(A)  Federal Prosecution.  A person who is removed, returns to the U.S. without permission, and then is found in the United States by federal authorities,[491] is guilty of a federal criminal offense and can be sentenced to a maximum of 20 years in federal prison.[492]  Moreover, the sentence is subject to an increase in the base offense level under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2 depending upon the noncitizen’s prior criminal history.  Defense of illegal re-entry prosecutions has become increasingly difficult, but a number of defenses remain available.[493]

 

The Supreme Court held that the prior convictions necessary to enhance a sentence for illegal re-entry are sentence enhancements, not elements of the offense.[494]  Prior convictions used to enhance a sentence for illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)[495] therefore need not be included in the indictment or proven to a jury.[496]  The defendant need only have pleaded guilty to simple illegal re-entry after deportation under INA § 276(a),[497] in order to be subject to the sentence enhancement provision under INA § 276(b).[498]  In other words, the maximum penalty is not limited by the illegal re-entry offense to which a plea was entered.  The existence of the prior conviction that triggers a sentence enhancement need only be shown by clear and convincing evidence.[499]

 

                The current Guidelines[500] provide for a Base Offense Level of 8 for illegal re-entry.  A 16-level increase is applied for certain serious felony prior convictions, such as:

 

(a)           a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months;

(b)           a crime of violence;[501]

(c)           a firearms offense;

(d)           a child pornography offense;

(e)           a national security or terrorism offense;

(f)            a human trafficking offense; or

(g)           an alien smuggling offense committed for profit . . . .[502]

The Guidelines provide for a 12-level increase if the prior conviction is “for a felony drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed was 13 months or less . . . .”[503] They provide for an 8-level increase if the prior conviction is “a conviction for an aggravated felony . . . .”[504]  They provide for a 4-level increase if the prior conviction is for “any other felony,” and the same if the defendant had suffered “three or more convictions for misdemeanors that are crimes of violence or drug trafficking crimes . . . .”[505]

 

                Under these Guidelines, some terms, including “crime of violence” and “drug trafficking offense,” are given different definitions than those applied in the aggravated felony context.  See § 19.22, infra.  Judicial decisions defining these terms must be carefully examined to determine whether they reach differing results based on the different language of the parallel provisions in these different contexts.  At least two courts have also found that while a categorical analysis must be applied to a conviction to determine whether it is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, a factual approach may be applied in some cases to decide this question in a sentencing context.[506]

 

                The Guidelines appear to apply to all prior offenses, regardless of the date of conviction: “For purposes of subsection (b)(1)(C), ‘aggravated felony’ has the meaning given that term in INA § 101(a)(43), without regard to the date of conviction of the aggravated felony.”[507]

 

There is a large body of case law on whether, and how, a noncitizen facing prosecution for illegal re-entry may collaterally attack the validity of the underlying criminal conviction and/or the underlying deportation.[508]  For example, the Tenth Circuit has held that a prior conviction that has been vacated may still be used to trigger a sentence enhancement as long as the conviction existed at the time of the illegal re-entry.[509]  A full discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this book.

[491] At least one court has found that the noncitizen must be found within five years of illegal re-entry, in order to be able to prosecute.  United States v. Gunera, 479 F.3d 373, (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 2007) (where the defendant was “found” in the United States more than five years following the defendant’s unlawful re-entry, indictment was barred by statute of limitations).

[492] INA § 276(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).

[493] See generally Note, Suppressing Defendant’s Identity and Other Strategies for Defending Against a Charge of Illegal Reentry After Deportation, 50 Stan.L.Rev. 139 (1997); McWhirter & Sands, A Primer for Defending a Criminal Immigration Case, 8 Geo.Immigr.L.J. 23 (1994); Yale-Loehr & Valente, Current Trends in Illegal Reentry Caselaw, 3 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin 1133 (1998); Swanson, Challenging Alienage – Is Your Client a U.S. Citizen?, Appendix 9-B,  following Chapter 9, in K. Brady, California Criminal Law and Immigration (2004).

[494] Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219 (1998).

[495] INA § 276(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b).

[496] United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Parga-Rosas, 238 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Camarillo-Tello, 236 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Arellano-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2001).

[497] INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

[498] Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1219 (1998).

