The primary task of the Immigration Judge is to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and determine whether a noncitizen respondent is subject to a ground of removal.  The respondent may choose either to concede a charge that s/he is removable or contest it.  If the change is contested, the party with the burden of proof must show that the respondent is or is not removable.  In the context of respondents subject to removal on the basis of a criminal conviction, the immigration judge will need to apply the categorical, divisible statute, and minimum conduct analysis to determine if the criminal conviction triggers a crime-based ground of removal.[298]   

[298] See Chapter 16, infra.

 

BIA

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS " DEPORTABILITY V. INADMISSIBILITY
Matter of DK, 25 I&N Dec. 761 (BIA 2012) (noncitizen who has been admitted to the United States cannot be charged under INA 212, 8 U.S.C. 1182, but must be charged under INA 237, 8 U.S.C. 1227).

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS - ADMISSIONS BY COUNSEL
Matter of Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377 (BIA 1986) (absent egregious circumstances, a distinct and formal admission made by an attorney acting in his professional capacity binds the respondent as a judicial admission; the admission is binding on the respondent and may be relied upon as evidence of deportability).

First Circuit

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS"CONVICTION"IMMIGRATION COURT MAY NOT ENTERTAIN PADILLA CLAIM
Matos-Santana v. Holder, 660 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. Nov. 2, 2011) (affirming BIA denial of motion to reopen removal proceeding as untimely; respondent must first attack the legal validity of a predicate conviction in the court in which the conviction occurred, and may not raise a claim that a conviction is legally invalid before the immigration courts without first doing so).

Second Circuit

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS - CONCESSION OF REMOVABILITY -CONCESSION BY ATTORNEY IS BINDING SO LONG AS NOT CONTRADICTED BY RECORD
Hoodho v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___ (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 2009) (IJ is authorized to accept a concession of removability where it is not plainly contradicted by the record evidence, and its acceptance constitute "egregious circumstances" that would free a represented party from the attorney's concessions).

Third Circuit

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS " STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS " FIVE-YEAR FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT APPLY TO REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Restrepo v. Attorney General, 617 F.3d 787, 2010 WL 3211138 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) (federal criminal five-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2462, providing that proceedings for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture must be commenced no later than five years from the date when the claim accrued, except as provided by law, does not apply to the initiation of removal proceedings 10 years after the conviction occurred, rejecting respondents argument that deportation is a forfeiture and/or a penalty). NOTE: The Supreme Courts decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 2010 WL 1222274 (March 31, 2010), however, lends strength to the argument that deportation constitutes a penalty. The court stated: as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part-indeed, sometimes the most important part-of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes. (Id. at 1480 [footnote omitted].) It also stated: We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe penalty, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893); but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984), deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century, see Part I, supra, at 1478-1481. And, importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it most difficult to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (C.A.D.C.1982). Moreover, we are quite confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of deportation for a particular offense find it even more difficult. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S., at 322, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the *1482 immigration consequences of their convictions). (Id. at 1481-1482.)

