPHY " CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE " DEFINITION
Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude is Void for Vagueness, Roger Williams University School of Law (Sept. 30, 2011). Abstract: A major problem facing noncitizen criminal defendants today is the vagueness of the term crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) in deportation law. The Supreme Court in the 1951 case Jordan v. DeGeorge decided that a statute authorizing deportation for a CIMT was not void for vagueness because courts had long held the noncitizens offense, fraud, to be a CIMT, so he was on notice of his likely deportation. I argue that when noncitizens are charged with an offense that case law has not clearly delineated as a CIMT, the term is vague, since the definition used by the agency and courts, an act that is base, vile, depraved, and contrary to the rules of morality, provides no useful definition. Rather, it casts judges in the role of God, deporting noncitizens for sin. Exacerbating this situation is the Supreme Courts 2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky; since the Court held that defense counsel only has a Sixth Amendment duty to warn noncitizens about immigration consequences that are succinct, clear, and explicit from the immigration statute, there is no clear obligation to warn about deportability for a CIMT. Scholars have thoroughly discussed the vagueness doctrine and also have begun to analyze the Courts recent Padilla decision. This article is the first to address whether CIMT in deportation law is void for vagueness in a post-Padilla world. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1936136

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - DEFINITION
Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2010) The Ninth Circuit described the difficult moral turpitude question as follows: Once again we face the question of what is moral turpitude: a nebulous question that we are required to answer on the basis of judicially established categories of criminal conduct. Although that may not be a satisfactory basis for answering such a question, it is the role to which we are limited by precedent as a court of law. Furthermore, any answer based on other considerations would in all probability be unacceptable to one or another segment of society and could well divide residents of red states from residents of blue, the old from the young, neighbor from neighbor, and even males from females. There is simply no overall agreement on many issues of morality in contemporary society. Morality is not a concept that courts can define by judicial decrees, and even less can it be defined by fiats issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals, to whose decisions the courts must give great deference. Yet, for the purpose of our immigration laws we are required to follow those determinations and to start by applying categories of offenses that the judiciary or the Board members appointed by the Attorney General have deemed morally turpitudinous in all of their applications. We call this the categorical approach. How sensible those decisions are and how close to rational concepts of morality they may come can be seen by considering one of the offenses involved in the case before us. While under our law numerous felonies are deemed not to be morally turpitudinous, all acts of petty theft automatically qualify for that label and the drastic legal consequences that may follow. As some in todays society might say, and with good reason, "Go figure." (Nunez v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2010 WL 432417 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2010).)

Second Circuit

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - JUDICIAL REVIEW - DEFERENCE - DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 2008) ("We afford Chevron deference to the BIA's interpretation of the undefined statutory term "moral turpitude," but we owe no deference to the BIA's construction of state criminal statutes. Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir.2005). Accordingly, we review de novo the BIA's determination that a particular state crime falls within the definition of moral turpitude. Id.").

Third Circuit

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - "INVOLVES"
Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. Oct. 6, 2009) (the term "crime involving moral turpitude" is a term of art; the use of the term "involving" does not "invite" an examination into the underlying circumstances of the offense). See also, Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 2299 ("Thus in James, referring to Taylor, we made clear that courts must use the "categorical method" to determine whether a conviction for "attempted burglary" was a conviction for a crime that, in ACCA's language, "involved conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).")

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - SEX OFFENSES - INDECENT ASSAULT
Mehboob v. Attorney General, 549 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. Nov. 26, 2008) (Pennsylvania conviction of indecent assault, under 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. 3126(a)(8), for touching the breast of a 15-year-old child, a strict liability offense, is a crime involving moral turpitude, because the offense combines a reprehensible act with deliberate conduct).

Ninth Circuit

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE " OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE " WITNESS DISSUASION
Escobar v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir 2017) (California conviction of witness dissuasion, in violation of Penal Code 136.1(b)(1) is not a crime of moral turpitude). NOTE: The Courts analysis focused on the growing rift between the BIA and the Ninth Circuit (and older BIA case law) on defining crime of moral turpitude.)

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " HIT AND RUN
Conejo Bravo v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. Nov.17, 2017) (California conviction of hit and run, under Vehicle Code 20001(a), is under a divisible statute; the record established that noncitizen failed to render aid, which is a crime of moral turpitude); see Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that Texas hit and run law qualifies as a CIMT, as "the failure to stop and render aid after being involved in an automobile accident is the type of base behavior that reflects moral turpitude").

