(B)  Crimes of Moral Turpitude.

 

Receiving stolen goods has traditionally been held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, but only where guilty knowledge, or subjective belief that the property has been stolen, is an essential element of the offense.[158]  Possession of stolen property has been held to involve moral turpitude where the statute requires reckless disregard that the property was stolen, instead of actual knowledge.[159]  However, possession of stolen property should not be a CMT where guilty knowledge is not required as an essential element of the offense.  Transporting stolen goods likewise constitutes a crime of moral turpitude only where guilty knowledge is required.[160]

 

Although traditionally held to be a CMT, the offense of receiving or possessing stolen property may no longer qualify.  Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), a conviction of receiving stolen property has been held not to be per se one of dishonesty or involving a false statement, for impeachment purposes, because it can be committed without misrepresentation or deceit.[161]  This leads to an argument this offense does not constitute a CMT, even if done knowingly.

Board of Immigration Appeals:

 

Matter of S, 4 I. & N. Dec. 365 (BIA 1951) (admission of receiving stolen goods in violation of § 259, German Criminal Code, which does not require knowledge or intent, but merely circumstances which should lead defendant to make inquiry, does not involve moral turpitude), citing Matter of K, 2 I. & N. Dec. 90 (BIA 1944).

Matter of K, 2 I. & N. Dec. 90 (BIA 1944) (German conviction of possessing stolen property will not be found to involve moral turpitude where the evidence of record indicates property was acquired without guilty knowledge and without wrongful intent, since offense in Germany differs from the United States in that conviction may result from negligent receipt of property by person acting in good faith).

[158] 9 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 40.21(a) N.2.3-1(b)(11) (“Receiving stolen goods (with guilty knowledge)”); De Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 1143 (3d Cir. June 11, 2002) (subjective belief property was stolen).

[159] See N. Tooby, J. Rollin & J. Foster, Crimes of Moral Turpitude § § 9.59-9.61 (2005).

[160] 9 U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) § 40.21(a) N.2.3-1(b)(14).

[161] United States v. Foster, 227 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2000).

BIA

AGGRAVATED FELONY " THEFT " RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Matter of Sierra, 26 I&N Dec. 288 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction for violation of NRS 193.330, 205.273, possession of a stolen vehicle, is not a categorical aggravated felony theft offense under INA 101(a)(43)(G), for immigration purposes, since the statute only requires reason to believe that the property received was stolen, but the generic definition of receipt of stolen property applicable to the aggravated felony definition requires knowledge).

AGGRAVATED FELONY " RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Matter of Sierra, 26 I & N Dec. 288, 292 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction of attempted possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of Nevada Revised Statute 193.330 and 205.273, was not categorically an aggravated felony as an attempted theft offense, because Nevada law does not require actual knowledge that the property had been stolen, but only reason to believe; aggravated felony theft ground requires intent to deprive, which can be inferred from actual knowledge, but not from reason to believe); citing Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I & N Dec. 436 (BIA 2008). NOTE: For any theft offense in which the mental state can be either knowledge or reason to know or believe, if the record shows that the defendant pled to the latter element, the defendant may be protected against the conviction being considered an aggravated felony. E.g., Massachusetts offense receiving a stolen motor vehicle, under M.G.L. ch. 266 28, only requires a reason to believe mental state.

AGGRAVATED FELONY " RECEIPT OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Matter of Sierra, 26 I & N Dec. 288, 292 (BIA 2014) (Nevada conviction of attempted possession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of Nevada Revised Statute 193.330 and 205.273, was not categorically an aggravated felony as an attempted theft offense, because Nevada law does not require actual knowledge that the property had been stolen, but only reason to believe; aggravated felony theft ground requires intent to deprive, which can be inferred from actual knowledge, but not from reason to believe); citing Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I & N Dec. 436 (BIA 2008). NOTE: For any theft offense in which the mental state can be either knowledge or reason to know or believe, if the record shows that the defendant pled to the latter element, the defendant may be protected against the conviction being considered an aggravated felony. E.g., Massachusetts offense receiving a stolen motor vehicle, under M.G.L. ch. 266 28, only requires a reason to believe mental state.