Sixth Circuit

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS " CONCESSION OF REMOVABILITY " CHALLENGE
Hanna v. Holder, 740 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2014) (noncitizen was qualified to challenge concession of removability by counsel where a change in the law occurred, concerning how that evaluation of deportability is made, that would render removal as charged unjust). The court explained the conditions under which a noncitizen could challenge counsels concession of removability as follows: In a removal proceeding, petitioners are bound by the concessions of their attorneys to the IJ unless they can show ineffective assistance of counsel or some other egregious circumstances. Gill v. Gonzales, 127 Fed.Appx. 860, 862"63 (6th Cir.2005); see also Magallanes"Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931, 934 (9th Cir.1986) (Petitioners are generally bound by the conduct of their attorneys, including admissions made by them, absent egregious circumstances.); In re Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 382 (BIA 1986) (Absent egregious circumstances, a distinct and formal admission made before, during, or even after a proceeding by an attorney acting in his professional capacity binds his client as a judicial admission.). This court has yet to clarify those egregious circumstances sufficient to relieve an alien of his counsel's prejudicial admissions. The BIA, however, clarified the meaning of egregious circumstances in Velasquez. See 19 I. & N. Dec. at 383. Building on Velasquez, other federal courts of appeals have developed a framework to determine egregious circumstances. See, e.g., Santiago"Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 831"36 (9th Cir.2011); Hoodho v. Holder, 558 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir.2009). As a threshold matter, to establish egregious circumstances, an alien must argue that the factual admissions or concessions of [removability] were untrue or incorrect. Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 383; see, e.g., Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir.2006) (reversing BIA's denial of a motion to reopen, where alien's prior attorney had admitted NTA's factual allegations that alien strongly denied); cf. Roman v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir.2009) (rejecting that the government must submit evidence of an alien's prior conviction because the alien does *388 not allege that the admissions were inaccurate); Torres"Chavez v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir.2009) (refusing to permit alien to withdraw attorney's tactical decision to admit alienage because attorney simply conceded that [client] was an alien, a fact that [client] has never suggested is untrue). Further, an alien's argument that his attorney's concessions were incorrect must be supported by record evidence. See, e.g., Hulse v. Holder, 480 Fed.Appx. 23, 26 (2d Cir.2012) (denying petition for review of BIA decision denying withholding of removal because admission of procuring benefit by entering into fraudulent marriage was not contradicted by the record evidence); Hoodho, 558 F.3d at 192 (denying petition for review of BIA decision because [w]here, as here, an IJ accepts a concession of removability from retained counsel and that concession is not contradicted by the record evidence, the circumstances are not egregious' in any respect). Where an alien has argued that his or her counsel's admission is incorrect and that argument is supported by the record, two types of egregious circumstances justify relieving the alien of his or her counsel's prejudicial admissions. The first circumstance concerns admissions that were the result of unreasonable professional judgment. Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 383; see also Santiago"Rodriguez, 657 F.3d at 834"36 (holding that BIA erred in not permitting alien to withdraw attorney's admission where such admission was made without any factual basis and constituted deficient performance); In re Morales"Bribiesca, No. A047 770 293, 2010 WL 4500889, at *2 (BIA Oct. 18, 2010) ([T]he respondent's prior attorney admitted that she conceded the respondent's removability [for alien smuggling] without first speaking to the respondent or discussing the factual allegations with the respondent ... [and] given the egregiousness of the representation, we do not deem the attorney's admission binding on the respondent. (citing Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 382)); In re Shafiee, No. A24 107 368, 2007 WL 1168488, at *1 (BIA Mar. 2, 2007) (granting motion to reopen and holding that attorney's concession of removability based on alien's insistence on expediting a case is no excuse for failing to research and advise a client that there is no sound basis for the charges). The second circumstance in which an alien should be relieved of an admission of counsel is if binding the alien to that admission would produce[ ] an unjust result. Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 383. An inadvertent admission would fall into this category. See, e.g., Ali v. Reno, 829 F.Supp. 1415, 1425 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (holding, in habeas corpus proceeding reviewing the rescission of permanent resident status, that alien could not withdraw the prior concessions of counsel because there has been no showing that counsel's concessions regarding rescission and excludability were inadvertent, unfair or extraordinary), aff'd, 22 F.3d 442 (2d Cir.1994); cf. Cortez"Pineda v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1118, 1122 n. 2 (9th Cir.2010) (refusing to bind the government to a mistaken factual assertion regarding the alien's entry date). So too would a circumstance where the propriety of an admission or concession has been undercut by an intervening change in law. In re Chavez"Mendoza, No. A90 542 948, 2005 WL 649052, at, * 1 n. 3 (BIA Feb. 2, 2005); see, e.g., Santiago"Rodriguez, 657 F.3d at 833 (Binding [petitioner] to the admission that he smuggled his brother ... even after [an intervening change in the law] would produce[ ] an unjust result, if [petitioner] can make a prima facie showing that his actions would not constitute smuggling under the clarified, correct interpretation of the smuggling*389 statute. (quoting Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 383)); Huerta"Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir.2003) (permitting alien to challenge removability despite concession because intervening change in law meant alien was not removable). (Id. at 387-389.)