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " DEFINITION " IMMIGRATION CONTEXT
Turijan v. Holder, 744 F.3d 617, 622 n.3 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2014) (The BIA's unreasoned reliance on a state court decision ... is not of great weight because it relates to the very different issue of whether a crime is morally turpitudinous for purposes of California evidence law, lacks power to persuade and thus is not entitled to deference.); quoting Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205, 1211 and n.6 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2013).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " STATUTORY INTERPRETATION " CHEVRON DEFERENCE IS NOT DUE WHERE BIA RELIES ON FLAWED RATIONALE
Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2012) (court of appeals did not give Chevron deference to BIA holding that federal conviction of misprision of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4, was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, where BIA relied on flawed rationale that an offense which contravenes societal duties is enough to make it a crime involving moral turpitude, since under that rationale, every crime would involve moral turpitude); following Navarro"Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring for the majority), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Aguila"Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " DEFINITION OF MORAL TURPITUDE
Saavedra-Figueroa v. Holder, 625 F.3d 621, 626 & n.4 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010) (We have held that the federal generic definition of a CIMT is a crime involving fraud or conduct that (1) is vile, base, or depraved and (2) violates accepted moral standards. Morales-Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058, 1062 & n. 2 (9th Cir.2009). Non-fraudulent CIMTs almost always involve an intent to harm someone. Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1131 & n. 4 (9th Cir.2010). FN4. An intent to harm is not always necessary. Nunez, 594 F.3d at 1131 n. 4; see also Matter of Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 869 (BIA 1994) (acts that cause serious harm to people, such as involuntary manslaughter, can be categorical CIMTs even if the harm was not specifically intended); Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2007) (where a protected class of victims, such as minors, is involved, certain unintentional acts that only threaten harm may be categorical CIMTs). These exceptions do not apply to section 236, which does not proscribe conduct that categorically causes serious harm or is directed against a protected class of persons.).

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - DEFINITION
Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2010)

The Ninth Circuit described the difficult moral turpitude question as follows:

Once again we face the question of what is moral turpitude: a nebulous question that we are required to answer on the basis of judicially established categories of criminal conduct. Although that may not be a satisfactory basis for answering such a question, it is the role to which we are limited by precedent as a court of law. Furthermore, any answer based on other considerations would in all probability be unacceptable to one or another segment of society and could well divide residents of red states from residents of blue, the old from the young, neighbor from neighbor, and even males from females. There is simply no overall agreement on many issues of morality in contemporary society.

Morality is not a concept that courts can define by judicial decrees, and even less can it be defined by fiats issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals, to whose decisions the courts must give great deference. Yet, for the purpose of our immigration laws we are required to follow those determinations and to start by applying categories of offenses that the judiciary or the Board members appointed by the Attorney General have deemed morally turpitudinous in all of their applications. We call this the categorical approach. How sensible those decisions are and how close to rational concepts of morality they may come can be seen by considering one of the offenses involved in the case before us. While under our law numerous felonies are deemed not to be morally turpitudinous, all acts of petty theft automatically qualify for that label and the drastic legal consequences that may follow. As some in todays society might say, and with good reason, "Go figure."

(Nunez v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2010 WL 432417 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2010).)

JUDICIAL REVIEW - PETITION FOR REVIEW - MORAL TURPITUDE DETERMINATION
Nunez v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2010 WL 432417 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2010) ("The BIAs conclusion that a particular crime does or does not involve moral turpitude is subject to different standards of review depending on whether the BIA issues or relies on a published decision in coming to its conclusion. If it does either, we accord Chevron deference. Id. If it does neither, we defer to its conclusion to the extent that it has the "power to persuade." Id. at 909 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).").

JUDICIAL REVIEW - PETITION FOR REVIEW - MORAL TURPITUDE DETERMINATION
Nunez v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2010 WL 432417 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2010) ("The BIAs conclusion that a particular crime does or does not involve moral turpitude is subject to different standards of review depending on whether the BIA issues or relies on a published decision in coming to its conclusion. If it does either, we accord Chevron deference. Id. If it does neither, we defer to its conclusion to the extent that it has the "power to persuade." Id. at 909 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).").

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - DEFERENCE
Uppal v. Holder, 576 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2009) (BIA's determination a conviction qualifies as a crime of moral turpitude is entitled to Skidmore deference: "The measure of deference due to the BIA's decision under Skidmore varies 'depending upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power to persuade, if lacking power to control.' Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140."); citing Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 911.

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - DEFINITION
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2009) (en banc) (no deference owed to BIA interpretations of criminal statutes or BIA examination of the record of conviction), citing Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2005). NOTE: Arguably, this may be interpreted to mean that the Ninth Circuit does not owe deference the method of analysis applied in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008). Therefore, prior Ninth Circuit case law applying categorical, divisible statute, minimum conduct, Duenas-Alvarez analysis should still hold in the CMT context despite Silva-Trevino. The Court did not apply the Silva-Trevino analytical method in Marmalejo-Campos, but this was not an issue before the court.

