Post-Conviction Relief for Immigrants



 
 

§ 10.6 III. Procedural Rules Governing the New Prosecution

 
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Vacating the conviction is only half the battle.  It is true that vacating the conviction eliminates it, at least temporarily, for immigration purposes.  It returns the client to the position s/he occupied immediately prior to the conviction, and all original charges, even those that have previously been dismissed as part of a plea‑bargain, are reinstated.  The client thus runs some risk of being convicted of additional charges, over and above the original convictions, and some risk of being sentenced to a greater sentence than the original sentence, and should have been advised of this possibility before vacating the conviction.  See § 2.18, supra.[4]  Counsel should be prepared to argue that the client cannot legally receive a greater sentence as a penalty for the exercise of the rights which required that the conviction be vacated, and that the client must be given credit for all time served, and all other punishment previously served.


[4] See California Criminal Law and Immigration, § 8.15 (2002).

Updates

 

POST CON RELIEF " FEDERAL " SENTENCE " AFTER REVERSAL
Pepper v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1229 (Mar. 2, 2011) (after an initial sentence has been vacated, and the case remanded for resentencing, a district court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitation, and such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward variance from the now-advisory federal Sentencing Guidelines range; abrogating U.S. v. Sims, 174 F.3d 911, U.S. v. Lorenzo, 471 F.3d 1219, U.S. v. Jenners, 473 F.3d 894, and U.S. v. McMannus, 496 F.3d 846, and the law of the case doctrine did not require the resentencing court to apply the same percentage departure from the Guidelines range for substantial assistance that had been applied at defendant's prior sentencing).

First Circuit

POST CON RELIEF - AFTER VACATUR, FEDERAL COURT MUST RESENTENCE DEFENDANT WHOSE ORIGINAL SENTENCE HAD BEEN ENHANCED BY VACATED CONVICTION
United States v. Pettiford, 101 F.3d 199, 200-202 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Bacon, 94 F.3d 158, 161 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Cox, 83 F.3d 336, 339-340 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Nichols, 30 F.3d 35, 36 (5th Cir. 1994) (government conceded Custis allowed defendant to reopen sentencing); United States v. LaValle, 167 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1999); cf. United States v. Fondren, 54 F.3d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1995).

Ninth Circuit

POST CON RELIEF - VACATING GREATER OFFENSE DOES NOT PRECLUDE RETRIAL ON GREATER OFFENSE EVEN THOUGH CONVICTION ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE IS FINAL
United States v. Jose, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. October 19, 2005) (reversal of a conviction on a greater offense, coupled with a final conviction on a lesser included offense, does not preclude retrial of the greater offense when the offenses were charged in the same indictment and tried together in the same original trial).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/9th/0410202p.pdf
POST CON RELIEF - AFTER VACATUR, CRIMINAL COURT CAN RESENTENCE ON REMAINING COUNTS
United States v. Handa, 61 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1997) (after vacating one count of conviction, the trial court has jurisdiction to resentence the defendant on all remaining counts of conviction). Accord, United States v. Harrison, 113 F.3d 135 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1861 (1997) (resentencing does not violate double jeopardy); United States v. Gordils, 117 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997); Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1997) No. 96-6315; United States v. Morris, 116 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Gardiner v. United States, 114 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rodriguez, 112 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Hillary, 106 F.3d 1170 (4th Cir. 1997).
POST CON RELIEF - AFTER VACATUR, DISMISSED COUNTS ARE REINSTATED
Compare United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 1997) (dismissed counts are not reinstated since defendant did not breach plea agreement), with United States v. Buner, 134 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-5066) (dismissed counts are reinstated); United States v. Barron, 127 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 1997), amended to add dissenting opinion, 136 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 1998). See also United States v. Hillary, 106 F.3d 1170, 1172 (4th Cir. 1997) ("on correcting the error complained of in a section 2255 petition, the defendant may be placed in exactly the same position in which he would have been had there been no error in the first instance."), quoting United States v. Silvers, 90 F.3d 95, 99 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Jose, 425 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1664 (Feb. 27, 2006).

 

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