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS " CONCESSION OF REMOVABILITY " CHALLENGE
Hanna v. Holder, 740 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2014) (noncitizen was qualified to challenge concession of removability by counsel where a change in the law occurred, concerning how that evaluation of deportability is made, that would render removal as charged unjust). The court explained the conditions under which a noncitizen could challenge counsels concession of removability as follows: In a removal proceeding, petitioners are bound by the concessions of their attorneys to the IJ unless they can show ineffective assistance of counsel or some other egregious circumstances. Gill v. Gonzales, 127 Fed.Appx. 860, 862"63 (6th Cir.2005); see also Magallanes"Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931, 934 (9th Cir.1986) (Petitioners are generally bound by the conduct of their attorneys, including admissions made by them, absent egregious circumstances.); In re Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 382 (BIA 1986) (Absent egregious circumstances, a distinct and formal admission made before, during, or even after a proceeding by an attorney acting in his professional capacity binds his client as a judicial admission.). This court has yet to clarify those egregious circumstances sufficient to relieve an alien of his counsel's prejudicial admissions. The BIA, however, clarified the meaning of egregious circumstances in Velasquez. See 19 I. & N. Dec. at 383. Building on Velasquez, other federal courts of appeals have developed a framework to determine egregious circumstances. See, e.g., Santiago"Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 831"36 (9th Cir.2011); Hoodho v. Holder, 558 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir.2009). As a threshold matter, to establish egregious circumstances, an alien must argue that the factual admissions or concessions of [removability] were untrue or incorrect. Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 383; see, e.g., Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir.2006) (reversing BIA's denial of a motion to reopen, where alien's prior attorney had admitted NTA's factual allegations that alien strongly denied); cf. Roman v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir.2009) (rejecting that the government must submit evidence of an alien's prior conviction because the alien does *388 not allege that the admissions were inaccurate); Torres"Chavez v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir.2009) (refusing to permit alien to withdraw attorney's tactical decision to admit alienage because attorney simply conceded that [client] was an alien, a fact that [client] has never suggested is untrue). Further, an alien's argument that his attorney's concessions were incorrect must be supported by record evidence. See, e.g., Hulse v. Holder, 480 Fed.Appx. 23, 26 (2d Cir.2012) (denying petition for review of BIA decision denying withholding of removal because admission of procuring benefit by entering into fraudulent marriage was not contradicted by the record evidence); Hoodho, 558 F.3d at 192 (denying petition for review of BIA decision because [w]here, as here, an IJ accepts a concession of removability from retained counsel and that concession is not contradicted by the record evidence, the circumstances are not egregious' in any respect). Where an alien has argued that his or her counsel's admission is incorrect and that argument is supported by the record, two types of egregious circumstances justify relieving the alien of his or her counsel's prejudicial admissions. The first circumstance concerns admissions that were the result of unreasonable professional judgment. Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 383; see also Santiago"Rodriguez, 657 F.3d at 834"36 (holding that BIA erred in not permitting alien to withdraw attorney's admission where such admission was made without any factual basis and constituted deficient performance); In re Morales"Bribiesca, No. A047 770 293, 2010 WL 4500889, at *2 (BIA Oct. 18, 2010) ([T]he respondent's prior attorney admitted that she conceded the respondent's removability [for alien smuggling] without first speaking to the respondent or discussing the factual allegations with the respondent ... [and] given the egregiousness of the representation, we do not deem the attorney's admission binding on the respondent. (citing Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 382)); In re Shafiee, No. A24 107 368, 2007 WL 1168488, at *1 (BIA Mar. 2, 2007) (granting motion to reopen and holding that attorney's concession of removability based on alien's insistence on expediting a case is no excuse for failing to research and advise a client that there is no sound basis for the charges). The second circumstance in which an alien should be relieved of an admission of counsel is if binding the alien to that admission would produce[ ] an unjust result. Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 383. An inadvertent admission would fall into this category. See, e.g., Ali v. Reno, 829 F.Supp. 1415, 1425 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (holding, in habeas corpus proceeding reviewing the rescission of permanent resident status, that alien could not withdraw the prior concessions of counsel because there has been no showing that counsel's concessions regarding rescission and excludability were inadvertent, unfair or extraordinary), aff'd, 22 F.3d 442 (2d Cir.1994); cf. Cortez"Pineda v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1118, 1122 n. 2 (9th Cir.2010) (refusing to bind the government to a mistaken factual assertion regarding the alien's entry date). So too would a circumstance where the propriety of an admission or concession has been undercut by an intervening change in law. In re Chavez"Mendoza, No. A90 542 948, 2005 WL 649052, at, * 1 n. 3 (BIA Feb. 2, 2005); see, e.g., Santiago"Rodriguez, 657 F.3d at 833 (Binding [petitioner] to the admission that he smuggled his brother ... even after [an intervening change in the law] would produce[ ] an unjust result, if [petitioner] can make a prima facie showing that his actions would not constitute smuggling under the clarified, correct interpretation of the smuggling*389 statute. (quoting Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 383)); Huerta"Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir.2003) (permitting alien to challenge removability despite concession because intervening change in law meant alien was not removable). (Id. at 387-389.)