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - DEFINITION
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2009) (en banc) (no deference owed to the BIAs definition of "crime of moral turpitude.") NOTE: Here the Ninth Circuit declines to give deference to the Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (A.G. 2008) ("[a] reprehensible act with some form of scienter."). Instead the Ninth Circuit continues to consider CMT to be of two types: "those involving fraud and those involving grave acts of baseness or depravity.");Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005); Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring for the majority). The court stated: "we have noted that our understanding does not differ materially from the Boards." Marmalejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2009), citing Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzalez, 465 F.3d 1054, 1058 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2006). Arguably, if the BIAs "understanding" of what is a CMT begins to diverge from that of the Ninth Circuit, counsel may argue that the BIA is owed no deference where the two CMT definitions differ.

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT
Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2713211 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2007) (California conviction for accessory after the fact, in violation of Penal Code 32, is not a crime of moral turpitude as the minimum conduct required to violate the statute includes acts that are not necessarily "morally shocking," such a mother providing food to her son, or being accessory after the fact to an offense that is not itself an crime of moral turpitude).

Lower Courts of Ninth Circuit

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - FEDERAL LAW DOES NOT BIND STATES
Donley v. Davi, 180 Cal.App.4th 447, 461 (Dec. 2, 2009), citing, People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 120, fn. 3, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; Howard Contracting, Inc. v. G.A. MacDonald Construction Co. (1998) 71 Cal.App.4th 38, 52, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 590 ["federal decisional authority is neither binding nor controlling in matters involving state law"].)

Other

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE " VOID FOR VAGUENESS " SAMPLE BRIEFING
Under Johnson, the Term Crime Involving Moral Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness. Several months ago, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally void for vagueness. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Because the reasons that led the Supreme Court to strike down that provision are just as present"if not more so"in the CIMT statute, the Court must apply Johnson to find that INA [ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)/ 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)] is also void for vagueness. Courts have long divided CIMTs into two basic types: those involving fraud and those involving grave acts of baseness or depravity. Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotations and citation omitted). See also Navarro"Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring for the majority) (stating that some offenses are so base, vile, and depraved that they qualify as crimes of moral turpitude even though they have no element of fraud) (citation omitted). In Jordan v. De George, the Supreme Court held that the CIMT statute was not unconstitutionally void for vagueness in regards to fraudulent offenses. 341 U.S. 223, 223-24 (1951). But the Supreme Court was careful to note that its holding only extended to offenses involving fraud. See id. at 232 (Whatever else the phrase crime involving moral turpitude may mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.). Because Jordan was limited to fraud offenses, the issue of whether the CIMT statute is unconstitutionally vague in regards to inherently base, vile, or depraved offenses remains an open question. In Johnson, the Supreme Court gave two reasons for finding the ACCA residual clause"which reaches conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another"unconstitutionally vague. First, the Court could find no practical methodology for measuring the inherent risk posed by any given statute, holding that there was no reliable way to choose between . . . competing accounts of how much risk a violation of the statute generally entailed. 135 S. Ct. at 2558; see also id. at 2557 (How does one go about deciding what kind of conduct the ordinary case of a crime involves? A statistical analysis of the state reporter? A survey? Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct?) (quoting United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Second, even if the Court could discern how much risk a violation of the statute ordinarily entailed, the residual clause leaves uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony"i.e., it lacked a meaningful gauge for determining when the typical conviction under a particular statute reaches the ACCA threshold of posing a serious potential risk of physical injury. Id. at 2558. In other words, Johnson found that where both the methodology of analyzing a state statute, as well as the degree of severity necessary to meet a generic definition, are unclear, this implicated constitutional concerns of vagueness. Here, the concerns raised in Johnson are just as present"if not more so"in the CIMT statute. In Matter of Silva-Trevino, then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey defined a CIMT as reprehensible conduct"a description substantially more vague than the serious potential risk of physical injury found unconstitutional in Johnson. See 24 I&N Dec. 687, 689 (A.G. 2008). To determine whether an offense is a CIMT, courts thus must look to the conduct falling within a particular state statute and decide in theory whether it is reprehensible. But as the Ninth Circuit has noted, the determination of what constitutes a CIMT may well be unacceptable to one or another segment of society and could well divide residents of red states from residents of blue, the old from the young, neighbor from neighbor, and even males from females. Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010). Because [t]here is simply no overall agreement on many issues of morality in contemporary society, courts are equally at a loss to determine whether a conviction under a particular statute renders a noncitizen removable. Id. At this point, courts may as well as resort to the same tongue-in-cheek methodology suggested by Johnson (A survey? Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct?) to decide whether community standards mandate that an offense qualifies as reprehensible conduct. Simply put, courts have no ability to gauge the degree of severity necessary for an offense to constitute a CIMT. Traditionally, non-fraudulent CIMTs crimes have been defined as offenses that are base, vile, and depraved and shock the public conscience. Navarro"Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1074"75 (internal quotation marks removed). Historically, this means they have been compared to offenses such as murder, rape, and incest. Id. at 1074. But in the last ten years, the BIA has found the state offense at issue to be a CIMT in 19 out 21 published decisions"over 90% of the time. This has led the Ninth Circuit to complain that if courts do not adhere to our precedents limiting the scope of [CIMTs], the category will sooner or later come to mean simply crimes, which would not only would dilute our language, it would also contravene Congresss intent. Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1075. And like the residual clause, the vagueness problems of CIMTs are evident in courts ongoing failure to establish a standard for moral turpitude. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558 (This Court has acknowledged that the failure of persistent efforts to establish a standard can provide evidence of vagueness.) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Johnson discussed its attempts to adjudicate various applications of the residual clause, finding that this Court's repeated attempts and repeated failures to craft a principled and objective standard out of the residual clause confirm its hopeless indeterminacy. Id. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has often expressed frustration over the difficulty of adjudicating CIMT cases. See Nunez, 594 F.3d at 1130 (noting the consistent failure of either the BIA or our own court to establish any coherent criteria for determining which crimes fall within that classification and which crimes do not); Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 909 (describing case law defining CIMTs as a mess of conflicting authority.) (Berzon, J., dissenting); Nicanor"Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992, 997"99 (9th Cir. 2008) (summarizing Ninth Circuit law on moral turpitude and recognizing that [w]e have not relied on a consistent or easily applied set of criteria to identify crimes of moral turpitude). Thus, the perpetual struggle to come up with a workable definition for a CIMT confirm[s] its hopeless indeterminacy. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558. For these reasons, the CIMT statute"like the ACCA residual clause"is unconstitutionally void for vagueness Thanks to Kara Hartzler.