[499] United States v. Bonilla-Montenegro, 333 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. June 9, 2003) (although presentence report (PSR) is not always sufficient evidence of a prior conviction, government burden may be satisfied if PSR specifies the exact statute under which the defendant was previously convicted; burden met in this case despite citation of the incorrect statute since PSR listed the offense by name and defendant admitted the conviction to the INS).

[500] Effective November 1, 2001.  Note that the United States Supreme Court has determined that the sentencing guidelines are merely advisory, not mandatory.  Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004); United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).  How, and to what extent, this will affect illegal re-entry sentencing is an active issue.  See, e.g., United States v. Ibarra-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 2005) (vacating illegal re-entry sentence on Booker grounds); United States v. Hermoso-Garcia, 413 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. July 7, 2005) (illegal re-entry sentence remanded in light of Booker); United States v. Camacho-Ibarquen, 410 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. June 2, 2005) (district court’s error of treating Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory did not affect defendant’s substantial rights, as required by plain error standard), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 457 (Oct. 11, 2005); United States v. Lechuga-Ponce, 407 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. May 17, 2005) (sentence for illegal re-entry after deportation vacated for a limited remand so district court may determine whether it would have sentenced defendant differently had it known that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory).

[501] A crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (2001) need only be a felony, not an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), to trigger a 16-level illegal re-entry sentence enhancement. United States v. Pimental-Flores, 339 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2003).

[502] U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).

[503] U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B).

[504] U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).

[505] U.S.S.G. § § 2L1.2(b)(1)(D), (E), respectively.

[506] United States v. Mendoza-Sanchez, 456 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. Jul. 14, 2006) (Arkansas conviction of burglary, in violation of Ark.Code Ann. 5-39-201(a), constituted enumerated offense of “burglary of a dwelling,” justifying application of sentencing guideline’s 16-level crime of violence enhancement; although the record of conviction did not show burglary of a dwelling, defendant admitted to district court in illegal re-entry prosecution that offense was, in fact, burglary of a dwelling); United States v. Izaguirre-Flores, 405 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2005) (determination of whether taking indecent liberties with a child constituted “sexual abuse of a minor” for purposes of determining whether the offense was a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, is to be made by use of a “ordinary contemporary, and common meaning” approach rather than by use of the “categorical analysis” used to determine whether an offense is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16); United States v. Martinez-Candejas, 347 F.3d 853 (10th Cir. Oct. 21, 2003) (disagreeing with United States v. Krawczak, 331 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003), the court held that the facts underlying a prior conviction may be examined to determine whether the smuggling offense was committed for profit, and categorical approach is inapplicable); United States v. Rodriguez-Duberney, 326 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. Mar. 25, 2003) (since court’s consideration of whether a prior conviction constitutes a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) does not require a determination whether the offense “by its nature” fits a certain definition, as opposed to the question whether a conviction constitutes a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, the court will not employ a categorical analysis that ignores the facts of the case; a conviction of interstate transportation in aid of racketeering with the intent to promote cocaine and marijuana trafficking, as disclosed by the language of the charge, was therefore held to be a drug trafficking conviction for this purpose).

[507] Application Note 2.  See also United States v. Camacho-Ibarquen, 404 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2005) (sentence enhancement proper for illegal re-entry following conviction of crime of violence, even where crime of violence occurred more than 10 years prior to illegal re-entry), vacated and superseded on denial of rehearing, 410 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. June 2, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 457 (Oct. 11, 2005).

[508] See, e.g., United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2006) (“where an alien is misled to believe that he has no opportunity for judicial review, the lack of an affirmative notice of the right to an appeal may combine to constitute a denial of the meaningful opportunity for judicial review, satisfying both § 1326(d)(2) and Mendoza-Lopez); United States v. Camacho-Lopez, 450 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. May 30, 2006); United States v. Lopez, 445 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2006) (for purposes of bringing a collateral attack of the underlying deportation order in prosecution for illegal re-entry, the IJ and BIA affirmatively misleading the noncitizen regarding eligibility for relief resulted in an improper denial of the opportunity for judicial review, as required to bring a collateral attack under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)); United States v. Rivera-Nevarez, 418 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. Aug. 5, 2005) (although deportation was found retroactively improper in light of Leocal, noncitizen failed to meet requirements necessary to be allowed collaterally to attack deportation order, since noncitizen was not able to show he had been deprived of the opportunity for judicial review); United States v. Delacruz-Soto, 414 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. July 12, 2005) (defendant cannot collaterally attack aggravated felony prior conviction during illegal re-entry prosecution); Romero v. INS, 399 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 2005) (petition for review denied over claim that due process rights were violated when counsel failed to inform the immigration court that the noncitizen was married to a United States citizen and eligible to adjust status); United States v. Ortiz-Lopez, 385 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2004) (California conviction for possession of a controlled substance was not an aggravated felony, therefore IJ erred in failing to inform respondent that he was eligible for voluntary departure; district court therefore erred in dismissing collateral attack of illegal re-entry conviction); United States v. Leon-Paz, 340 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2003) (conviction and sentence for re-entry after having been deported under INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), reversed since the defendant was denied due process at his deportation hearing, because he was eligible for relief but the Immigration Judge misadvised him to the contrary).