Eighth Circuit

JUDICIAL REVIEW " PETITION FOR REVIEW " CONCESSION OF DEPORTABILITY
Escoto-Castillo v. Napolitano, 658 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. Oct. 13, 2011)(concession in expedited removal proceeding of deportability without relief precluded later petition for review of removal order, on grounds petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies); citing 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1); Gonzalez v. Chertoff, 454 F.3d 813, 816 (8th Cir.2006) (failure to timely respond to expedited removal Notice precludes merits review of the unexhausted issue); Wijono v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir.2006) (failure to raise due process issue to agency precludes merits review of the unexhausted issue); Fonseca"Sanchez v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 439, 443"44 (7th Cir. 2007).

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS " CONCESSION OF ISSUE " BINDING NATURE OF CONCESSION
National Sur. Corp. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 2001) (judicial efficiency demands that a party not be allowed to deny what it has formally told the court); United States v. Sanchez-Garcia, 642 F.3d 658, 2011 WL 2462958 (8th Cir. June 22, 2011) (same).

Ninth Circuit

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS " CONCESSION OF REMOVABILITY " INACCURATE CONCESSION
Perez-Mejia v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL 5865888 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2011), amending 641 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2011) (Perez"Mejia is correct that we may set aside a determination by the IJ that rests on an alien's erroneous concession, at least in some circumstances.); citing Mandujano"Real v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 585, 588 (9th Cir. 2008) (The Government does not argue, nor could it, that the IJ's reliance on [the alien's] concession would suffice as a basis for removal if the BIA or the court were to determine that his conviction does not, as a matter of law, constitute an aggravated felony.); Garcia"Lopez v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 840, 844 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an alien was not bound by his characterization, in an application for suspension of deportation, of his prior conviction as a felony, because the characterization was patently inaccurate, and, more importantly, because an alien's belief about the nature of his offense is irrelevant to the purely legal question of how the offense was categorized or what the maximum penalty was); Huerta"Guevara, 321 F.3d at 886 ([W]e may consider an issue regardless of waiver if the issue is purely one of law and the opposing party will suffer no prejudice.).

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS " CONCESSION OF REMOVABILITY " INACCURATE CONCESSION
Perez-Mejia v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL 5865888 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2011), amending 641 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2011) (Perez"Mejia is correct that we may set aside a determination by the IJ that rests on an alien's erroneous concession, at least in some circumstances.); citing Mandujano"Real v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 585, 588 (9th Cir. 2008) (The Government does not argue, nor could it, that the IJ's reliance on [the alien's] concession would suffice as a basis for removal if the BIA or the court were to determine that his conviction does not, as a matter of law, constitute an aggravated felony.); Garcia"Lopez v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 840, 844 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an alien was not bound by his characterization, in an application for suspension of deportation, of his prior conviction as a felony, because the characterization was patently inaccurate, and, more importantly, because an alien's belief about the nature of his offense is irrelevant to the purely legal question of how the offense was categorized or what the maximum penalty was); Huerta"Guevara, 321 F.3d at 886 ([W]e may consider an issue regardless of waiver if the issue is purely one of law and the opposing party will suffer no prejudice.).

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS " CHARGES AND ALLEGATIONS " WITHDRAWAL FROM EARLIER CONCESSIONS
Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2011) (an alien in removal proceedings can withdraw his former attorney's admission of the Government's factual allegations when the propriety of the admission has been severely undercut by subsequent legal developments that may, in fact, mean that the admission was false).

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS " PLEADING STAGE " CONCESSION OF REMOVABILITY BINDING ON RESPONDENT
Perez-Mejia v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 WL 1496990 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2011) (admissions by an alien to facts alleged in an NTA, and concessions concerning matters of law, made in the 8 C.F.R. 1240.10(c) pleading stage of removal proceedings are binding on respondent); citing Barragan"Lopez v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir.2007) (a noncitizens admissions in the pleading stage to each factual allegation of the NTA against him constitute[d] clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that satisfied the government's burden of proof); Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir.2008) (where the alien concedes removability, the government's burden in this regard is satisfied.), quoting Estrada v. INS, 775 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir.1985).