MORAL TURPITUDE " A TERM NOT IN COMMON USAGE
Matter of X, _____ (unpublished) (Aug. 28, 2012) ([W]e acknowledge that the term "moral turpitude" is not in common usage, and it is unlikely that the average person is aware of its meaning and application in U.S. immigration law. ... There is no indication that this applicant was aware that he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude at the time he submitted his 1-94W forms. In fact, both the applicant and his spouse have submitted statements recalling that the applicant was confused about the crime involving moral turpitude query on his Form l-94W, but answered to the best of his ability at that time. ... Based on the record, the AAO finds that the applicant has demonstrated rehabilitation and that his admission to the United States would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security or the United States pursuant to section 212(h)( I )(A) of the Act.)

CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE - DEFINITION
Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. Nov. 9, 2008) (crimes of moral turpitude are defined as "reprehensible conduct" with some degree of scienter, whether specific intent, deliberateness, willfulness, or recklessness).

See http://www.bibdaily.com/pdfs/Silva%20Trevino%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf, for amici brief outlining many arguments in opposition to this terrible decision. This decision abruptly changes nearly 100 years of CMT law, and should be attacked.

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - SILVA-TREVINO WARNING
In the light of the recent published decision by outgoing Attorney General Mukasey, Matter of Silva-Trevino 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. November 2008), the question of what is a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and the methodology for deciding it, is currently unsettled. The Ninth Circuits recent 7-5 en banc decision in Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009), added to this uncertainty by holding that where the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rules on "moral turpitude" in a precedential decision, the Court will apply the doctrine of administrative deference. The combination of these decisions tends to undermine the analytical framework with which these issues are analyzed, and may call into question some previously settled rulings on which non-citizens could normally rely.

Because this issue is still in flux, non-citizens who have pleaded guilty to criminal offenses should neither travel out of the United States, nor, in some cases, out of the 7 states of the 9th Circuit , nor should they apply to naturalize or for other immigration benefits, until they have consulted with competent immigration counsel. Thanks to Jonathan Moore.

CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE - STATE DEFINITION
("Moral turpitude is defined as the general readiness to do evil. ( People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 313-316, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111 (Castro).) In deciding whether a criminal conviction involves moral turpitude, the question is whether one can reasonably infer the presence of moral turpitude (a general readiness to do evil) from the least adjudicated elements of the offense-without regard to the facts of the particular violation. (People v. Campbell (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1492, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 716; Castro, supra, at p. 317, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111.)).

BIBLIOGRAPHY " CRIMES OF MORAL TURPITUDE
Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude is Void for Vagueness (Roger Williams University Legal Studies Paper No. 115, SSRN, October 1, 2011).