[509] United States v. Cisneros-Cabrera, 110 F.3d 746 (10th Cir. Apr. 9, 1997).

ILLEGAL RE-ENTRY - DOUBLE JEOPARDY
United States v. Castillo-Basa, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 570326 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2007) (doctrine of collateral estoppel, applied in the criminal double jeopardy context, prevents government from charging illegal entrant with perjury where during the initial illegal re-entry prosecution, the government could not find the taped record of the deportation hearing, but later finds the tape after acquittal; "The Double Jeopardy Clause does not only bar a second prosecution on the same charge of which a defendant has been previously acquitted (or convicted). It also prevents the government from seeking to prosecute a defendant on an issue that has been determined in the defendant's favor in a prior prosecution, regardless of the particular offense involved in the earlier trial.").

Third Circuit

ILLEGAL RE-ENTRY - COLLATERAL ATTACK OF REMOVAL ORDER
Debeato v. Atty Gen. U.S., 505 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. Oct. 9, 2007) (defendant must demonstrate underlying removal proceeding was "grossly unjust" in order collaterally to attack underlying order of removal during illegal re-entry prosecution; the fact that INA 212(c) relief was improperly denied on the basis that noncitizen did not have seven years residence, and improperly applying AEDPA aggravated felony bar to case pending on or before April 24, 1996, was not "grossly unjust" because denial of relief was proper under the law as it existed at that time).

ILLEGAL REENTRY - SENTENCE
United States v. Hernandez-Gonzalez, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2051096 (3d Cir. July 19, 2007) (date that illegal re-entry offense commences, for purposes of calculating the criminal history score, is the date defendant entered the U.S., not the date that he was found by immigration authorities).

Fourth Circuit

ILLEGAL REENTRY - SUPPRESSION OF IDENTITY INFORMATION FLOWING FROM ILLEGAL ARREST
United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 2007) ("After arresting Raul Mesa Oscar-Torres without a warrant as part of a nationwide initiative to apprehend illegal alien gang members, law enforcement officers fingerprinted him and thus obtained his criminal and immigration records. The Government then charged him with one count of illegally reentering the United States following commission of a felony and deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C.A. 1326(a) and (b)(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007). Prior to trial, Oscar-Torres moved to suppress the fingerprint evidence and the records obtained through it as the "fruit" of his illegal arrest. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that this evidence constituted "identity" evidence and therefore could never be suppressed. Oscar-Torres conditionally pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal denial of his suppression motion. We reverse and remand for further proceedings."). NOTE: This case is concerned a Fourth Amendment violation applicable to criminal proceedings, not the much more difficult Fifth Amendment protection.

Fifth Circuit

ILLEGAL REENTRY - SENTENCE - CONSIDERATION OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION TO IMPOSE REASONABLE SENTENCE DESPITE THE FACT IT DID NOT QUALIFY UNDER GUIDELINES
United States v. Lopez-Salas, 513 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 2008) (district court may properly consider in sentence a North Carolina conviction of conspiring "to commit the felony of trafficking by transporting 100 pounds or more but less than 2000 pounds of marijuana", even though it did not qualify as a "drug trafficking offense" for Guidelines purposes); following United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 709 (5th Cir. February 17, 2006)("[a] defendant's criminal history is one of the factors that a court may consider in imposing a non-Guideline[s] sentence."); United States v. Tzep-Mejia, 461 F.3d 522, 526-28 (5th Cir.2006) (upholding an upward variance in a non-Guidelines sentence for a past conviction without regard to whether the prior offense "technically" qualified as a crime of violence under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)).