NINTH CIRCUIT DISCUSSES IJS DESIGNATION OF COUNTRY OF REMOVAL
Hadera v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. July 18, 2007) (IJ failed to properly apply the four-step inquiry established in Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335 (2005), to determine the proper country of removal), citing INA 241(b)).

The rules on the question of the destination country of deportation state:

(1) A noncitizen shall be removed to the country of his or her choice, unless one of the conditions eliminating that command is satisfied;

(2) otherwise s/he shall be removed to the country of which s/he is a citizen, unless one of the conditions eliminating that command is satisfied;

(3) otherwise s/he shall be removed to one of the countries with which s/he has a lesser connection; or

(4) if that is impracticable, inadvisable or impossible, s/he shall be removed to another country whose government will accept him or her.

In Hadera, the Ninth Circuit found that because the petitioner failed to designate a country of removal under Step 1, and because the IJ determined the petitioner was stateless under Step 2, the IJ should have proceeded to Step 3 and considered with which country the petitioner had a "lesser connection," but the IJ - without consideration of this factor - erroneously designated Ethiopia as the country of removal, despite finding that the petitioner was not likely a citizen of Ethiopia. In addition, the court rejected the governments argument that whenever a petitioners country of citizenship is in question, the IJ must stop at Step 2 and presume petitioners citizenship. Rather, the court held that it is within the IJs powers to determine that Ethiopia was unlikely to accept the petitioner as a citizen.

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS - WITHDRAWAL OF ADMISSIONS OF FACT AND CONCESSIONS OF DEPORTABILITY
How does counsel withdraw a prior admission to facts contained in the NTA or a prior concession of removability under one of the charged grounds? See Huerta-Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 826 (9th Cir.2003) ("we may consider an issue regardless of waiver if the issue is purely one of law and the opposing party will suffer no prejudice or if new issues have become relevant while the appeal was pending because of a change in the law.") In that case, Huerta-Guevara conceded deportability, then filed an appeal to the BIA contesting deportability on the basis that her crime was not an aggravated felony. The Ninth Circuit found that her concession was not dispositive. This holding has been applied in three unpublished BIA cases. (2007 WL 275744, 2007 WL 1059685, and 2006 WL 2008223.) Counsel can argue if there is no waiver for appeal purposes, then there should be no waiver in pending removal proceedings, provided that the opposing party will suffer no prejudice. Counsel should file a motion to change the pleadings as soon as possible so that the IJ cannot say counsel waited too long to do so. Thanks to Michael K. Mehr.

Eleventh Circuit

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS " ADMITTING AND CONCEDING
Ali v. U.S. Attorney General, 643 F.3d 1324, 2011 WL 2462560 (11th Cir. Jun. 22, 2011) (noncitizens attorney did not render ineffective assistance of counsel when he conceded that his client had sought to procure an immigration benefit through willful misrepresentation of a material fact on his application for adjustment of statu: An attorney does not render ineffective assistance when he declines to make an argument that the attorney reasonably believed was ... doomed to fail. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, ____, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009). The Supreme Court has never required defense counsel to pursue every claim or defense, regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic chance for success, id., nor is an attorney required to have a tactical reason"above and beyond a reasonable appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success"for recommending that a weak claim be dropped altogether, id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1422.).

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS " DUE PROCESS
Lapaix v. U.S. Atty Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 2010) (petitioners in removal proceedings are entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment due process clause: To prevail on a due process claim, the petitioner must show that she was deprived of liberty without due process of law and that the purported errors caused her substantial prejudice. To show substantial prejudice, an alien must demonstrate that, in the absence of the alleged violations, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.; denial of discretionary relief does not implicate the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause) (citations omitted).

Other

OVERVIEW " IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS " STIPULATED ORDER OF REMOVAL
EOIR OPPM 10-01: Procedures for Handling Requests for a Stipulated Removal Order (Sept. 15, 2010), presents guidelines for the immigration courts on requests for stipulated removal. http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=33119