ILLEGAL RE-ENTRY - EX POST FACTO APPLICATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES
United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez,488 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. May 23, 2007) (defendants' sentences following conviction for illegally re-entering the United States in 2002 are vacated where application of the 2003 Sentencing Guidelines, as opposed to the 2002, constituted an ex post facto violation).

ILLEGAL RE-ENTRY - EX POST FACTO APPLICATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES
United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. May 23, 2007) (defendants' sentences following conviction for illegally re-entering the United States in 2002 are vacated where application of the 2003 Sentencing Guidelines, as opposed to the 2002, constituted an ex post facto violation).

ILLEGAL RE-ENTRY - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
United States v. Gunera, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 456732 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 2007) (where the defendant was "found" in the United States more than five years following the defendants unlawful re-entry, indictment was barred by statute of limitations).

Lower Courts of Fifth Circuit

ILLEGAL RE-ENTRY - SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
United States v. Hernandez-Lopez, __ F.Supp.2d __, 2007 WL 2428219 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2007) (defendant cannot be convicted of illegal re-entry following deportation solely upon his own uncorroborated confession).

Seventh Circuit

ILLEGAL REENTRY - COLLATERAL ATTACK
United States v. De Horta Garcia, 519 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. Mar. 13, 2008) (conviction for illegal re-entry affirmed over defendant's challenge to the denial of his right to seek a discretionary waiver of deportation during his original deportation hearing where he defendant is barred from collateral attack on deportation order since alleged violation did not render the deportation order fundamentally unfair).

ILLEGAL REENTRY - DEFENSES - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - STATUTE COMMENCED WHEN IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES ACTUALLY DISCOVERED DEFENDANT, NOT WHEN THEY SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERED HIM
United States v. Are, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2265118 (7th Cir. Aug. 9, 2007) (five year statute of limitations on prosecution for being found in the United States following removal starts to run on the date the immigration authorities actually discover noncitizens presence, identity, and status or when they arrested him, interrupting his illegal conduct).

Ninth Circuit

REMOVAL " REINSTATEMENT OF REMOVAL " REENTRY WAS ILLEGAL EVEN THOUGH PROCEDURALLY REGULAR
Tamayo-Tamayo v. Holder, 709 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2013) (denying petition for review of reinstatement of 1989 removal order, after illegal reentry, where 1993 removal order did not invalidate original removal order, and procedurally regular, yet substantively illegal, reentry met the requirement in INA 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), that he had "reentered the United States illegally," where petitioner tricked the border official into allowing him physically to enter by presenting an invalid alien registration card).

ILLEGAL REENTRY - INDICTMENT ERROR BY FAILING TO ALLEGE THAT REMOVAL OCCURRED AFTER QUALIFYING CONVICTION - HARMLESS ERROR
United States v. Calderon-Segura, 512 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. Jan. 9 2008) ("Under Salazar-Lopez, in order for a defendant to be eligible for an enhanced statutory maximum under [8 U.S.C.] 1326(b), the indictment must allege, in addition to the facts of prior removal and subsequent reentry, either the date of the prior removal or that it occurred after a qualifying prior conviction. Id. at 752. Yet the one count indictment against Calderon-Segura included no such allegation. But the error was harmless on these facts, since defendant made no factual attack on the factual applicability of the sentence enhancement and the record is not too indeterminate to decide what the grand jury would have decided if the record had been placed before it."), following United States v. Salazar-Lopez, 506 F.3d 748, 752 (9th Cir. 2007).

ILLEGAL RE-ENTRY - PROOF OF PRIOR CONVICTION AND REMOVAL
United States v. Salazar-Lopez, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 3085906 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2007 ) (under Apprendi, dates of prior criminal convictions and removal from the United States must be alleged in the indictment and proven to a jury in order to subject defendant to enhanced sentence under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)).

ILLEGAL REENTRY - ELEMENTS - PRIOR DEPORTATION
United States v. Diaz-Luevano, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2044256 (9th Cir. Jul. 18, 2007) (prior physical removal remains one of the bases for sentence enhancement under 8 U.S.C. 1326 and United States Sentencing Guideline 2L1.2; Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), does not overrule United States v. Luna-Madellaga, 315 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2003)).

ILLEGAL REENTRY - SENTENCE - EQUAL PROTECTION - 16-LEVEL ENHANCEMENT FOR ILLEGAL REENTRY DID NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION ALTHOUGH SAME PRIORS WOULD HAVE CAUSED SMALLER ENHANCEMENT IF DEFENDANT HAD BEEN CONVICTED OF DIFFERENT OFFENSE
United States v. Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. July 6, 2007) (enhanced sentence for illegal reentry after deportation affirmed over an equal protection challenge, since Sentencing Commission did not act arbitrarily in treating one convicted of this offense more severely than a felon who is convicted of a different crime and has the same priors for enhancement purposes).

ILLEGAL REENTRY - SENTENCE - AGGRAVATED FELONY CONVICTIONS TRIGGER SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT REGARDLESS OF DATE OF CONVICTION
United States v. Olmos-Esparza, 484 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. April 24, 2007) (district court did not err by considering convictions from 1972 and 1976 in calculating illegal reentry sentencing enhancements under USSG 2L1.2), (USSG 2L1.2 contains no time limitation on the age of convictions for purposes of calculating sentencing enhancements); accord, United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1181-82 (10th Cir.2006), petition for cert. filed November 22, 2006 (No. 06-7990); United States v. Camacho-Ibarquen, 410 F.3d 1307, 1312-13 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 457 (2005).

ILLEGAL RE-ENTRY SENTENCING - CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS
United States v. Almazan-Becerra, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2007 WL 926486 (9th Cir. March 29, 2007) (applying categorical analysis to illegal re-entry sentencing context to determine whether conviction triggers sentence enhancement).

Lower Courts of Ninth Circuit

ILLEGAL REENTRY - ELEMENTS - DEPORTATION - COLLATERAL ATTACK - IJ FAILURE TO ADVISE OF RELIEF
United States v. Lopez-Menera, ___ F.Supp. __ (N.D.Cal. Feb. 13, 2008) ("Because the IJ's failure to inform defendant of his eligibility for voluntary departure violated his due process rights, and because this violation caused defendant prejudice, the underlying order of deportation cannot be used as an element of a conviction under 1326.").

OVERVIEW - ILLEGAL RE-ENTRY
United States v. Garcia-Espana, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15696 (E.D. Wash. March 6, 2007) (defendant may not be convicted of illegal reentry after deportation, where INS erred in concluding that he was deportable because of his vehicular homicide conviction, which in turn, invalidated his deportation order, which violated his due process rights and therefore cannot serve as a predicate element of his 1326 conviction).

OVERVIEW - ILLEGAL RE-ENTRY - COLLATERAL ATTACK
United States v. Lopez-Hernandez, __ F.Supp.2d __ (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2007) ("[T]o collaterally attack his 1997 deportation proceeding, Lopez-Hernandez must demonstrate: (1) that he exhausted all administrative remedies available to him to appeal his removal order, (2) that the underlying removal proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived him of the opportunity for judicial review, and (3) that the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.")

OVERVIEW - ILLEGAL RE-ENTRY - COLLATERAL ATTACK
United States v. Lopez-Hernandez, __ F.Supp.2d __ (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2007) (motion to allow collateral attack of immigration proceedings in prosecution for illegal re-entry granted where defendant demonstrated that immigration proceeding was improper where IJ failed to inform defendant [post-IIRAIRA, pre-St. Cyr] that he could apply for relief under former INA 212(c)).

Tenth Circuit

ILLEGAL REENTRY - SENTENCING - DISMISSED PRIORS
United States v. Chavez-Calderon, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2171363(10th Cir. Jul. 30, 2007) (district court was within its discretion in considering dismissed domestic violence charge and unprosecuted violations of stay-away orders in sentencing for illegal re-entry).

Other

CRIMINAL DEFENSE - IMMIGRATION OFFENSES
R. McWhirter, Defending the Crime of Illegal Entry and Reentry, in L. FRIEDMAN RAMIREZ, ED., CULTURAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE 555 (2d ed. 2007).

IMMIGRATION OFFENSES - NEW AFM CHAPTER
AFM revision: Section 212 (a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Illegal Entrants and Immigration Violators Section 212 (a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Illegal Entrants and Immigration Violators, Revisions to Adjudicator's Field Manual (AFM) to Include a New Chapter 40.6 (AFM Update AD07- 18); USCIS, Mar. 3, 2009: "This memorandum provides guidance, through the creation of a new chapter 40.6 of the Adjudicator's Field Manual (AFM), regarding the interpretation of the grounds of inadmissibility contained in section 212(a) (6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), addressing illegal entrants and immigration violators." http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/section212_a_6_immi_natl_act_illegal_violators.pdf